Explaining perceptions of autonomy in the last chain of delegation
| Author | Patrícia Silva,Carlos Jalali |
| Published date | 01 October 2020 |
| Date | 01 October 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0952076718814896 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Explaining perceptions
of autonomy in the last
chain of delegation
Patrı
´cia Silva
Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences, University
of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal
Carlos Jalali
Research Unit in Governance, Competitiveness and Public
Policies (GOVCOPP), Department of Social, Political and
Territorial Sciences, University of Aveiro, Campus Universita
´rio
de Santiago, Aveiro, Portugal
Abstract
This article explores the impact of consolidated principles of delegation on top civil
servants’ perceptions of autonomy in management and policy-making processes across
European parliamentary democracies. Particular attention is devoted to the extent to
which bureaucratic capacity can be equated as a principle of delegation, considering the
lenses and perspectives of bureaucrats instead of relying on politicians’ formal mech-
anisms to control bureaucratic activities. Empirically, this article is based on a large-scale
study survey of senior public executives applied in eight European countries. While
consolidated principles of delegation seem to be able to explain perceptions of auton-
omy across parliamentary democracies, results also suggest the importance of including
bureaucratic capacity as a predictor of autonomy in the last chain of delegation. This
emerges as one of the strongest explanatory variables of perceptions of managerial
autonomy, regardless of the hierarchical position of respondents. However, it does not
impact on bureaucrats’ perception of policy autonomy, as respondents’ position within
the administrative state and the distinct traits of national public bureaucracies in Europe
have a greater impact on the delegation of authority.
Keywords
Autonomy, civil servants, bureaucracy, bureaucratic capacity, delegation processes, pol-
itical control
Public Policy and Administration
2020, Vol. 35(4) 424–444
!The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0952076718814896
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Corresponding author:
Patricia Silva, Research Unit in Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies (GOVCOPP), Department of
Social, Political and Territorial Sciences, University of Aveiro, Campus Universita
´rio de Santiago, Aveiro
PT-3810-193, Portugal.
Email: patriciasilva@ua.pt
Introduction
Modern democratic government cannot function without bureaucracy. Given the
complexity of governance, elected politicians have no choice but to delegate at least
some responsibility to bureaucracies. In recent years, there has been a renewed
interest in the last chain of delegation – from ministers to civil servants, given
bureaucrats’ ‘‘critical role in understanding the overall prosperity of nations’’
(Lapuente, 2016:227).
Despite the impressive research on delegation processes, many questions remain
unanswered. First, considerable empirical research on delegation within public
administration is mostly focused in the American context. Hence, delegation
studies are framed within institutional settings that affect delegation processes. In
presidential systems, principals at the federal level compete with each other for
control over bureaucratic agencies. That generates a non-exclusive, dyadic rela-
tionship between agencies and political principals – which can result in decreased
control over the bureaucracy (McCarty, 2004) – in a sharp contrast to delegation in
parliamentary systems, which are more narrowed down to a single and noncompet-
ing principal for each agent link of delegation (Strøm, 2000).
The empirical assessment of delegation has also been limited. As Huber and
Shipan (2008) rightly assert, empirical tests on delegation processes are dominated
by analyses of politicians’ use of formal procedures to limit bureaucratic discretion:
the design of more or less detailed statutes (Epstein and Halloran, 1999; Huber and
Shipan, 2000); the use of budgetary restrictions (Huber, 2000) or the creation of
oversight bureaucratic agencies (Roness et al., 2008). Despite their valuable empir-
ical contributions, the focus on formal rules disregards much of the richness of
actual politics, particularly given the informal mechanisms of control that underlie
the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.
Several researchers have sought to overcome these limitations, acknowledging the
perceptual nature of autonomy, particularly within European parliamentary democ-
racies. Notable and extensive research was carried out within the confines of (semi-
)autonomous public agencies to explain the changing nature and structure of UKs
governance (Dommett et al., 2014; Tonkiss, 2016) and to analyse autonomy and
performance of managers and agencies (see, inter alia, Maggetti, 2007, 2012;
Maggetti and Verhoest, 2014; Verhoest et al., 2004). Beyond being limited to their
specific focus, the study of delegation has not systematically assessed the impact of
consolidated principles of delegation on perceptions of autonomy within parliamen-
tary democracies and across the entire administrative landscape. Additionally, exist-
ing research has not yet assessed the extent to which bureaucratic capacity can emerge
as a principle of delegation. While the perils of delegation within contexts of reduced
administrative capacity have already been highlighted (Huber and McCarty, 2004),
research needs to provide a clear definition of administrative capacity.
This article seeks to address these gaps. It examines the extent to which bureau-
cratic capacity (BC) explains top civil servants’ perceptions of autonomy in man-
agement and policy-making processes when controlling for other consolidated
Silva and Jalali 425
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