Fixed-Term Parliaments: Electing the Opposition
| Published date | 01 February 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2009.01364.x |
| Date | 01 February 2010 |
| Subject Matter | Research and Analysis |
Research and Analysis
Fixed-Term Parliaments: Electing
the Oppositionponl_136418..25
Alan Hamlin
University of Manchester
Constitutional reform requires a cautious approach that draws heavily on the theory of institutions.
Too often arguments for particular constitutional arrangements are one-dimensional and limited in
scope and imagination. This article illustrates this theme by discussing the debate over fixed- and
variable-term parliaments, and by offering a somewhat novel argument that focuses on the role of
the opposition within a parliamentary system.
Introduction
The constitutional debate between fixed and variable terms of office for elected
governments has recently been enlivened in the UK in the aftermath of the scandal
surrounding MPs’ expenses in May 2009 (for evidence of the campaign see http://
www.fixedterm.org.uk/). The scandal was met by renewed calls for a wide variety
of constitutional reforms which were at least nominally aimed at reconnecting
citizens with the parliamentary process and limiting the discretionary power of MPs
and government. Quite what the link from MPs’ expenses to fixed-term parlia-
ments may be is not clear; perhaps it is no more than the thought that if we cannot
trust MPs in one domain (expenses), we should not trust MPs, or the government,
in any domain (determining the date of a general election) where there is an
alternative institutional arrangement that operates without requiring trust. In any
case, just as the advocates of constitutional reform have taken the opportunity to
renew calls for their preferred measures, so I will take the opportunity to take up
the argument.
The UK is by no means alone in having constitutional arrangements that allow of
variable terms. Although details differ, Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, India,
Japan, New Zealand and Turkey are among those where there is at least some
discretion in the timing of elections, and in a substantial number of these countries
there have been calls for reform to fix the dates of national elections (see
Chowdhury, 1993). In the case of Canada this reform has been introduced recently,
although the government that introduced it did not then serve its full term (for
discussion of the Canadian case see Reid, 1998; Blais et al., 2004; Leuprecht and
McHugh, 2008).
The broad idea behind the argument for fixed-term parliaments is that allowing the
government of the day the choice of the election date grants them an undue political
POLITICS: 2010 VOL 30(1), 18–25
© 2010 The Author.Journal compilation © 2010 Political Studies Association
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