Economic governance: Does it make or break a dominant party equilibrium? The case of India
| Date | 01 June 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512119866845 |
| Published date | 01 June 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119866845
International Political Science Review
2020, Vol. 41(3) 451 –465
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119866845
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Economic governance: Does it
make or break a dominant party
equilibrium? The case of India
Chanchal Kumar Sharma
Central University of Haryana, India
Wilfried Swenden
University of Edinburgh, UK
Abstract
Why do voters re-elect the same party for prolonged periods of time even when there are reasonable
alternatives available? When and why do they stop doing so? Based on a quantitative analysis of elections
between 1972 and 2014, we test the significance of ‘economic governance’ for the continuance and fall of
one-party dominance. With data from India we show that, under a command economy paradigm, a national
incumbent party sustains its dominance by playing politics of patronage, but in a marketized economy, state
governments gain considerable scope in managing their economic affairs. This enables different state parties
to create a stable pattern of support in states. As state-level effects cease to aggregate at the national level,
the party system fragments. However, such an aggregation can re-emerge if a single party consistently
delivers in the states which it governs.
Keywords
Party system, India, Indian politics, economic governance, patronage politics, federalism
Introduction
The dominance of a single political party in a federal democracy is often attributed to one or a com-
bination of the following six factors: the party’s ability to perform as an internally factionalized
catch-all party; the influence of charismatic leadership (political agency) in popularizing a party
across multiple levels of the state; the failure of opposition parties to coordinate their actions; the
effect of institutional rules, especially a majoritarian electoral system and economic centralization
on prolonging single party dominance; the successful framing of ideology and social identity; or the
ability to engage in vote-buying and clientelistic machine politics.
Corresponding author:
Chanchal Kumar Sharma, Central University of Haryana, Pali, Flat no. 203, Type IV Quarters, Mahendergarh,
Haryana 123029, India.
Email: chanchalsharma@cuh.ac.in
866845IPS0010.1177/0192512119866845International Political Science ReviewSharma and Swenden
research-article2019
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