DPP v Smith
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Year | 1960 |
| Court | House of Lords |
| Date | 1960 |
Crime - Homicide - Intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm - Presumption of intention - Extent of application -
The respondent was driving a car in the back of which were some sacks of scaffolding clips which had been stolen. A police constable, noticing the sacks, told him to draw in to the kerb, but instead the appellant accelerated. The constable clung on to the side of the car, which pursued an erratic course, but he was finally shaken off and fell in front of another car, receiving fatal injuries. The respondent did not stop but drove on some 200 yards and dumped the stolen property. He then returned and, there was evidence that on being told that the constable was dead, he said that he knew the constable personally but had become frightened at the constable's actions and only wanted to shake him off the car. The appellant was charged with capital murder. In his summing up the judge said to the jury:
“If you are satisfied that … he must as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was likely to result to that officer … and that such harm did happen and the officer died in consequence, then the accused is guilty of capital murder …. On the other hand, if you are not satisfied that he intended to indict grievous bodily harm upon the officer — in other words, if you think he could not as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm would result to the officer in consequence of his actions — well, then, the verdict would be guilty of manslaughter.”
The respondent was convicted of murder:—
Held, that there was no misdirection by the trial judge.
It is immaterial what the accused in fact contemplated as the probable result of his actions, provided he is in law responsible for them in that he is capable of forming an intent, is not insane within the M'Naghten Rules and cannot establish diminished responsibility. On that assumption, the sole question is whether the unlawful and voluntary act was of such a kind that grievous bodily harm was the natural and probable result and the only test of this is what the ordinary responsible man would, in all the circumstances of the case, have contemplated as the natural and probable result (post, p. 554).
Once the accused's knowledge of the circumstances and nature of his acts has been ascertained, the only thing that can rebut the presumption that he intends the natural and probable consequences of those acts is proof of incapacity to form an intent, insanity or diminished responsibility (post, p. 557). The test of the reasonable man, properly understood, is a simpler criterion than that of the “presumption of law” and contains all the necessary ingredients of malice aforethought (post, p. 559).
There is no warrant for drawing any distinction between the case where serious harm is “certain” to result and that where it is “likely” to result (post, p. 559).
The expression “grievous bodily harm” should bear its ordinary and natural meaning of “really serious” harm (post, p. 560).
Section 1 (1) of the Homicide Act, 1957, has not abolished malice constituted by a proved intention to inflict grievous bodily harm.
APPEAL from the Court of Criminal Appeal (Byrne, Sachs and Wynn JJ.).
The respondent, Jim Smith, was convicted at the Central Criminal Court on April 7, 1960, on a charge that on March 2, 1960, he murdered Leslie Edward Vincent Meehan, a police constable acting in the execution of his duty. The constable had told the respondent to pull his car in to the side of the road so that he could question him, but instead of doing so the respondent accelerated causing the death of the constable. The ground of his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal was that Donovan J. misdirected the jury as to the application of the rule that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts. The facts are fully set out in the opinion of Viscount Kilmuir L.C.
On May 10, 1960, the court allowed the appeal, substituting a verdict of manslaughter for that of capital murder and imposing a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. The Director of Public Prosecutions now appealed to the House of Lords.
Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller Q.C., A.-G., J. M. G. Griffith-Jones and S. A. Morton for the appellant.
Edward Clarke Q.C., Audrey Jennings and D. B. Watling for the respondent.
The following authorities, besides those referred to in the opinion of Viscount Kilmuir L.C., were cited in argument: Reg. v. LenchitskyF1; Reg. v. RymellF2; Reg. v. KirkhamF3; Reg. v. Gibbins and ProctorF4; Rex v. Betts and RidleyF5; Reg. v. Grant and GilbertF6; Reg. v. CharlsonF7; Rex v. WhybrowF8; Rex v. PembiltonF9; Reg. v. CunninghamF10; Reg. v. WelchF11; Reg. v. WaltersF12; Reg. v. DohertyF13; Reg. v. SernéF14; Rex v. HedleyF15; Lang v. LangF16; Bedder v. Director of Public ProsecutionsF17; Milne v. Commissioner of Police for City of LondonF18; Rex v. Barnes and RichardsF19; Reg. v. HorseyF20; Woolmington v. Director of Public ProsecutionsF21; Reg. v. NichollsF22; Rex v. BonnymanF23; Reg. v. Bubb and HookF24; Reg. v. PorterF25; Rex v. LarkinF26 and Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions.F27
Their Lordships took time for consideration.
July 28. VISCOUNT KILMUIR L.C. My Lords, the respondent, Jim Smith, was convicted on April 7, 1960, of the wilful murder on March 2, 1960, of Leslie Edward Vincent Meehan, a police officer acting in the execution of his duty. Such a crime constitutes capital murder under section 5 of the Homicide Act, 1957, and, accordingly, the respondent was sentenced to death. There was never any suggestion that the respondent meant to kill the police officer, but it was contended by the prosecution that he intended to do the officer grievous bodily harm, as a result of which the officer died.
In his final direction to the jury the trial judge, Donovan J., said:
“If you are satisfied that … he must as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was likely to result to that officer … and that such harm did happen and the officer died in consequence, then the accused is guilty of capital murder …. On the other hand, if you are not satisfied that he intended to inflict grievous bodily harm upon the officer — in other words, if you think he could not as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm would result to the officer in consequence of his actions — well, then, the verdict would be guilty of manslaughter.”
The respondent appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal alleging misdirection by the trial judge, the main ground being that the direction cited above was wrong in that the question for the jury was what he, the respondent, in fact contemplated. The appeal was heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal on May 9 and 10, 1960, when the court allowed the appeal, substituted a verdict of guilty of manslaughter and imposed a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. The court gave its reasons on May 18, 1960. They upheld the respondent's contention, holdingF28 that “there always remained the question whether the appellant” (the present respondent) “really did … realise what was the degree of likelihood of serious injury.”
Thereupon the Attorney-General gave his fiat certifying that the appeal of Jim Smith involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and that, in his opinion, it was desirable in the public interest that a further appeal should be brought. The matter now comes before your Lordships' House on the appeal of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The appeal certainly involves an important question, raising, as it does, the question as to what is the proper direction to be given to a jury in regard to the necessary intent which has to be proved in cases of murder and also in cases under section 18 of the Offences against the
The facts can be summarised as follows: At about 7.30 p.m. on March 2, 1960, the respondent, accompanied by a man named Artus, was driving a Ford Prefect motor-car through Woolwich. In the boot and the back of the car were sacks containing scaffolding clips that they had just stolen. The car was stopped in Beresford Square by the police officer on point duty in the normal course of traffic control and, while so stopped, P.C. Meehan, who was acquainted with the respondent, came to the driver's window and spoke to him. No doubt as a result of what P.C. Meehan saw in the back of the car he told the respondent when the traffic was released to draw in to his near-side. The respondent began to do so and P.C. Meehan walked beside the car. Suddenly, however, the respondent accelerated along Plumstead Road and P.C. Meehan began to run with the car, shouting to the officer on point duty to get on to the police station. Despite the fact that the respondent's car had no running board, P.C. Meehan succeeded in hanging on and never let go until some 130 yards up Plumstead Road when he was thrown off the car and under a bubble car coming in the opposite direction, suffering a crushed skull and other injuries from which he died.
What happened during the time the car travelled that 130 yards was the subject of considerable evidence. The police officer on traffic duty, P.C. Baker...
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