Do people in authoritarian countries have lower standards when evaluating their governments? An anchoring vignettes approach

Published date01 February 2024
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/02633957221144010
AuthorYingnan Joseph Zhou
Date01 February 2024
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957221144010
Politics
2024, Vol. 44(1) 78 –101
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/02633957221144010
journals.sagepub.com/home/pol
Do people in authoritarian
countries have lower standards
when evaluating their
governments? An anchoring
vignettes approach
Yingnan Joseph Zhou
The University of Texas at El Paso, USA
Abstract
Why do people in authoritarian countries think more positively of their governments than people
in democratic countries? Existing research suggests three explanations: (1) people in authoritarian
countries lie; (2) people in authoritarian countries are indoctrinated; and (3) authoritarian
governments have better performance than their democratic counterparts. In this study, I explore
a fourth explanation – people in authoritarian countries apply lower standards. To test it, I apply
the anchoring vignettes method developed by Gary King and others to original data from China,
Vietnam, Russia, Mexico, and the United States, and from the cities of Beijing and Taipei. Adding
a case study of Taiwan’s economic trajectory as a robustness check, I conclude that people in
authoritarian countries tend to use lower standards when reporting political trust and government
responsiveness, but the lower standards are likely to be caused by fast economic growth rather
than authoritarianism.
Keywords
anchoring vignettes, authoritarian politics, cross-national studies, political trust
Received: 9th March 2022; Revised version received: 24th June 2022; Accepted: 21st July 2022
Introduction
Scholars who have attempted public opinion surveys in authoritarian countries have a
curious observation. In spite of institutions devoid of electoral accountability, authoritar-
ian regimes enjoy rather favourable public opinion (Shlapentokh, 1985). Norris (2011:
87) compares the institutional confidence in 50 countries and finds more confidence in
Corresponding author:
Yingnan Joseph Zhou, The University of Texas at El Paso, Benedict Hall 111, 500 W. University, El Paso, TX
79968, USA.
Email: yzhou5@utep.edu
1144010POL0010.1177/02633957221144010PoliticsZhou
research-article2023
Article
Zhou 79
autocracies than in any type of democracies. Herein lies the puzzle: how come authoritar-
ian governments outperform their democratic counterparts at the latter’s own game?
The literature suggests three explanations. First, respondents in authoritarian countries
lie due to repression (Newton, 2001; Shlapentokh, 1985). Second, people in authoritarian
governments are indoctrinated through media control and cultural influence (Kennedy,
2009; Lu and Shi, 2014). Third, authoritarian governments earn their approval by better
performance in economic development (Dickson, 2016; Wang, 2006), responsiveness
(Chen et al., 2016; Tang, 2016), and institutional adaptation (Dickson, 2004; Nathan,
2003).
These explanations are insightful but are still steps away from a full picture, because
they leave open the possibility that the more favourable opinion in authoritarian is a result
of lower standards of judgement. In democracies, failing to elect one’s candidates may
permeate an opposition mentality in the electorate, predisposing them to tougher evalua-
tion, whereas in authoritarian countries that tolerate no credible opposition or free press,
people have less exposure to governments’ shortcomings and therefore have less to
expect.
In this article, I explore this possibility using anchoring vignettes, a method originally
created to enhance the comparability of cross-cultural surveys (King et al., 2004). My
study paints a nuanced picture. My initial online survey in China, Vietnam, Russia,
Mexico, and the United States did find evidence that people in authoritarian countries
apply lower standards when it comes to political trust and government responsiveness,
especially when we compare full authoritarian countries and full democracies. Yet, it was
inconclusive whether the relationship was causal. Aiming for a stronger causal interpreta-
tion, I conducted a follow-up survey in the cities of Beijing and Taipei. Controlling for
culture, language, and population, I compared political systems with two competing
explanations of standards of judgement: levels of economic development and rates of
economic growth. My final analysis favours rates of economic growth as the
explanation.
My study makes four contributions to the research of public opinion and authoritarian
politics. First, it is the first direct investigation of lower standards as a possible cause of
authoritarian resilience. Second, it shows that more favourable public opinion is not an
inherent feature of authoritarianism but rather a product of fast economic growth. Third,
expanding the economic voting literature, it uncovers a new way in which economic
growth can benefit political leaders, both democratic and authoritarian. Finally, it shows
that neglecting standards may lead to wrong prediction of political behaviour and inac-
curate assessments of government performance.
Lower standards in authoritarian countries
Numerous studies, including my more up-to-date rundown in the Supplemental appendix,
show that authoritarian governments enjoy more favourable public opinion (Klingemann,
1999; Nathan, 2007). Because democracy has been touted as the final answer to respon-
sive government, authoritarian governments’ upper hand cries for an explanation (Dahl,
1989; Sen, 2009). This study approaches the puzzle through people’s standards of judge-
ment. Is it possible that people in authoritarian countries apply lower standards when
evaluating their governments? This explanation departs from the existing explanations
reviewed earlier in that even if people in authoritarian countries are forthright in their
answers, are not brainwashed, and are aware of their governments’ objective

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