EXPERT EVIDENCE
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1947.tb00035.x |
| Published date | 01 January 1947 |
| Date | 01 January 1947 |
| Author | H. A. Hammelmann |
EXPERT EVIDENCE
TEIE
ever-widening range of scientific and technical know-
ledge provides the Courts of law with new or improved
means for the investigation of truth.'
Is
the Law
of
Evidence as
it
stands today capable of making full use
of
this knowledge? Are the conditions under which English
Courts receive expert evidence calculated to assist to the fuII
in the ascertainment of truth
?
English Law of Evidence recognises that in certain cases
involving scientific
or
technical questions the Court may
require the assistance of persons (experts) who, on account
of
special studies or experience, are conversant with matters
of
science and/or professional skill which are beyond the range
of the tribunal. Little effort has been made to ensure that
the evidence of experts is made available to the Court under
conditions which guarantee,
so
far
as
possible, the reliability
of the information presented. English law considers and
treats experts as witnesses. Unfortunately, the customary
safeguards calculated to ensure the credibility and veracity
of testimonial evidence of
a
witness are in the case of experts
in some respects unnecessary and unsuitable, in others
insufficient.
A
witness proper testifies before the Court to what he
has, in the past, seen
or
heard with regard to the facts in
issue; his testimony, in other words, refers to
'
res
gestz
'
of
which he has gained casual perception on account of circum-
stances or situation peculiar to him. The number of witnesses
who have personally observed the matters in issue is
of
necessity limited. Since
a
witness cannot be replaced, he
must be heard in Court such as he is
:
a
notorious liar,
a
child
whose intellect is not yet fully developed should not be
excluded
;
a
person's partiality and bias may be obvious from
the outset, but his evidence must be received. Only in the
examination of the witness and in the assessment of the value
of his evidence can the Court protect itself against the short-
comings of this instrument of proof of which it is aware.2
1
See, for instance,
A.
C. Mitchell,
The
Scientific Detectioe,
Cambridge,
U.S.A.,
1931.
2
A
person who informs the tribunal of facts
of
which he has gained casual
perception in the past
is
properly treated
as
a
witness even if
he
happens
to
possess particular knowledge
or
qualifications which enabled
him
to draw
conclusions from what he has seen
or
heard which other witnemes (or the Court)
32
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