Fairman v Perpetual Investment Building Society
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Buckmaster,Lord Atkinson,Lord Sumner,Lord Wrenbury,Lord Carson |
| Judgment Date | 03 November 1922 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1922] UKHL J1103-4 |
| Date | 03 November 1922 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1922] UKHL J1103-4
Lord Buckmaster.
Lord Atkinson.
Lord Sumner.
Lord Wrenbury.
Lord Carson.
House of Lords
After hearing Counsel, as well on Tuesday the 4th, as Thursday the 6th, days of July last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Lilian Fairman, pauper, of 18, Salisbury Buildings, Munton Road, Old Kent Road, S.E., praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 1st of July 1921, might be reviewed before His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied, or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament might seem meet; as also upon the printed Case of the Perpetual Investment Building Society, lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, in the name of the House of Lords, by the Lords of Appeal sitting in the House of Lords during the Dissolution of Parliament, by virtue of a Writing by His Majesty the King under His Sign Manual, dated the 26th day of October 1922, pursuant to the provisions of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, That the said Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 1st day of July 1921, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Affirmed, and that the said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House.
My Lords,
If the case of Miller and Hancock (1893, 2 Q.B., at page 177) be accepted without qualification or restriction as a correct exposition of the law, I agree with Mr. Justice Shearman in thinking that there is no answer to the Appellant's claim, for the difference between the circumstances in that case, and those which have given rise to the present dispute, is one devoid of legal consequence. It is therefore advisable, before analysing the facts that underlie the present Appeal, to examine critically what it was that Miller and Hancock established.
The case is reported both in the "Law Reports" and in the "Law Times," and the reports differ both in the narrative of facts and in the words of the judgments. I assume, therefore, that in the "Law Reports" there was a revision by the learned Judges of the judgments that they delivered, and I shall therefore accept that as an authoritative statement.
The facts were these: The Defendant Hancock owned a building in the City, the different floors of which were let separately as chambers or offices. The staircase by which access to and from the street was obtained remained in his possession and control.
The Plaintiff, who, in the course of business with one of the tenants, was attending one of these sets of offices on the second floor, fell on the stairs owing to their worn and defective state and suffered injuries for which he sought recompense against the landlord.
The jury found that the stairs were in an unsafe condition and that in consequence the accident had arisen. Judgment was accordingly given for the Plaintiff, and from that judgment an Appeal was brought. The Appeal failed. The Master of the Rolls held that the landlord was bound to keep the staircase so as to afford a reasonably safe entrance and exit to the tenants. He added that there was an implied obligation on the part of the landlord to the tenants to that effect. He further stated that there was a relation between the landlord and those who resort to the premises for business purposes, from which the duty arises on the part of the landlord to keep the staircase which is the means of access in reasonably safe repair.
Lord Justice Bowen also said, that as part of the demise, it was intended by necessary implication that the landlord should keep the stairs reasonably safe for the use of persons who go up and down the stairs in the ordinary course of business with the tenants, and Lord Justice Kay's judgment depends upon similar considerations.
If these statements are accepted without explanation, they appear difficult to reconcile with well-known principles of law, for behind them there is a suggestion that the liability arises from a contractual obligation between the landlord and the tenant and this could not give rise to any rights by third parties unless the contract was construed as authorising the tenant to act on the part of the landlord in giving an invitation to those attending the premises for business purposes with wider implications and more serious consequences than an ordinary invitation would confer at Common Law. I do not think this was intended.
Both the Master of the Rolls and Lord Justice Bowen state that their reasoning is supported by the case of Smith against London and St. Katherine Docks Company, in Law Reports 3, Common Pleas 326. In that case a gangway was provided by the dock company from the vessel to the docks. The dock authority knew that the gangway was dangerous, strangers did not. A person lawfully using the gangway fell by reason of its negligent construction and was injured, and the docks company were held liable upon the principle that persons inviting others on their premises were answerable for anything in the nature of a trap. This clearly placed the liability on grounds of tort and disregarded all questions connected with contract.
It is, to my mind, only upon that ground that the case of Miller and Hancock can be supported. Now the liability in tort of the owner of premises to those who use them is carefully discussed in the case of Latham v. R. Johnson and Nephew (1913, 1 K.B., p. 398), and the statement of law at page 410 is a concise and accurate expression of well-known principles. It is there pointed out that the duty varies; being lowest to the trespasser; next to a licensee, and greatest to a person whose position owing to the deficiencies of the English language is described by lawyers as an "invitee," meaning persons invited to the premises by the owner or occupier for purposes of business or of material interest.
It was under that third clause that the Plaintiff came in Miller and Hancock and in Indermaur and Dames.
It is well to keep these principles in mind in considering the subsequent authorities in which Miller and Hancock came under consideration. The first of these, Hargroves v. Hartopp (1905, 1 K.B. p. 472), although the judgment appears to depend upon Miller and Hancock, may be dismissed upon the ground that the action was one between landlord and tenant and therefore involved a consideration of contractual obligation. That such contractual obligations gave no rise to claims by third parties is old and well established law and its application is illustrated by the case of Cavalier v. Pope (1906, Appeal Cases, p. 428).
The next authority in order of date is Huggett v. Myers (1908, 2 K.B., p. 278). The circumstances there were similar to those in Miller and Hancock, excepting that the accident was due to the staircase being unlit. It was held that the landlord was not responsible for the damage. Miller v. Hancock was naturally much discussed, and Lord Gorell appears to think, at page 283, that the liability in that case might have arisen owing to the implied agreement by the landlord with the tenant. I have already stated that I cannot accept that view. Lord Moulton confesses to a difficulty in understanding the grounds of that decision, but suggests it was due to the authority conferred by the landlord upon the tenant to issue invitations to people having business on the premises, binding the landlord. This also was the view of Lord Justice Farwell, but if the invitation was not clothed with unusual consequences it was unnecessary it should be so inferred as the facts of the common staircase and open entrance would in themselves, in my opinion, constitute a direct invitation by the landlord.
In Lucy and Bawden (1914, 2 K.B., p. 318), steps approaching the house were insufficiently fenced from the adjoining area. The steps were in the possession and control of the landlord, but the accident due to this insufficient fencing was held by Mr. Justice Atkin to be one in respect of which the landlord was not responsible since the danger was patent and had existed throughout.
His judgment contains the following statement:—
"On principle it is difficult to see how an obligation could be imposed upon a landlord larger than the obligation to avoid traps. It is plain that he is, in the absence of express or implied agreement, not liable at all for the consequence of letting a house in a state of even dangerous disrepair. If he lets a loft approached by a ladder, a cellar approached by steel steps, or invites access to his premises over a plank, there seems no reason that the person accepting an invitation to use the ladder, the steps, or the plank, should, if injured by no hidden danger, be at liberty to complain that the access was not of a different and safer character. I see no difference between the use of an unlighted staircase— Huggett v. Miers—and the use of an unfenced staircase."
This is, in my opinion, an accurate statement of the law.
In Dobson v. Horsley (1915, 1 K.B., p. 634), an accident occurred owing to steps in a similar position having a defect in the railing through which a child of the tenant's fell. The defect existed at the date of the demise, and as the law throws upon the landlord no obligation to guarantee the conditions as to safety, through either sanitary or structual defects, of the property he lets, it was held again that the landlord was not responsible.
The case of Miller v. Hancock was once more examined, and L.J. Buckley, following as he was bound to do the case of Miller and Hancock, placed the...
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