Factortame-like Judicial Statute Disapplication and Dicey's Constitutional Orthodoxy: A Case for their Mutual Compatibility

JurisdictionUnited Kingdom
Pages119-152
Date01 October 2021
Published date01 October 2021
AuthorVincent Lafortune
Subject MatterCivil Law
Factortame-like Judicial Statute Disapplication 119
Factortame-like Judicial Statute
Disapplication and Dicey’s
Constitutional Orthodoxy: A Case
for their Mutual Compatibility
V LF*1
A
In the second Factortame case, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords
disapplied part of an Act of Parliament that infringed Community law. In 1996,
HWR Wade famously argued that that decision had engendered a revolution in
the traditional doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty: such judicial intervention,
according to the constitutional scholar, was incompatible with the orthodox
constitutional arrangement of the United Kingdom as authoritatively captured by
AV Dicey. In this article, I argue that if Wade’s analysis of the case still holds such
sway today, it is because it has not been met with the rebuttal it, in fact, deserves.
This article contends that, with all the necessary ingredients, Factortame-like judicial
statute disapplication in virtue of an earlier statute is well within the boundaries
of an orthodox Diceyan conception of Parliamentary Sovereignty. In other words,
that provided all the necessary conditions are met, a court, in disapplying an
Act of Parliament or part thereof, does not commit either of the two oences
that immediately spring to the reader’s mind when reading the Factortame (No. 2)
decision, namely (i) that of subverting Parliament’s legislative sovereignty by force of
common law encroachment or (ii) that of allowing an earlier Parliament to bind its
successor through manner-and-form hurdles. To achieve this objective, I formulate
* LLB candidate (University College London). My heartfelt gratitude goes to Professor Ronan
McCrea (University College London) for his precious guidance in the writing of this article, and to
Professor Philip Schofield for his constructive comments on early drafts. Insightful comments from
anonymous reviewers were also instrumental in strengthening the piece, for which I am grateful.
vincent.lafortune.19@ucl.ac.uk. 1
Cambridge Law Review (2021) Vol VI, Issue ii, 119–152
Factortame-like Judicial Statute Disapplication120
a new definition of “constitutional statute” and argue for a reconceptualization
of Parliament’s temporality. These two arguments, which I respectively label the
technical and constitutional arguments, fuse together to show that a pristine Diceyan
conception of Parliamentary sovereignty enjoys more expansive bounds than
previously thought, so as to even encompass judicial disapplication of an Act of
Parliament or part thereof in virtue of an earlier statute, when a particular set of
conditions obtain.
Keywords: Factortame, statute disapplication, constitutional statute, constitutional orthodoxy,
parliamentary sovereignty
I. I
In his 1996 article “Sovereignty: Revolution or Evolution?”,1 HWR Wade
characterized the Factortame (No. 2)2 decision as a revolution in the “traditional
[Diceyan] doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty” because, by disapplying
a provision in the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 in virtue of a provision in the
earlier European Communities Act 1972, “the House of Lords elected to allow
the Parliament of 1972 to fetter the Parliament of 1988”.3 Wade’s claim is a bold
but sensible one because judicial disapplication of an Act of Parliament seems
prima facie anathema to the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom as
authoritatively captured by Dicey.4 It is also an appealing claim, not least because
it has not yet been met with the rebuttal it in fact deserves. Indeed, all attempts to
rationalize the decision systematically cede, however unwittingly, the most crucial
terrain to Wade, namely the decision’s incompatibility with Dicey’s idea of the
workings of Parliamentary Sovereignty in this jurisdiction.
This article contends that with all the necessary ingredients, Factortame-
like judicial statute disapplication in virtue of an earlier statute is well within the
boundaries of an orthodox Diceyan conception of Parliamentary Sovereignty.
In other words, that provided all the necessary conditions are met, a court, in
disapplying an Act of Parliament or part thereof, does not commit either of the two
oences that immediately spring to the reader’s mind when reading the Factortame
(No. 2)5 decision, namely (i) that of subverting Parliament’s legislative sovereignty
by force of common law encroachment or (ii) that of allowing an earlier Parliament
1 HWR Wade, ‘Sovereignty: evolution or revolution?’ (1996) 112 LQR 568.
2 R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd (No. 2) [1990] UKHL 7, [1991] 1 AC 603.
3 Wade (n 1) 574.
4 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (first published 1885, Macmillan 1915),
3-4.
5 Factortame (n 2).
Factortame-like Judicial Statute Disapplication 121
to bind its successor through manner-and-form hurdles. If these contentions are
accepted, hitherto controversial case law such as the decision in Factortame (No.
2),6 can be safely reframed as perfectly Dicey-compliant. Moreover, incidental
conclusions of almost equal importance will be arrived at on the way to this main
one. A technical argument and a constitutional argument fuse together to support this
thesis.
The technical argument puts forth a brand-new definition of the key ingredient
for judicial statute disapplication to obtain, namely a constitutional statute.
Necessary therefore, in the first place, is a review of the many dierent accounts
currently existing on the nature of these somewhat perplexing special statutes.
Secondly, in rejecting all currently available rationalizations of constitutional
statutes, my definition signals a clear break from the current paradigm where
constitutional statutes are said to be shielded from implied repeal because they boast
some especial normative worth entitling them to constitutional status. I show why
this irremediably puts the cart before the horse and argue that, instead, some statutes
are of a constitutional nature because they are linguistically shielded from implied
repeal. This enables me to show, contra prior explanations, that there is nothing
controversial, from a Diceyan perspective, in a constitutional statute investing the
courts with disapplication powers. With this redefinition of constitutional statutes, I
am equipped to deflect contentions that Factortame (No. 2)7 marked a fundamental
shift in constitutional orthodoxy, something which other attempted counters to
Wade’s revolution thesis have failed to accomplish.
Next, the constitutional argument erects fortifications around the technical
argument in anticipation of jurisprudential siege. It argues for a radical departure
from the idée reçue that “a Parliament” is one unique sovereign unit established
at every general election (in following the conventional characterisation, it is
assumed here that when the composition of the House of Commons changes,
a new Parliament is formed). Rather, I argue that Parliament, as the supreme
and untrammelled legislator under a Diceyan conception of sovereignty, is one
temporally continuous entity, and has been so since its inception. This argument acts
as a prophylactic against the most obvious attack to which the technical argument
exposes itself, namely a “constitutional-orthodoxy-flavoured” rebuke of the
premises upon which it (the technical argument) stands. Furthermore, the constitutional
argument’s importance is signified by the light it shines on a core aspect of the United
Kingdom’s constitution, namely the foundational principle of the separation of
powers between the legislature and the executive.
Thus, the technical and constitutional arguments come together to show that a
pristine Diceyan conception of Parliamentary sovereignty enjoys more expansive
6 ibid.
7 ibid.

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