Filling black holes – using business process analysis in criminal intelligence
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-03-2017-0023 |
| Published date | 03 July 2017 |
| Pages | 412-424 |
| Date | 03 July 2017 |
| Author | Kenneth Murray |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & Finance,Financial risk/company failure,Financial crime |
Filling black holes – using
business process analysis in
criminal intelligence
Kenneth Murray
Department of Forensic Accountancy, Police Scotland, Glasgow, UK
Abstract
Purpose –The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of improving nancial intelligence
capture in understanding organized crime and the funding of terrorism.
Design/methodology/approach –The paper presents an analytical review of the core business
processes used to harvest the revenues from illegal drug trafcking. Furthermore, assessment of the extent to
which modern, organised crime – and the dynamics of the relationships between the relevant collaborating
parties – can be more accurately dened in terms of these processes.
Findings –Understanding distinctive capabilities of criminal funding processes as well as their
participants offers an approach to lling intelligence black holes which continue to afict efforts to tackle
organised crime and terrorism.
Originality/value –This paper establishes a framework for understanding and countering threat through
application of competitive strategy analysis.
Keywords Organised crime, Counter terrorism, Business processes, Distinctive capabilities,
Financial intelligence
Paper type Viewpoint
Introduction
The concept of organised crime, as considered by contemporary criminologists, often leads
to conclusions critical of approaches taken by law enforcement and the government to tackle
it. The underlying message, whether explicit or implied, is that “organised crime” is
essentially a term used to “sex up” threats to support the case for public investment in law
enforcement resources.
A common approach of these critiques is to dismember the term “organised crime” in
ways designed to show the term serves limited practical purpose; the range of phenomena it
describes can be presented as being too diverse to support its use; organised crime is not
really organised at all but a loose collection of partially connected activities that are
characterised, not by planning or management or anything that could be construed as
sophistication, but the availability of suitable opportunity.
One of the more inuential contributions promulgating this view has been that Peter Reuter’s
seminal study of illegal gambling rackets in Nevada (Reuter, 2004). The text was recently
recruited by Tom Gash in the context of his review of a series of self-constructed criminal “myths”
(the aim of his book, of course, being to dismantle them). The “myth” relating to organised crime
is given the heading, “Organised crime is big, bad and booming” (Gash, 2016).
In his paraphrase of Reuter, Gash posits the relevant “myth”, derived from “government
reports and lm dramatisations”, to be that:
[…] illegal businesses were essentially dominated by organised crime groups (OCGs) which
eliminated competition through violence and corruption. These organisations were thought to be
large and hierarchical, with orders cascading down various layers of management, and numerous
street level employees (Gash, 2016).
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/1359-0790.htm
JFC
24,3
412
Journalof Financial Crime
Vol.24 No. 3, 2017
pp.412-424
©Emerald Publishing Limited
1359-0790
DOI 10.1108/JFC-03-2017-0023
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