Financial independence and its implications for euro area central banks
| Published date | 01 August 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X231224717 |
| Author | David Baez Seara |
| Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Financial independence and its
implications for euro area
central banks
David Baez Seara*
,
**
Abstract
The principle of financial independence recently recognized by the Court of Justice in the Banka
Slovenije judgment requires that euro area central banks should be able to avail themselves with
sufficient financial resources to carry out their tasks, as in situations in which central banks are
financially dependent on the State to operate, the latter might impose conditions impairing the
monetary policy objective. The Banka Slovenije judgment arrives within a context never faced
before by the Eurosystem, that of several euro area central banks facing losses from the implemen-
tation of the monetary policy function. This novel situation, which is very likely to be prolonged
over the next years, together with the articulation of the principle of financial independence by the
Court of Justice, has an impact on the role of the State as a possible last resort provider of add-
itional capital to the central bank, on the tools that central banks have in place to protect them-
selves against losses, and on the stability of accountability arrangements. This article assesses this
impact and proposes a mechanism based on the reallocation of losses to the ECB which reinforces
the financial independence of euro area central banks and streamlines accountability practices.
Keywords
Accountability, central bank capital, central bank losses, ECB, Eurosystem, euro area national
central banks, financial independence, monetary policy
1. Introduction
Several euro area central banks are facing losses as consequence of the monetary policy defined
and implemented in the Eurosystem. The primary monetary policy objective, as established in
*European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
**Université Catholique de Lille, Faculté Libre de Droit, Lille Cedex, France
Corresponding author:
David Baez Seara, European Central Bank, Sonnemannstrasse 20, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; Université
Catholique de Lille, Faculté Libre de Droit, 58 Rue du Port, 59016 Lille Cedex, France.
Email: david.baez@ecb.europa.eu.; david.baezseara@lacatholille.fr
Article
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
2023, Vol. 30(4) 506–523
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1023263X231224717
maastrichtjournal.sagepub.com
Article 127(1) of the TFEU, is price stability and not loss-reduction or profit maximization, and
hence the objective of price stability shall not be subordinated to internal financial considera-
tions of the euro area central banks. In other terms, the way monetary policy is carried out
should not be modified for the sole purpose of reducing losses or maximizing profits, if that
modification negatively affects the monetary policy objective.
1
In the current context of
excess liquidity from monetary policy purchases programmes adopted in the past by the
Eurosystem and a higher deposit facility rate according to which euro area central banks remu-
nerate deposits of commercial banks, euro area central banks may have to endure growing
losses in their financial accounts for some time. This may trigger a novel situation for the
Eurosystem: that of euro area central banks operating with large losses.
2
The situation is par-
ticularly interesting from the viewpoint of the principle of financial independence according
to which euro area central banks should be able to avail themselves of sufficient financial
resources to carry out their tasks.
3
The rationale for this principle is that euro area central
banks with insufficient financial resources may be prone to pressure by the State that may
link an eventual provision of funding to the central bank with the fulfilment of conditions
which undermine the monetary policy objective.
4
Euro area central banks, as issuers of euro-
denominated central bank money, can neither go insolvent nor run out of money, and hence
they could continue to operate with losses.
5
However, when losses grow and accumulate for
1. The ECB’s Governing Council decided on 27 July 2023 to set the remuneration of minimum reserves from the
Eurosystem’s deposit facility rate (3.75% at the time the decision was made) to 0%. The purpose of this change was
to reduce ‘the overall amount of interest that needs to be paid on reserves in order to implement the appropriate [monetary
policy] stance’while at the same time ‘preserv[ing] the effectiveness of monetary policy by maintaining the current degree
of control over the monetary policy stance’. Hence, while the decision was driven by internal financial considerations
relevant within with the principle of proportionality (i.e.: reducing the amount to be paid by national central banks to com-
mercial banks for their minimum reserves) that measure was adopted without prejudice of the price stability objective, and
hence it did not negatively affect the price stability objective. See, European Central Bank, ‘ECB Adjusts Remuneration of
Minimum Reserves’, 23 July 2023, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2023/html/ecb.pr230727∼7206e9aa48.en.
html.
2. The annual accounts for 2022 of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Banque de France and De Nederlandsche Bank reported a
distributable profit of zero. This result was achieved by tapping into the financial buffers, which means that, absent
those financial buffers, these central banks would have reported a net loss for the year.
4. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-45/21 Banka Slovenije, EU:C:2022:241, para. 80; K. Cukierman, ‘Central
Bank Finances and Independence: How Much Capital Should a Central Bank Have?’, in S. Milton and P. Sinclair (eds.),
The Capital Need of Central Banks (Routledge, 2010), p. 34. According to Cukierman, ‘[when the capital of the central
bank] is negative, it is more likely that the CB will depend on infusions of funds from the treasury, opening the door for
various pressures on the bank to ease policy in order to contribute directly or indirectly to financing of the deficit and/or to
a (temporary) higher level of economic activity’.
5. European Central Bank, ‘Transcript of Christine Lagarde’s Hearing at the Committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs,
European Parliament’, 19 November 2020: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201119_
transcript∼353ee9966e.en.pdf, p.10. The idea that euro area central banks can neither go insolvent nor run out of
money takes into consideration the decision-making role of the Governing Council on monetary policy matters and
hence its capacity to decide on money creation within the Eurosystem. It should also be noted that Lagarde’s explanation
differs in kind from arguments on the financially unconstrained nature of ‘sovereign currency issuers’as these arguments
focus on the role of national governments as issuers of a currency and hence in their capacityto influence monetary policy.
See, L.R. Wray, ‘Alternative Path to Modern Money Theory’,89Real-World Economics Review (2019), p. 5.
Seara 507
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