Focus On: East-West Relations at the Cross-Roads

AuthorCarl G. Jacobsen
Published date01 June 1983
Date01 June 1983
DOI10.1177/002234338302000201
Subject MatterArticles
Focus
On:
East-West
Relations
at
the
Cross-Roads
CARL G. JACOBSEN
Center
for
Advanced
International
Studies,
University
of
Miami
1983
looks
to
be
a
make
or
break
year
for
arms
control.
On
the
one
hand
a
number
of
military,
technological
and
political
factors
have
come
together
in
a
way
that
makes
signi-
ficant
arms
control,
and
even
arms
reductions,
a
real
possibility,
for
the
first
time
in
many
years.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
opportunity
is
missed,
it
is
clear
that
we
will
be
entering
a
cycle
of
the
arms
race
that
may
stymie
arms
control
aspirations
for
years
and
perhaps
decades
to
come.
The
weapons
technologies
and
weapons
systems
now
ready
to
take
off
will
result
in
less
observable
and
less
countable
arsenals.
Laser
and
high
energy
particle
beam
prospects
and
intercontinental-range
cruise
missiles
small
enough
to
hide
in
the
baggage
compartment
of
your
car
promise
to
make
the
task
of
even
the
most
reasonable
minded
arms
negotiators
of
the
1990s
well
nigh
impossible.’
I
During
the
late
1970s
the
spreading
(mis-)
perception
that
the
military-political
pendulum
was
swinging
Moscow’s
way,
and
that
the
Soviet
Union
might
be
on
the
verge
of
achieving
meaningful
superiority,
fuelled
the
rightward
trend
in
US
politics
that
made
Ronald
Reagan
President.
The
early
years
of
the
1980s
generated
a
mirror-image
reaction
in
Moscow.
Reagan’s
historic
boosting
of
US
arms
expenditures
(from
144
billion
dollars
in
1981
to
a
projected
343
billion
in
1986)
acted
like
a
blood
transfusion
for
the
most
doctrinaire
and
hawkish
sector
of
Russia’s
Party
and
military
establishment.
Fear
that
Washington
was
now
riding
the
crest
of
military-political
momentum
gave
Soviet
hardliners
their
chance.
The
weeks
before
Brezhnev’s death
witnessed
their
apparent
victory.
Brezhnev
himself,
and
other
leading
Politburo
members,
confirmed
a
consensus
decision
to
jack
up
Soviet
arms
expenditures.
They
emphasized
their
reluctance,
their
recognition
that
the
decision
would
mean
deferment
of
at
least
some
alternative
invest-
ment
goals.
But
they
appeared
to
have
con-
cluded
that
they
had
no
other
option.
The
reluctance
had
of
course
been
borne
out
by
Soviet
action,
or
lack
thereof,
during
the
preceding
two
years.
Reagan’s
unremitting
hostility,
in
words
and
deeds,
was
on
the
whole
met
by
surprisingly
mild
reaction
in
Moscow.
In
many
ways
Moscow
clearly
bent
over
back-
wards
in
order
not
to
add
fuel
to
White
House
fires.
The
conciliatory
stance
was
epitomized
by
Moscow’s
announcement
that
on-site
inspection
of
arms
treaty
compliance
would
be
acceptable.
For
political
reasons
Moscow
had
never
before
been
willing
to
concede
this
long-standing
American
demand.
The
con-
cession
had
little
military
relevance.
After
all,
SALT
I
and
SALT
II
had
been
predicated
on
the
considered
judgement
of
past
American
administrations,
Republican
as
well
as
Democratic,
that
’national
means
of
veri-
fication’
(primarily
satellites)
had
become
so
reliable
that
the
scope
for
cheating
was
minimal,
and
hence
tolerable.
Nevertheless,
in
political
terms
there
can
be
no
question
that
the
concession,
and
its
symbolism,
was
highly
meaningful.
Moscow’s
conciliatory
posture,
and
her
reluctance
to
up
the
arms
race
ante,
was
a
direct
consequence
of
the
squeeze
occasioned
by
lower
economic
growth
rates.
Brezhnev
had
side-tracked
Prime
Minister
Kosygin’s
1964-68
calls
for
extensive
domestic
economic
reforms
and
decentralization
by
forging
a
consensus
belief
that
more
extensive
com-

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