A Fool's Errand? The Next Secretary‐General and United Nations Reform
| Published date | 01 May 2017 |
| Author | Richard Ponzio,Michael Bluman Schroeder |
| Date | 01 May 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12445 |
A Fool’s Errand? The Next Secretary-General
and United Nations Reform
Richard Ponzio
Stimson Center
Michael Bluman Schroeder
American University
Abstract
How can the incoming Secretary-General Ant
onio Guterres promote and lead change? The view in many policy circles is that
the UN urgently needs comprehensive change, and the next Secretary-General is expected to capitalize on the honeymoon to
initiate a transformation. We argue that initiating transformational change is counterproductive for the next Secretary-General.
A better strategy is to implement modest changes that accumulate over multiple rounds and to influence and empower the
leadership of so-called ‘smart coalitions’of state and non-state actors seeking to enact ambitious changes to intergovernmen-
tal structures and global norms. Specifically, we propose a change leadership strategy for the next Secretary-General based on
five guiding principles and including illustrative reforms that suggest how the next Secretary-General might put each principle
into practice.
Policy Implications
The incoming Secretary-General should:
•Give the organization direction by defining an operational mission.
•Resist the urge to play thought leader and focus instead on gathering and analyzing the carefully researched and thought-
ful ideas of others.
•Avoid the temptation to pursue a comprehensive grand bargain by, instead, introducing a reform agenda incrementally
and implementing it over multiple rounds.
•Embrace informal change by seizing windows of opportunity to establish new practices.
•Let others lead by piggybacking on existing ‘smart coalitions,’or where these coalitions do not exist, exercising the Secre-
tary-General’s network, convening, and agenda setting power to facilitate their formation.
Inflated expectations? The new Secretary-General
and UN reform
The United Nations needs strong leadership if it is to meet
21st Century threats and challenges. In 2016, its humanitar-
ian agencies provided emergency relief to 76 million people
and more than 118,000 uniformed personnel and civilians
served in 16 peacekeeping operations. For many UN Mem-
ber States, change is urgently needed to update intergov-
ernmental structures, modernize the Secretariat, and reduce
turf wars and functional overlap among the loosely-orga-
nized network of specialized agencies, funds and programs.
When a new Secretary-General is selected, many Member
States, including the United States and other Western coun-
tries, demand that the new leader seize the honeymoon
period to transform the organization. The problem is that
the UN as an institution is designed to curb strong leader-
ship, and the record of these attempted transformational
reforms should stand as a cautionary tale for the next
Secretary-General, Ant
onio Guterres. The office’s limited
authority and resources, coupled with exigencies of major
powers, will constrain the kinds of reforms that the next
Secretary-General can enact –and rushing an ambitious
agenda can trigger a backlash and lingering resentment that
cripples subsequent reform initiatives.
So, how can Secretary-General Guterres promote and lead
change? Historically, strong, patient, and diplomatically cre-
ative Secretaries-General have brought about change by
accepting the office’s limitations and adapting their strategy
accordingly. Dag Hammarskj€
old (1953–1961) was responsible
for instilling a culture of civil service independence and
expanding the organization’s operational reach. More
recently, KofiAnnan (1997–2006) began updating manage-
ment practices, improving system-wide coherence, and insti-
tutionalizing civilian protection in UN peace operations. He
also threw the weight of his office behind a series of new
global institutions –from an anti-personnel landmine treaty
to the Millennium Development Goals and the Responsibility
Global Policy (2017) 8:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12445 ©2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 8 . Issue 2 . May 2017 263
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