Farrer & Company LLP v Julie Marie Meyer
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Males,Lady Justice Nicola Davies,Lord Justice Green |
| Judgment Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] EWCA Civ 706 |
| Docket Number | Case No: CA-2022.000220 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
[2022] EWCA Civ 706
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Mr Justice Kerr
[2022] EWHC 3662 (QB)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Green
Lady Justice Nicola Davies
and
Lord Justice Males
Case No: CA-2022.000220
The Appellant was unrepresented and did not attend
Liisa Lahti (instructed by Farrer & Co LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 19 May 2022
Approved Judgment
This judgment will be handed down by the Judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to The National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10.30 a.m. on Thursday 26 May 2022.
Introduction
This is an appeal by the defendant, Julie Marie Meyer, against the order made by Mr Justice Kerr on 26 th January 2022 finding her in contempt of court and sentencing her to a suspended sentence of six months' imprisonment.
Ms Meyer is a citizen of the United States, resident in Zurich, Switzerland. She is the Chief Executive Officer of Viva Investment Partners AG (“Viva”), an investment company which she says that she founded in July 2018, although she says also that she is not a shareholder or in control of any shares in the company. She describes herself as “the public face of the firm and its sole director”.
Between April and November 2018 Ms Meyer instructed the claimant, a firm of solicitors. The claim in this action is for unpaid fees of £187,227, together with interest. On 10 th December 2019 the claimant obtained a default judgment against Ms Meyer. The claim form had been served on her pursuant to section 1140 of the Companies Act 2006 at two London addresses registered by her in connection with her role as a director of two English companies.
The judge dealt with a number of matters in his judgment. He dismissed Ms Meyer's application to set aside the default judgment; he refused an extension of time for her to comply with an order to disclose certain documents; he refused to vary the order for disclosure and ordered her to attend in person at a hearing on 14 th February 2022; he found that Ms Meyer was in contempt of court; and he sentenced her to a suspended sentence of six months' imprisonment. Ms Meyer sought permission to appeal on all of these matters, contending that the default judgment should be set aside; that the disclosure order was wrong in principle; that the judge had no jurisdiction to find her in contempt; and that the sentence imposed was excessive.
Permission to appeal was refused by Lord Justice Coulson on all of these issues without a hearing. His comprehensive ruling extended to 32 paragraphs. However, at a hearing on 5 th April 2022 at which the defendant was represented by counsel (Ms Francesca Perselli), it was submitted on her behalf that she did not need permission on any of her five proposed grounds of appeal. Lord Justice Coulson held (see [2022] EWCA Civ 585) that Ms Meyer did need permission to appeal on four of the five grounds (concerned with whether the default judgment was regular, whether the proceedings had been validly served on her, and whether the judge should have exercised his discretion to set aside the judgment), that those grounds had no prospect of success, and that his refusal to grant permission would be maintained. He accepted, however, that the defendant was entitled to appeal against the finding of contempt and the sentence imposed on her without permission pursuant to section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960.
Accordingly the sole ground of appeal so far as liability is concerned is that:
“The learned judge had no jurisdiction to find that the Appellant was in contempt of court, or to make a suspended committal order because the relevant provisions of CPR Part 71 and PD 71 were not complied with in respect of the 21 January hearing and the order made subsequently to it.”
This ground of appeal does not identify the respects in which it is contended that there was a failure to comply with the provisions of CPR 71 and PD 71. We must therefore find these, as best we can, in a skeleton argument prepared by Ms Perselli in support of the initial application for permission to appeal, together with a further skeleton argument, dated 27 th April 2022, prepared by Mr Anthony Metzer QC and Ms Emma Harris after the hearing before Lord Justice Coulson at which the scope of the appeal was defined.
Ms Meyer is currently unrepresented and did not attend the hearing of the appeal. Nor did she provide the appeal bundle required by CPR 52 PD 6.3. On 11 th May 2022 (i.e. eight days before the hearing of this appeal) Mr Stephen Gilchrist of her solicitors, Clarke & Co, notified the court that she had dispensed with the services of his firm and, as he understood it, of counsel. Ms Meyer has claimed that she did not attend the hearing on 14 th February 2022 ordered by the judge because “her Swiss and US legal team has directed her not to appear in court nor to go to the UK for the foreseeable future”. I infer that this remains her position.
So far as I can see there is no good reason why Ms Meyer could not have attended the hearing of her appeal, save perhaps for her desire to avoid imprisonment in the event of it being unsuccessful. Equally, it has been her choice to dispense with the services of her lawyers here. She continues, apparently, to be advised by what she describes as her “Swiss and US legal team”. Until recently she has had access to legal advice from solicitors and counsel here, but she has chosen not to provide the documents required for proper consideration of her appeal or to attend or instruct counsel to advance her case.
In these circumstances the appeal could properly be regarded as having been abandoned. However, as we have been provided with an appeal bundle by the respondent claimant, and as we have the benefit of the skeleton arguments prepared by Ms Perselli and by Mr Metzer and Ms Harris, I think it preferable to decide the appeal on its merits. I am satisfied that we are in a position to do so fairly. In particular, we have been greatly assisted by the submissions of the claimant's counsel, Ms Liisa Lahti, both in writing and at the hearing. Ms Lahti very fairly identified the points which might have been made in favour of the appeal.
Background
The claimant firm seeks payment of £187,227, together with interest, being fees for professional services rendered to Ms Meyer between April and November 2018. On 9 th October 2019 the claimant sent a letter before claim to her address in Switzerland, but Ms Meyer did not respond. The claim was issued on 15 th November 2019. On 19 th November the claimant served the claim form at two London addresses registered by Ms Meyer pursuant to section 1140 of the Companies Act 2006 in connection with her role as a director of two English companies. Ms Meyer learned of the proceedings, apparently from a media source, and emailed Mr Julian Pike, a partner of the claimant, on 6 th December 2019, saying that she had heard that a claim had been made. However, she did not acknowledge service.
Accordingly the claimant obtained a default judgment on 10 th December 2019. On 20 th January 2020 an order was made under CPR 71, endorsed with two penal notices, requiring Ms Meyer to attend at the Royal Courts of Justice on 5 th March 2020 to provide information about her means for the purpose of enforcement of the judgment. The order explained that she would be required to produce documents to the court and answer questions on oath. The second penal notice warned that if she did not obey the order, she might be sent to prison for contempt of court. A list of documents to be produced was included.
On or about the same day, 20 th January 2020, Ms Meyer (at this point unrepresented) made an application to set aside the default judgment, challenging the validity of the service upon her. She complained that the claimant had provided a poor standard of service and that, at the most, only £50,000 was due to it rather than the full sum claimed. She sought also a stay of execution and an adjournment of the oral examination due to be held on 5 th March 2020. That application came before Mr Justice Saini on 4 th March 2020, with Ms Meyer represented by counsel, Mr Tom Bell. Mr Bell accepted that Ms Meyer owed money to the claimant, but could not put a figure on how much was owed. He submitted that she had a good defence to the balance of the claim, whatever that was, so that the judgment ought to be set aside. Mr Justice Saini dismissed the application to adjourn the oral examination due to take place the next day. He adjourned the remainder of Ms Meyer's application.
The hearing on 5 th March 2020 took place before a court officer. Ms Meyer did not attend, either remotely or in person (this was before the first coronavirus lockdown), but was represented by counsel. The court officer referred the matter to a Queen's Bench Master. There was then a very long delay during which the claimant chased the court on a number of occasions. Eventually, in June 2021, the claimant sought an order that Ms Meyer be held in contempt, requesting that a suspended sentence should be imposed, and that she should be ordered to attend court in order to comply with the order previously made under CPR 71. Mr Justice Lane ordered the matter into court, warning Ms Meyer that she would be in contempt if she did not attend the hearing by remote means. His order was endorsed with a penal notice.
On 28 th July 2021 the matter came before His Honour Judge Simpkiss, sitting as a judge of the High Court. Ms Meyer did not attend, although she was represented by Ms Perselli, instructed by Oakland & Co. Judge...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc.
...the particular case. That is how the point was put in Business Mortgage Finance 4 Plc v Hussain at [91] and in Farrer & Co LLP v Meyer [2022] EWCA Civ 706, P2–23] 1 WLR 396 at [40]. It is, after all, the common experience of this court that new points are sometimes raised on appeal, in whi......
-
Business Mortgage Finance 4 Plc v Rizwan Hussain
...may be an abuse of process to do so: Al-Rawas v Hassan Khan & Co [2022] EWCA Civ 671 at [29] per Coulson LJ, Farrar & Co v Meyer at [2022] EWCA Civ 706 at [40] per Males LJ. Mr Counsell pointed out that he was only instructed at a very late stage and had a number of other matters to deal ......