Do sanction types affect the duration of economic sanctions? The case of foreign aid

DOI10.1177/0192512117753150
AuthorJin Mun Jeong
Published date01 March 2019
Date01 March 2019
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117753150
International Political Science Review
2019, Vol. 40(2) 231 –245
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512117753150
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Do sanction types affect the
duration of economic sanctions?
The case of foreign aid
Jin Mun Jeong
University of Missouri, USA
Abstract
What effect does the type of economic sanctions have on sanctions duration? Despite extensive research
about their effect on sanctions success, little is known about how sanction types affect the duration of
sanctions episodes. I argue that, among different types of economic sanctions, terminating foreign aid to
target states (foreign aid sanctions) expedites target capitulation, because it imposes disproportionate costs
on elites and crucial regime supporters. However, I also contend that the effect of foreign aid sanctions is
rendered indistinguishable from other types of economic coercion over time, as target governments adjust
to the adverse impacts of sanctions. The empirical tests using the Threat and Imposition of Economic
Sanctions dataset provide supporting evidence for my hypotheses that foreign aid sanctions accelerate target
capitulations, but this effect diminishes over time.
Keywords
Duration of sanctions, foreign aid sanctions, sanction types, domestic redistribution, foreign policy
Introduction
Economic sanctions are used to tackle a wide range of international issues such as militarized con-
flicts, democratization, human rights, or trade disputes. A large body of scholarship has explored
the effectiveness of sanctions as foreign policy instruments and the conditions under which sanc-
tions might succeed. Another strand of research has focused on the duration of economic sanctions
as one of the important factors that affect the usefulness of sanctions. The longer sanctions are in
place, the more economic losses both sending and target states experience. Prolonged sanctions,
even if senders manage to accomplish their goals with them, may not be an optimal foreign policy
tool due to the greater costs they entail. Therefore, examining the conditions that affect sanctions
duration will expand current understanding for the usefulness of economic sanctions as foreign
policy instruments (Krustev and Morgan, 2011).
Corresponding author:
Jin Mun Jeong, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, 315 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211,
USA.
Email: jj3h6@mail.missouri.edu
753150IPS0010.1177/0192512117753150International Political Science ReviewJeong
research-article2018
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