External forces and Russian foreign policy: Simulation of identity narratives inside Putin’s regime
| Author | Tomas Janeliūnas,Linas Kojala |
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702019854003 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2019, Vol. 74(2) 258–281
External forces and
! The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702019854003
Simulation of identity
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narratives inside Putin’s
regime
Tomas Janeliu¯nas
Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political
Science, Vilnius, Lithuania
Linas Kojala
Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political
Science, Vilnius, Lithuania
Abstract
This article analyzes the impact of external factors on Russia’s foreign policy. Specifically,
it identifies patterns in Russia’s foreign policy reactions to two kinds of developments:
changes in US foreign policy, and fluctuating global oil prices affecting Russia’s economy.
Our hypothesis is that US foreign policy, as it is perceived by Putin’s regime, is the key
determinant of the Kremlin’s reactions, while the changes in economic trends, affected
by oil price, influence the regime’s preference to choose more confrontational or more
defensive ways of action. As the analysis shows, different versions of national identity
narratives can be constructed within Putin’s regime: it acts as a closed political system
that can produce different foreign policy reactions and even ideological narratives with-
out major changes in the governing elite.
Keywords
Russia, foreign policy, identity, oil prices, US
Ever since Winston Churchill uttered his famous phrase, the commonly held per-
ception in the Western world about Russia is that it is an unpredictable state,
whose national interests lie in ‘‘a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an
Corresponding author:
Tomas Janeli unas, Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vokiecˇiu˛ 10,
Vilnius, 01043, Lithuania.
Email: tomas.janeliunas@tspmi.vu.lt
Janeliu¯nas and Kojala
259
enigma.’’1 However, it could be argued that there are clear and persistent patterns
in Russian foreign policy.
Russia’s foreign policy relies on a complex system of factors. The Russian gov-
erning elite is neither separate nor autonomous from the international environ-
ment; on the contrary, for centuries it has been driven by insecurity and the pursuit
of great-power status.2 Hence Russia’s foreign policy is highly susceptible to out-
side influence, and its reactions might be predictable at least to some extent. In
order to better understand Russian foreign policy, both the domestic con-
text—especially material capabilities and self-perception—and the country’s inter-
pretation of international realities must be taken into consideration.
The interaction of both external and domestic factors in shaping Russian foreign
policy has already been scrutinized by many authors.3 According to Derek Averre,
‘‘[t]he link between domestic politics—in terms of both governance and ideas about
the country’s development—and how foreign policy aims are prioritized and put
into operation is crucial, but it is perhaps the most difficult factor in the equation to
analyze.’’4
Hence, the main question that this article seeks to answer is how specific external
factors shape Russia’s foreign policy outcomes. Specifically, it identifies patterns in
Russia’s foreign policy reactions to two factors: changes in US foreign policy, and
fluctuating global oil prices affecting Russia’s economy.
The Kremlin constructs its dominant narrative vis-a-vis the US as the ‘‘other,’’
according to its own perception of US foreign policy, by employing different nar-
ratives of its own national identity. Jutta Weldes explains the constructivist concept
of a formation of national interests and foreign policy in more detail. She argues
that ‘‘before state officials can act for the state, they need to engage in a process of
interpretation in order to understand both what situation the state faces and how
they should respond to it.’’5 According to Weldes, ‘‘[o]nce a situation has been
1.
Alan Cowell, ‘‘Churchill’s definition of Russia still rings true,’’ The New York Times, 1 August
2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/europe/01iht-letter.1.14939466.html (accessed 20
December 2016).
2.
Matthew Sussex, ‘‘From retrenchment to revanchism. . . and back again? Russian grand strategy in
the Eurasian ‘heartland’,’’ in Matthew Sussex and Roger E. Kanet, eds., Russia, Eurasia and the
New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 33–34.
3.
See Ariel Cohen, ‘‘Domestic factors driving Russia’s foreign policy,’’ The Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder no. 2084 on Russia, Russia and Eurasia, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2007/11/domestic-factors-driving-russias-foreign-policy (accessed 18 November 2015);
Derek Averre, ‘‘Russian foreign policy and the global political environment,’’ Problems of Post-
Communism 55, no. 5 (2008): 28–39; Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev, ‘‘Russian foreign
policy: Continuity in change,’’ The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2012): 147–161; Jeffrey
Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Portsmouth: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 2012); Elena Kropatcheva, ‘‘Russian foreign policy in the realm of European
security through the lens of neoclassical realism,’’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 3, no. 1 (2012): 30–40;
Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘‘Domestic power relations and Russia’s foreign policy,’’ Demokratizatsiya:
The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 22, no. 3 (2014): 383–409.
4.
Averre, ‘‘Russian foreign policy,’’ 33.
5.
Jutta Weldes, ‘‘Constructing national interests,’’ European Journal of International Relations 2
(1996): 276–277.
260
International Journal 74(2)
described, that is, the national interest has already been determined—it emerges out
of representations of identities and relationships constructed by state officials.’’6
In this article, we rely on works of other authors that establish how external
factors facilitate the promotion of a particular version of national identity (espe-
cially on the issue of Russia’s stance vis-a-vis the West), and subsequently create a
more favourable ground for specific ideological groups within the political elite to
acquire authority in the Kremlin.7 In competitive political systems, different ideo-
logical groups may promote strongly opposing versions of national identity.
Consequently, the dominant version of the national identity narrative and foreign
policy doctrine can change after a different group takes the lead.
However, Putin’s authoritarian rule during the last decade has eliminated genu-
ine ideological competition among political groups in Russia. Nonetheless, since
assuming power in 2000, Putin and his associates (including Dmitry Medvedev’s
presidency in 2008–2012) have tried on various ideological patterns and different
foreign policy strategies. The regime is still able to utilize other versions of national
identity when needed, as an adaptive response to external changes.
Russia’s economy is sensitive to global economic fluctuations due to its high
dependency on the revenue of exports of hydrocarbons. As it will be explained in
this paper, the price of oil is the most significant variable that correlates with trends
in Russia’s economy (GDP growth, federal budget, et cetera). Consequently, we
use oil price as an indicator of external economic impact on Russia’s economic
capacity which affects the material means and self-confidence of Russia’s regime to
implement a specific reactive policy.
Our hypothesis is that US foreign policy, as it is perceived by Putin’s regime, is
the key determinant of the Kremlin’s foreign policy priorities, while changes in
economic trends, affected by oil price, influence the regime’s preference to choose
more confrontational or more defensive ways of action. Hypothetically, the con-
junction of assertive or unilateral US foreign policy and relatively high oil prices
should provoke the most confrontational reaction from Moscow, while a more
multilateral US foreign policy with relatively low oil prices should lead to a
more cooperative approach vis-a-vis the US.
We assume that different versions of national identity narratives can be con-
structed within Putin’s regime: it acts as a closed political system that can produce
different foreign policy reactions and even ideological narratives without major
changes in the governing elite.
Russian worldview
The international environment is often cited as the main factor influencing Russian
foreign policy. More specifically, it has often been seen as a reactive power,
6.
Weldes, ‘‘Constructing national interests,’’ 282.
7.
Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy. Change and Continuity in National Identity (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 4–14; Kuchins and Zevelev, ‘‘Russian foreign policy,’’
147–149.
Janeliu¯nas and Kojala
261
following from George F. Kennan’s characterization of the Soviet Union in his
arguments for a Cold War ‘‘containment’’ strategy. Kennan emphasized Russia’s
antagonistic nature, citing not only its ideologically based confrontation with the
West (‘‘the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility’’),8 but also
the amount of flexibility in the Kremlin’s actions, especially due to its sensitivity to
the policies of its adversary.
Andrei Tsygankov also shares the view that Russia’s behaviour is particularly
influenced by the behaviour of Western nations. According to him, Russia has
continually responded to similar challenges to its security; hence, throughout...
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