DPP v Mark Thomas Ramos

This is an appeal by way of Case Stated from a decision of Mr Nicholas Evans, a Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, who on 22nd October 1999, at Bow Street Magistrates'Court, ruled that the respondent had no case to answer on an information which contained this charge -

"On or before 22nd April 1999 within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court you distributed to another person letters containing writings, signs, or other visible representations which were threatening, abusive or insulting with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence would be used against him or another by any person, or whereby that person was likely to believe that such violence would be used"contrary to section 4(1)(b) of the Public Order Act 1986 and section 31(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998."

As the magistrate has pointed out, the charge should have ended with the words "which offence was racially aggravated" but for present purposes nothing turns on the omission.

Facts

The facts were not in dispute, and the magistrate set out the facts which he found in paragraph 6 of the case stated as follows -

(1) the respondent wrote and sent two letters by first class post to the Monitoring Group, an organisation based in Southall which offers advice and assistance to the Asian community in West London.

(2) The letters contained threats of unlawful violence.

(3) The respondent, by what he wrote demonstrated hostility towards members of racial groups so as to racially aggravate any offence (if any committed) against section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986.

(4) The recipient(s) of the letters, and others to whom they were shown, were immediately concerned for their own and other's safety.

(5) It is reasonable to infer, and I was satisfied, that the respondent either intended to cause the recipient(s) of his letters to believe that unlawful violence would be used, or following his distribution of the letters, the recipient(s) of them would be likely to believe that unlawful violence would be used.

(6) The "Brixton nail bomb"exploded on 17th April 1999, five days earlier.

Copies of the letters in question are appended to the Case Stated.

We were told that the body to which the letters were sent was in fact the National Civil Rights Group, whose mail was opened by the Monitoring Group, but nothing turns on that.

Statutory Provisions

The Public Order Act 1986, so far as is material for the purposes of this appeal, reads -

4(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he -

(b) distributes … to another person any writing ….. which is threatening abusive or insulting,

with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used against him or another by any person, ….. or whereby that person is likely to believe that such violence will be used.

6(3) A person is guilty of an offence under section 4 only if he intends his words … or the writing ….. to be threatening, abusive or insulting or is aware that it may be threatening, abusive or insulting.

7(2) For the purposes of the rules against charging more than one offence in the same count or information, each of sections 1 to 5 creates one offence.

Section 31(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 , so far as relevant, provides -

A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he commits -

(a) an offence under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 -

which is racially aggravated for the purposes of this section.

The Issue

The issue on which the magistrate was invited to rule is encapsulated in paragraph 11 of the Case Stated which reads -

"I was of the opinion that on the facts found it would not be possible to infer that the respondent had either demonstrated an intention to cause (the recipient(s) of his letters) to believe that immediate unlawful violence would be used, or following his distribution of the letters, the recipient(s) of them would likely to believe immediate unlawful violence would be used."

Magistrate's Reasons

In paragraph 12 of the Case Stated the Magistrate set out his reasons for deciding as he did -

"I considered that had the letters said 'a bomb will be detonated within 24 hours of receipt of this letter'then that probably would amount to a threat of 'immediate unlawful violence'. Whereas, if the letter said 'a bomb will be detonated no sooner than 48 hours following receipt of this letter'then that would probably not amount to such a threat. If, as in this case, the letters are silent as to when a bomb might be detonated then it follows that such detonation might be immediate or at some unspecified time in the future. Some unspecified time in the future lacks the element of immediacy required by the statute. There is no basis for concluding that the recipient of such a letter is likely to believe immediate unlawful violence would be used."

The question.

The Case Stated then poses this question for our consideration -

"The question for the opinion of the High Court is, (given that immediate unlawful violence within the meaning of the statute is a question of fact and degree in all the circumstances of the case), whether I was right to conclude that there was no evidence on which I could be satisfied that the Respondent either (by what he wrote) had demonstrated an intention to cause the recipient(s) of his letters to believe that immediate unlawful violence would be used, or following his distribution of the letters, the recipient(s) of them would be likely to believe immediate unlawful violence would be used."

Assault.

Section 4 of the 1986 Act created a new offence which adopted from the old offence of assault the concept of a threat causing a victim to fear immediate unlawful violence. In Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 James J at 444D defined assault as "any act which intentionally —or possibly recklessly —causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence."That definition was adopted by Lord Steyn in R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 at 161. In that case the House of Lords was considering two cases where men made silent telephone calls to targeted women, and pleaded guilty to offences contrary to section 47 and section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. At 162B Lord Steyn said that a silent caller may be guilty of an assault, depending on the facts, and continued -

"After all, there is no reason why a telephone caller who says to a woman in a menacing way 'I will be at your door in a minute or two' may not be guilty of an assault if he causes his victim to apprehend immediate personal violence. Take now the case of the silent caller. He intends by his silence to cause fear and he is so understood. The victim is assailed by uncertainty...