| Library | Adjudication in Construction Law |
| Pages | 203-306 |
| Author | Darryl Royce |
6.1: Effect of decision
6.1.1: Statutory provisions
6.1 Construction contracts governed by Part II of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 are required to provide that the decision of the adjudicator is binding until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to arbitration) or by agreement . 1 The parties are entitled to agree to accept the decision of the adjudicator as finally determining the dispute. 2 If a construction contract regulated by Part II does not comply with these requirements, the adjudication provisions of the Scheme for Construction Contracts apply. 3 The Statutory Scheme provides that the decision of the adjudicator shall be binding on the parties and that they shall comply with it until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to arbitration) or by agreement between the parties. 4 These provisions of the Act and the Scheme have been described as prescribing ‘temporary binding finality of an adjudicator's decision', 5 although some difficulty has been acknowledged with the concept of the ‘temporary finality' of an adjudicator's decision and as to what, precisely, are the consequences of the provision in the latter that an adjudicator's decision is ‘binding on the parties, and they shall comply with it until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings or arbitration'. 6
6.1.2: Nature of proceedings before an adjudicator
6.2 Proceedings before an adjudicator are not legal proceedings. They are a process designed to avoid the need for legal proceedings. 7 Legal proceedings result in a judgment or order that in itself can be enforced. If the decision at the end of legal proceedings is that money should be paid, a judgment is drawn up that can be put in the hand of the Sheriff or Bailiff and enforced. That is not the case with an adjudicator. The language of the 1996 Act throughout is that the adjudicator makes a decision. He or she does not make a judgment. Nor does he or she make an ‘award' as an arbitrator does though he or she can order that his or her decision be complied with. Proceedings before an arbitrator are closer to court proceedings because an award of an arbitrator can in some circumstances be registered and enforced without a judgment of the court. But the decision of an adjudicator, like the decision of a certifier, is not enforceable of itself. Those decisions, like the decisions of a certifier, can be relied on as the basis for an application to the court for judgment, but they are not in themselves enforceable. 8 Nevertheless, adjudicators' decisions are frequently referred to as being ‘enforceable' in the sense of being capable of being relied upon for the purposes of litigation.
6.1.3: Nature of enforcement proceedings
6.3 The subsequent claim in court proceedings is for the enforcement of the adjudicator's decision. That decision is only temporarily binding but it is to be enforced, he argues, because the contract requires adjudicators' decisions to be complied with once properly given. That reflects the statutory requirement under the 1996 Act. Thus the cause of action is or follows essentially from the failure on the part of the losing party in the adjudication to honour the adjudication decision. The nature of enforcement of adjudicators' decisions is contractual and the contract requires the parties to comply with the decision of the adjudicator, the adjudicator's decision may be right or wrong but, whether right or wrong, it is to be complied with. 9 A failure to comply with the decision of the adjudicator and pay the sum ordered is a breach of contract. Thus, the cause of action upon which the enforcing party has to rely is the breach of contract and it does not as such sue the other party for a debt or damages said to have arisen as a result of the latter's failure to pay the sum due under the contract. 10
6.4 Although an adjudication award in the referring party's favour creates a contractual obligation on an insured responding party to pay the referring party, it is not an absolute obligation. In particular, it will not be enforced by the court if the adjudicator has exceeded his or her jurisdiction. Liability under the insurance policy is not established until the decision is enforced by a judgment of the court or agreement. 11
6.2: Effect of the challenge to the validity of the decision
6.2.1: Purpose and effect of Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996
6.5 Even if there is a challenge to the validity of an adjudicator's decision, the decision is binding and enforceable (in the sense used above) until the challenge is finally determined. The word ‘decision', where it appears in section 108(3) of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 and paragraph 23(1) of the Statutory Scheme, is not limited in meaning to a lawful and valid decision, the validity of which is not under challenge. If the contrary were correct, it would substantially undermine the effectiveness of the scheme for adjudication. The intention of Parliament in enacting the Act was plain. It was to introduce a speedy mechanism for settling disputes in construction contracts on a provisional interim basis and requiring the decisions of adjudicators to be enforced pending the final determination of disputes by arbitration, litigation or agreement: see section 108(3) of the Act and paragraph 23(2) of the Statutory Scheme. The timetable for adjudication is very tight. Many would say unreasonably tight, and likely to result in injustice. Parliament must be taken to have been aware of this. So far as procedure is concerned, the adjudicator is given a fairly free hand. It is true (but hardly surprising) that he or she is required to act impartially (section 108(2)(e) of the Act and paragraph 12 (a) of the Statutory Scheme). He or she is, however, permitted to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law (section 108(2)(f) of the Act and paragraph 13 of the Statutory Scheme). He or she may, therefore, conduct an entirely inquisitorial process, or he or she may invite representations from the parties. It is clear that Parliament intended that the adjudication should be conducted in a manner which those familiar with the grinding detail of the traditional approach to the resolution of construction disputes apparently find difficult to accept. But Parliament has not abolished arbitration and litigation of construction disputes. It has merely introduced an intervening provisional stage in the dispute resolution process. Crucially, it has made it clear that decisions of adjudicators are binding and are to be complied with until the dispute is finally resolved. 12
6.2.2: Comparison with arbitration
6.6 It is well known that many, if not most, construction contracts contain arbitration clauses. It is by no means uncommon for such clauses in sub-contracts to state that the arbitration between main contractor and sub-contractor may not be commenced until the main contract works have been completed, at any rate, unless the main contractor decides otherwise. A groundwork sub-contractor to a major development may have to wait years before it can even start to arbitrate its dispute with the main contractor. This was the mischief at which the Act was aimed. In the light of Halki Shipping Corporation v Sopex Oils Ltd, 13 the problem from the sub-contractor's point of view in such a situation is even more pressing than it was previously thought to be, since it cannot even seek summary judgment for a sum as to which there is no arguable defence. 14
6.7 A possible answer to this is that it is open to parties to draft their arbitration clauses in such a way as to exclude disputes arising from adjudicators' decisions. This would require careful drafting, since standard arbitration clauses expressed in terms of ‘any dispute arising out of or in connection with' the contract in question might well be wide enough to embrace any dispute arising out of or in connection with an adjudicator's decision in relation to that contract. Also, arbitration can itself be a swift procedure. 15
6.8 Arbitration can be swift, but often it is not, and, as already explained, in some cases cannot even be started until long after the dispute has arisen. More fundamentally, if Parliament had thought that resolution by arbitration was a swift and effective procedure, it would surely not have seen the need to enact the Act at all. 16
6.2.3: A decision is a ‘decision'
6.9 The suggestion that the word ‘decision' where it appears in section 108(3) of the Act and paragraph 23(2) of the Statutory Scheme, means only a decision whose validity is not under challenge ought to be viewed with considerable care. It is easy to mount a challenge based on an alleged breach of natural justice even though the challenge may be hopeless. But the fact is that the challenge has been made, and a dispute therefore exists between the parties in relation to it. On this argument, the party who is unsuccessful before the adjudicator has to do no more than assert a breach of the rules of natural justice, or allege that the adjudicator acted partially, and he or she will be able to say that there has been no ‘decision'. 17
6.10 At first sight, it is difficult to see why a decision purportedly made by an adjudicator on the dispute that has been referred to him or her should not be a binding decision within the meaning of section 108(3) of the Act and paragraph 23(1) of the Scheme. If it had been intended to qualify the word ‘decision' in some way, then this could have been done. Why not give the word its plain and ordinary meaning? There is no good reason for not so doing. If an adjudicator's decision on the...
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