Does Issue Alignment Matter? The Electoral Cost and Reward of Agricultural Representation in Urban and Rural Areas
| Author | Zsófia Papp |
| Published date | 01 August 2021 |
| Date | 01 August 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1478929920979192 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue: The Electoral Connection Revisited: Personal Vote-Seeking Efforts in the Era of Political Personalization |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929920979192
Political Studies Review
2021, Vol. 19(3) 376 –392
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1478929920979192
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Does Issue Alignment Matter?
The Electoral Cost and Reward
of Agricultural Representation
in Urban and Rural Areas
Zsófia Papp
Abstract
There is plenty of evidence that legislators think that aligning with voter preferences benefits
their re-election. But whether or not legislators are constrained by demand, we have limited
knowledge. This article tests whether issue representation in a generally salient field affects
legislators’ electoral performance. The analysis uses data from five consecutive Hungarian
elections (1994–2010), and investigates the effect of agricultural interpellations on the
legislators’ vote shares under varying district demand. The findings indicate that congruence
between district demand and legislator action matters when the issue is of great salience, and
during times of anti-party sentiments within the electorate. While more interpellations are
rewarded in rural districts, MPs can lose a lot of votes by asking agricultural interpellations in
an urban area. At the same time, not submitting interpellations in rural constituencies does not
result in similar vote loss. The results suggest that for re-election seekers taking action is the
way to go only if it is calibrated to district demand.
Keywords
issue representation, agriculture, parliament, Hungary
Accepted: 17 November 2020
Introduction
Students of legislative behaviour often consider legislators as ‘single-minded seekers of
re-election’ (Mayhew, 1974). Members of Parliament (MPs) believe that their actions
have an electoral impact, and organize their activities so that it maximizes their chances
for re-election. Although they may pursue re-election through a number of ways, issue
representation has always been one of the most important phenomena researchers look at.
‘Policy responsiveness’ (Eulau and Karps, 1977), ‘congruence’ (Miller and Stokes,
1963) or ‘concurrence’ (Verba and Nie, 1987) appears when there is a strong correlation
Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, Budapest, Hungary
Corresponding author:
Zsófia Papp, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, Budapest
1097, Hungary.
Email: papp.zsofia@tk.mta.hu
979192PSW0010.1177/1478929920979192Political Studies ReviewPapp
research-article2020
Special Issue Article
Papp 377
between constituent opinion and what governments, parties or legislators do in office. If
citizens pay attention to the legislators’ policy performance, re-election seekers must
align with voter preferences (Ferejohn, 1986; Söderlund, 2008; Woon, 2012). This means
that to some extent, MPs are ‘constrained by constituent demand’ (Norris, 1997). Although
legislators are often torn between the dissimilar interests of their competing principals
such as party leaders and constituents (Carey, 2007; Kirkland and Harden, 2016; Rosas
et al., 2015), and party leaders exert great influence by controlling candidate access to the
party label (re-selection) and to various resources and positions, considerable literature
demonstrates that parliamentary action aligns with citizen preferences too (Costello et al.,
2012; Maestas, 2000; Roberts and Kim, 2011; Sorace, 2018; Thomassen and Andeweg,
2004). Clearly, legislators think that doing so benefits their re-election. But whether or not
legislators are indeed constrained by demand, we have limited knowledge. Do policy
actions really have an effect on re-election? Does issue representation in a salient field
affect legislators’ electoral performance?
The literature of retrospective voting largely builds on the sanctioning and the selec-
tion models of representation. While the sanctioning model argues that voters try to mini-
mize moral hazard, and re-elect only high-performing parties and politicians (Barro,
1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Key, 1966), voters in the selection model aim at electing compe-
tent leaders with high integrity (Fearon, 1999; Mansbridge, 2009). However, whereas
voters may try to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection, cognitive and emotional
biases can hinder effective accountability. Accordingly, Healy and Malhotra (2013) oper-
ationalize retrospective voting as a four-step process: (1) voters observe politicians, par-
ties and policy actions, (2) they attribute responsibility for these actions and outcomes, (3)
they evaluate the performance of those with the responsibility, and cast their votes accord-
ingly, and finally (4) the voters’ electoral behaviour creates the incentives for parties and
politicians, and consequently influences policy actions (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). The
reason that policy actions do not necessarily translate into reactions is that voters some-
times make mistakes at the stages of observation and attribution. In addition, sometimes
the respective policy action is just not relevant to the voters, leaving legislator effort
unrewarded.
This article joins the process at the step of performance evaluation, and analyses elec-
tion results as a function of legislator behaviour and district preferences. Legislators who
demonstrate being aware of local problems, and show willingness to use their limited
resources to address them are perceived as ‘good’ representatives by the voters, and as a
result increase their vote share. At the same time, engaging in an issue irrelevant for the
district may hinder re-election by sending voters the wrong message. A mismatch between
issues advertised by legislators and district preferences is not only useless for achieving
re-election, but it might even worsen electoral performance. Advocating the wrong issue
may rapidly alienate voters by painting the picture of legislators who ignore the constitu-
ency angle of their work, and pursue the representation of alternative interests.
The analysis uses data from five consecutive Hungarian elections (1994–2010), and
investigates the effect of agricultural interpellations on the legislators’ single-member
district (SMD) vote shares under varying district compositions. The rural–urban cleavage
is one of the most basic political divides and, though in new forms, it still shapes both
divisions in society (Ford and Jennings, 2020; Kriesi, 1998) and political preferences
(Kelly and Lobao, 2019). Therefore, thematizing agriculture is an important means of
vote-seeking in rural areas. Importantly, although a number of studies focus on issue rep-
resentation and issue voting in Eastern Europe (Roberts, 2009; Roberts and Kim, 2011;
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