Dodds v Walker
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Diplock,Lord Edmund-Davies,Lord Fraser of Tullybelton,Lord Russell of Killowen,Lord Roskill |
| Judgment Date | 18 June 1981 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1981] UKHL J0618-1 |
| Date | 18 June 1981 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1981] UKHL J0618-1
Lord Diplock
Lord Edmund-Davies
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Lord Russell of Killowen
Lord Roskill
House of Lords
My Lords,
Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 entitles a tenant of business premises, whose tenancy has been terminated by notice given to him by his landlord in accordance with the provisions of that Act, to apply to the court for a new tenancy. By section 29(3) the application must be made "not less than two nor more than four months after the giving of the landlord's notice."
In the instant case the (respondent) landlord's notice was given on September 30th 1978; the (appellant) tenant's application to the court for a new lease was made on January 31st 1979. The only question in this appeal is: "Was that one day too late?"
The registrar and the judge of Grantham County Court both thought that it was too late. They dismissed the tenant's application on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. In the Court of Appeal opinion was divided. Stephenson and Templeman L.JJ. agreed that it was one day too late; Bridge, L.J. thought that it was just in time: and leave was given by that court to appeal to your Lordships' House.
My Lords, reference to a "month" in a statute is to be understood as a calendar month. The Interpretation Act says so. It is also clear under a rule that has been consistently applied by the courts since Lester v. Garland (1808) 15 Ves. Jun. 248, that in calculating the period that has elapsed after the occurrence of the specified event such as the giving of a notice, the day on which the event occurs is excluded from the reckoning. It is equally well-established, and is not disputed by counsel for the tenant, that when the relevant period is a month or specified number of months after the giving of a notice, the general rule is that the period ends upon the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month, i.e. the day of that month that bears the same number as the day of the earlier month on which the notice was given.
The corresponding date rule is simple. It is easy of application. Except in a small minority of cases, of which the instant case is not an example, all that the calculator has to do is to mark in his diary the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month. Because the number of days in five months of the year is less than in the seven others the inevitable consequence of the corresponding date rule is that one month's notice given in a 30-day month is one day shorter than one month's notice given in a 31-day month and is three days shorter if it is given in February. Corresponding variations in the length of notice reckoned in days occur where the required notice is a plurality of months.
This simple general rule which Cockburn C.J. in Freeman v. Read (1863) 4 B. & S. 174, 184 described as being "in accordance with common usage … and with the sense of mankind," works perfectly well without need for any modification so long as there is in the month in which the notice expires a day which bears the same number as the day of the month on which the notice was given. Such was the instant case and such will be every other case except for notices given on the 31st of a 31-day month and expiring in a 30-day month or in February, and notices expiring in February and given on 30th or 29th (except in leap year) of any other month of the year. In these exceptional cases, the modification of the corresponding date...
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