Exploring the implications of ‘low visibility’ specialist cyber-crime units
| Author | Chad Whelan,Diarmaid Harkin |
| Published date | 01 December 2019 |
| Date | 01 December 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0004865819853321 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Australian & New Zealand Journal of
Exploring the implications
Criminology
2019, Vol. 52(4) 578–594
!
of ‘low visibility’ specialist
The Author(s) 2019
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cyber-crime units
DOI: 10.1177/0004865819853321
journals.sagepub.com/home/anj
Diarmaid Harkin
and Chad Whelan
Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Victoria, Australia
Abstract
Using original data gathered within Australia, this paper argues that specialist cyber-policing
units experience a pronounced level of low visibility within the police. This low visibility has
three key dimensions. Firstly, there is low ‘vertical’ visibility as higher management and
supervisors often have a limited understanding of the nature of the work and the needs of
these units. Secondly, there is low ‘horizontal’ visibility as peers and colleagues within the
wider organisation are similarly lacking in terms of their understanding of cyber-policing. The
third dimension of low visibility concerns the external–internal visibility of the units as they
relate to outside stakeholders including politics, media, the wider community and the judi-
ciary. It is argued there is also a significant level of disinterest, disengagement and ignorance
along this external–internal dimension. The implications of this ‘low visibility’ is explored and
it is argued that there are consequences for the effectiveness of the units while also raising
concerns around accountability and the overall prospects for progressive change.
Keywords
Cyber-crime, cyber-policing, cyber-security, policing
Date received: 20 December 2018; accepted: 6 May 2019
Introduction
A growing body of literature is calling attention to the challenges police face in relation
to preventing and responding to cyber-crime (e.g. Bossler & Holt, 2012; Dupont, 2012;
Gogolin & Jones, 2010; Harkin, Whelan & Chang, 2018; Holt & Bossler, 2016;
Leukfeldt, Veenstra, & Stol, 2013; Wall, 2007; Yar, 2013). In general, it is clear that
Corresponding author:
Diarmaid Harkin, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Melbourne, Victoria 3125, Australia.
Email: diarmaid.harkin@deakin.edu.au
Harkin and Whelan
579
the escalating volume and complexity of cyber-crime and demands placed on digital
forensics are increasingly exceeding the capacity of most police organisations. As the
prevalence of cyber-offences escalates into a “high volume crime” (Leukfeldt et al.,
2013), specialist units for combatting cyber-crime are increasingly becoming a norm
of contemporary police organisations (Willits & Nowacki, 2016, p. 105). Data from
the United States, for example, demonstrate that a half of all state-level agencies have a
dedicated cyber-crime unit (Willits & Nowacki, 2016, p. 105). In Australia, most of the
states and territories have introduced a dedicated unit that specialises in serious cyber-
offending. A point oft-repeated in the cyber-policing literature, however, is that the
study of such units is “under-developed” (Willits & Nowacki, 2016, p. 106), with only
a “few empirical studies” of how law enforcement responds to cyber-offending (Bossler
& Holt, 2012, p. 166). This paper aims to contribute to the need for greater empirical
and conceptual articulation of this recent police innovation.
In particular, this paper argues that specialist cyber-policing units currently operate
within a distinctive level of low visibility. It is a cornerstone of police studies literature
that all policing operates in a context of low visibility, an idea most notably articulated
by Joseph Goldstein (1960, p. 543) who documented that routine police decision-making
is of “extremely low visibility”. It will be shown that specialist cyber units have low
visibility across three main dimensions. First, along a ‘vertical’ dimension as managers
up and down the hierarchy reportedly have limited comprehension of the core opera-
tions of the unit and show a diminished interest in the crime type. Second, along a
‘horizontal’ dimension as peers and colleagues in other specialist units are perceived to
exhibit a similar lack of understanding of the nature of cyber-policing. And finally,
along an ‘internal–external’ dimension as cyber units are arguably subject to less interest
from the media, politicians and wider community, and experience a weaker relationship
with external actors such as the judiciary who also reportedly struggle to conceptually
comprehend cyber-policing.
The concept of ‘visibility’ has occasionally appeared in police studies (see Mawby,
1999; Rowe, 2007), but has been utilised in different ways. Before proceeding here,
however, it is worth establishing an understanding of what we mean by ‘low visibility’.
As will be shown, it is a concept that emerged organically from our data as our research
participants described their ‘frontline’ experiences. In the literature, Goldstein (1960,
p. 543) principally conceptualised low visibility as routine decisions of police officers to
enforce the law (or not) in ways that are “seldom the subject of review”. The use of ‘low
visibility’ that is applied here shares this understanding but we would also add three
additional elements. The first is the degree to which an area or crime-type that the police
is working on is attention-grabbing and that others have an active interest in the work.
This is related to Yar’s (2013, p. 491) “hierarchies of standing” which suggests that
“different forms of crime” are ordered in terms of seriousness or importance. It is our
contention that cyber-crime currently has a comparatively low profile in this regard.
Second is the material sense of ‘being seen’. Much like the covert units described by
Loftus and Goold (2011, p. 285), cyber-policing is not performed for a public audience
with a ‘spectacle quality to it’. Rather it is largely concealed and face-to-face interactions
with the public are rare. And third is the degree to which the frontline operational work
is comprehensible to outsiders. It is also emphasised that because of the technological
aspect of cyber-offending and cyber-policing, cyber investigations have an intelligibility
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Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 52(4)
barrier that dampens and weakens outsider oversight and permits cyber units to operate
in a context of relative inconspicuousness. These elements combine to create the context
for a significant level of low visibility for cyber-policing.
Data and methods
The data presented in the paper come from case study research with anonymous cyber-
crime units. A total of five state and territory law enforcement organisations were
approached and three agreed to participate in the research on the basis of confidenti-
ality. The purpose of this research was to address the knowledge gap of cyber-policing in
Australia and therefore was exploratory in its approach. The principal aim was to seek
information on the primary challenges facing specialist cyber-crime units, allowing the
participants to shape the main themes, outlining the key issues from their perspective.
There were two principal research methods: surveys and semi-structured interviews. The
surveys with the cyber units took place during 2017. An online survey gathered basic
information on the members of squad (e.g. gender, years of experience in the police, etc.)
and also invited respondents to grade statements on a Likert-scale. The attitudes and
views of the squads were canvassed for how much they agreed with statements such as
‘My internal training prepared me for my current role’ and ‘My organisation places an
appropriate amount of significance and attention on the issue of cyber-crime’.
Interviews were used to gain greater in-depth knowledge of the functioning of the
respective units and the challenges faced by staff. For example, interviewees were
asked to tell us about their role, the challenges they faced in carrying out their role
and what they perceive to be the requirements for effective specialist cyber-crime units.
To ensure the anonymity of interviewees, respondents are referred to only as a member
of the de-identified organisation. It is the personal views of interviewees that are quoted
and these views are not necessarily representative of their respective organisations.
It should also be noted that each state takes a distinctive approach to organising their
cyber units. While confidentiality concerns prevent us from being able to discuss the
similarities and differences between the units in detail, we are able to make a number of
general observations that provide further context for the research. For example, two of
the case study units situate their digital forensics teams within the cyber unit, while one
organisation places the digital forensics team outside of the cyber team. In all cases, the
digital forensics team service the whole police organisation rather than exclusively inves-
tigations undertaken by the specialist units. One of the cyber units is responsible for
investigating online child sex offences, whereas in the other two organisations this is the
domain of another specialist unit. All the units sit within their respective state’s Crime
Command division alongside other specialist units addressing areas such as sexual
assault or organised crime. The units have a mixture of sworn and unsworn officers
employed, but one particular case site has significantly fewer civilian colleagues than
the others.
All three units provide support to other specialist units such as counter-terrorism,
organised crime or sexual assault investigations, but they also become...
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