From West to South to North

Published date01 June 2008
DOI10.1177/002070200806300205
Date01 June 2008
Subject MatterRussian Resurgence
IJ Print Pavel K. Baev
From west to south
to north
Russia engages and challenges its neighbours
It is hardly surprising that Russia’s foreign policy is to a very large degree
concerned with relations with its immediate neighbourhoods, which are
uniquely diverse and often rich in violent conflicts. This short-range policy
is a direct consequence of the country’s enormous longitude, which provides
it with more neighbours than any other state in the world. Obsession with
relations with the United States constitutes an important exception to this
pattern, but this pivotal political dimension has to remain outside the scope
of this article. Another massive omission is the ambiguous nature of Russia’s
relations with its far eastern neighbours, primarily China. Following advice
from Dirty Harry, this author acknowledges the need to know his limitations.
What is really striking about Russia’s concentration in dealing with its
neighbours is that it reaches such a degree where there is little attention left
for a wide range of global issues, even those that directly impact its well-
being. This explains the sincere lack of interest in Africa, even if Putin has
to endure long discussions about increasing aid at the G8 meetings. Hence
also the lack of attention to climate change problems after ratifying the Kyoto
Pavel K. Baev is a research professor at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo
(PRIO).

| International Journal | Spring 2008 | 291 |

| Pavel K. Baev |
protocol in 2004; it is widely assumed that Russia would not suffer that
much from global warming (even if the oil and gas producing areas in west-
ern Siberia might). Land mines and small arms ring no political bells. What
becomes less easy to explain is Russia’s non-engagement in key international
economic and financial institutions. Putin did proclaim the goal of joining
the WTO, but its non-achievement has barely registered. Among the more
current global economic issues, it is possible to point out that, during the
second half of 2007, the consensus in Moscow was that Russian banks
would not be affected by the US sub-prime crisis; it was only the sharp fall
of the stock market in January 2008 that informed the political elite that
Russia was not insulated from the continuing shocks. Even that awakening
has not changed the dominant perception that a country that holds the third
largest gold/hard currency reserves in the world does not have to play any
role in regulating global finances.
This article starts with indicating these peculiarities and oddities in order
to cut them off and isolate its main aim—to provide a provisional assessment
of whether the proactive policies in the western, southern, and northern
neighbourhoods have secured for Russia the status of a “regional great
power.” The desire for such status originates in the evolution of Russia’s po-
litical regime, and that is where the analysis begins. Energy exports constitute
the resource base for—and the key content of—these policies, and the role
of energy is evaluated in the next section. Then, five key theatres in Russia’s
foreign policy operations are examined: Europe (essentially the EU), Ukraine
and Belarus, the Caucasus, the Caspian area, and the Arctic “frontier.” The
conclusion draws a very provisional balance of achievements and setbacks
that could show whether Russia is indeed turning into a bona fide revisionist
power.
DOWN WITH DEMOCRATIZATION
Russia’s political evolution inevitably determines the key content of its rela-
tions with its neighbours, and this evolution gives more and more ground for
serious concern. Portraying Russia as an incorrigible state returning to its
traditional authoritarian ways and inherent imperialistic policies would be
not only an over-simplification but a misrepresentation of the complex and
controversial political processes. At the same time, there is hardly any doubt
that Putin’s second presidential term signified a profound retreat from the
path of democratic reforms and modernization that Russia had embarked
upon with the implosion of the USSR in late 1991. This article will not ex-
| 292 | International Journal | Spring 2008 |

| From west to south to north |
amine the incoherent substance of the emergent overcentralized (but thor-
oughly corrupt) petro-bureaucratic regime, but it appears essential to em-
phasize some of its features that are particularly pertinent to the theme under
investigation.1
One rather counterintuitive feature, for instance, is the pronounced re-
luctance to experiment with the use of military force to achieve entirely fea-
sible political goals; this reluctance is typically camouflaged with aggressive
rhetoric. Putin’s Russia is often—and often justly—criticized for blackmail-
ing and bullying its neighbours, but it is important to acknowledge that the
second half of Putin’s second term was the most peaceful period in Russia’s
post-Soviet history. An important underlying factor behind this pacifism is
the significantly slower growth of defence expenditures compared to various
socially oriented national projects—though this underspending on defence
is typically hidden behind a smokescreen of self-assertive bragging.2
This feature betrays the mercantilist character in the core interests of
Putin’s regime, but at the same time its self-proclaimed pragmatism has
gradually given way to a more ideological approach; though it isn’t formalized
in any kind of doctrine, it nevertheless constitutes a feature that has an im-
pact on its relations with neighbours. The concept of “sovereign democracy”
may not be particularly clever in its attempts to paint a democratic façade for
the bureaucratic power construct, but Vladislav Surkov, a key Kremlin ideol-
ogist, tellingly suggested that “sovereignty is a political synonym of compet-
itiveness.”3 The key proposition of this non-doctrine of sovereignty is that a
state could achieve economic success and political stability without copying
western models. In this sense, Russia has moved closer to China, since, as
1 Thoughtful and updated analysis can be found in Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-
Weiss, “The myth of the authoritarian model: How Putin’s crackdown holds Russia
back,” Foreign Affairs (January-February 2008): 68-84; penetrating insights are abun-
dant in Lilia Shevtsova, Russia—Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies
(Washington: CEIP, 2007).
2 I have elaborated on this in Pavel Baev, “Russia’s security policy grows ‘muscular’:
Should the west be worried?” UPI Briefing paper, Helsinki, FIIA, January 2008, www.upi-
fiia.fi.
3 Surkov’s lecture is posted on the “United Russia” party site, www.edinros.ru; for
poignant criticism, see Aleksandr Golts, “Forward, to the victory of Putinism,” Ezhed-
nevny zhurnal, 3 March 2006, www.ej.ru.
| International Journal | Spring 2008 | 293 |

| Pavel K. Baev |
Gideon Rachman pointed out, “the two countries are once again occupying
similar ideological terrain.”4
By conceptualizing its success story as an ideological challenge to the
west, Russia deliberately reduces the common spaces and increases the val-
ues gap with the EU, and the consequent erosion of trust inevitably down-
grades their partnership to a limited cooperation. At the same time, Russia
becomes not only perfectly politically positioned with regard to many other
neighbours—from Iran to China and from Turkmenistan to Belarus—but
even assumes informal leadership in that incoherent political space. This
leadership does not guarantee friendly relations, as the slogan “authoritari-
ans of Eurasia, unite” works only when regimes in question see a threat to
their existence, since in fair weather their parochial interests come first, shap-
ing a...

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