Evidence, advocacy and the social sciences
| Author | Mark Coen,Imogen Jones |
| Published date | 01 July 2018 |
| Date | 01 July 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1365712718787419 |
| Subject Matter | Editorial |
The International Journal of
Evidence & Proof
Evidence, advocacy
2018, Vol. 22(3) 189–191
ª The Author(s) 2018
and the social sciences
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DOI: 10.1177/1365712718787419
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Mark Coen
Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Imogen Jones
School of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
This special issue of the International Journal of Evidence and Proof brings together articles on
evidentiary and criminal justice scholarship informed by the methodologies and perspectives of the
social sciences. The adherents of a discipline can fall into the trap of believing that it constitutes a self-
contained paragon that can generate solutions without recourse to outside influences. Lawyers are
particularly susceptible to this delusion. Common law rules and procedures are creatures of judicial
experience and may be grounded in ‘an inarticulable emotion or hunch’ (Posner, 2006) rather than
empirical reality.
The perception that ‘law is law and is in no way dependent on social and philosophical science’,
identified as the prevalent view in legal circles at one time (Cohen, 1915), has begun to be undermined in
recent decades. Courts across the world have considered empirical research on matters such as juror
bias,1 credibility assessments,2 the likelihood of the making of independent inquiries by jurors,3 the
dangers inherent in eyewitness evidence4 and the effects on police interrogation of the procedures
required by Miranda v Arizona.5 The citation and discussion of social science research does not neces-
sarily mean that such research is being properly or comprehensively considered or is making a differ-
ence, of course. A passing mention of a small number of empirical studies may not displace reliance on
intuition or assumption, but it represents progress of a sort nonetheless.
When confronted with challenges to evidentiary rules and procedural conventions it would appear
that judges in Ireland and Britain are less open to considering relevant empirical research than their peers
elsewhere. Indeed, a Privy Council decision from the turn of this century demonstrates how practices
rooted in intuition rather than scientific research can become entrenched through repetition,...
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