Functional Justiciability and the Existence of a Dispute: a Means of Jurisdictional Avoidance?

DOI10.1093/jnlids/idz019
Date25 November 2019
Pages599-621
Year2019
Published ByOxford University Press
1. INTRODUCTION

In the recent Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament1 string of cases the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declined jurisdiction by holding that there was no dispute between the parties. The Court recently—albeit more discretely—also relied on a restrictive definition of an international dispute to carve out the most controversial issue in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea: Colombia’s purported threats to use force against Nicaragua.2

This Article analyses on the Court’s treatment of the existence of a dispute (EoD) jurisdictional objection from both a doctrinal and a theoretical perspective,3 and in the broader context of justiciability. This Article does not pretend to embark upon an empirical analysis of how international courts adjudicate disputes.4 Also, while the Article examines the Court’s reliance on the EoD as a procedural escape device in some recent cases, it does not purport to analyse the Court’s broader reliance on jurisdictional issues as a more general means of avoiding or ‘ducking’ cases.5

From a doctrinal perspective, the Court’s interpretation of the EoD objection in those cases is unpersuasive and unsound—at least when viewed in strictly formalist terms. The main issue is that the existence of a dispute jurisdictional objection has become doctrinally muddled. This is problematic. It results in the Court’s relatively erratic treatment of the EoD objection throughout its cases, including the sudden addition of new requirements and the abrupt modification of old ones.6

Jurisdictional requirements regarding the existence of a dispute before domestic courts are usually focused on avoiding covert requests for advisory opinions.7 Discussions over the existence of a dispute are thus rare.8 These requirements are not particularly common at the international level either, yet they have surfaced with certain regularity before the ICJ.9 The ICJ’s inherent jurisdictional limitations (and the complexities they create) may be the reason for this.10 Few other tribunals face the jurisdictional challenges that the International Court faces. Several factors cause this: lack of compulsory jurisdiction; States’ possibility of restricting their acceptance of the Court’s temporal and subject-matter jurisdiction through reservations; treaties that, although accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, narrowly limit that acceptance to certain issues; and reciprocity requirements for jurisdictional acceptance, among other factors. It is easy to see why some jurisdictional issues end up being so hard to decide. In colourful terms: bringing a case before the ICJ requires solving a jurisdictional rubik’s cube, which requires the not-always-easy alignment of personal, subject matter, and temporal jurisdiction.

Yet the Article’s theoretical conclusions are not equally critical. The Article considers that the Court has relied on the existence of a dispute objection as a doctrine of covert or functional justiciability. That is, as a grounds for discretionarily declining jurisdiction or, to borrow a term from private international law, as an escape device.11 The Article contends that such jurisdictional avoidance may be justified on both theoretical and normative grounds.12 Normatively, the decision to rely on a procedural technicality to avoid going into the merits of a potentially explosive case may be seen as a valid exercise of judicial self-restraint—and one that can aid the Court navigate the tensions created by increased scepticism of international adjudication. Doctrines of principled avoidance, particularly when faced with cases on a sensible subject matter that touches on core aspects of defence and national security, could be accepted as a way of side-stepping potential backlash.13

Some domestic courts operate in a delicate balance between principle and pragmatism.14 This is even more true for international courts, which, in addition to lacking both compulsory jurisdiction and coercive enforcement mechanisms, also depend on States voluntarily agreeing to their jurisdiction. Jurisdictional techniques that allow international courts to channel their pragmatism, for instance, by declining jurisdiction over a dispute, may well be justified.15 From a pragmatic perspective, the inherently weak nature of the obligations invoked by the Marshall Islands, coupled with the high possibility of non-compliance—as evinced by the conduct of all three respondent States during the course of the proceedings (as well as the conduct of the other States against whom the Marshall Islands purported to file a claim but which did not accept the Court’s jurisdiction)—provide an alternative and persuasive explanation of the Court’s ‘silent inspiration’ for its decision.16

This Article is divided in three parts. The first part analyses the statutory and precedential origins of the EoD objection (or its lack thereof). The second one evaluates the evolution of the Court’s treatment of the EoD objection and the indeterminacy that still surrounds its treatment. The third section considers whether the Court has been using the EoD as a procedural escape device or as a technique of functional justiciability. This section analyses the matter from a theoretical perspective and evaluates whether, by relying on the EoD to discretionarily decline jurisdiction, the Court is actually taking into account broader factors that may affect its authority and the potential effectiveness of its decisions (i.e. whether the Court is using the EoD as a doctrine of functional justiciability to achieve a principled avoidance of a dispute). This Article concludes that it does—and that such conduct is normatively justified.

2. THE ORIGIN OF THE EoD A. A Distinction Between Political and Legal International Disputes?

Article 36 of the statutes of both the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ provide that the court’s general subject-matter jurisdiction encompasses ‘all or any of the classes of legal disputes’.17 The Statutes’ specific reference to the term legal dispute could be taken to support the EoD objection, as the Court’s contentious jurisdiction is circumscribed to deciding actual disputes (as opposed to its advisory role, in which it can tackle abstract or theoretical issues). Another possible explanation for the inclusion of the qualifier legal disputes in Article 36 was to distinguish legal disputes from political ones, thus restricting the Court’s jurisdiction along that divide.18 This implies accepting that some disputes brought before the Court are not fit for adjudication (i.e. that they are non-justiciable). This view, although not popular today, was at one point expressly accepted by the PCIJ. Indeed, the Permanent Court accepted a restrictive view of the scope of the international judicial function. This is consonant with Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which established that disputes that States ‘recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement’ could be resolved through those means. One example of this position is the Permanent Court’s decision in Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, where it held that:

[T]he settlement of such matters is not a question of law, but is a matter depending on the interplay of economic interest on which no Government can afford to be controlled by an outside organ. Such questions are outside the sphere in which a Court of Justice, concerned with the application of rules of law, can help in the solution of disputes between two States.19

The Court seems to have taken a similarly cautious approach in Northern Cameroons, were it considered that:

[W]hen seised, finds that it has jurisdiction, the Court is not compelled in every case to exercise that jurisdiction. There are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which the Court, as a court of justice, can never ignore.20

Some prominent international judges have expressed similar views in their individual opinions. Among them, Judges Fitzmaurice and Spender, in an admittedly unpopular dissenting opinion in the South-West Africa cases, declared that: ‘We are not unmindful of … the various considerations of a non-juridical character, social, humanitarian … but these are matters for the political rather than the legal arena.’21 Judge Xue struck a similar note in her dissenting opinion in Application of the Interim Accord, where she wrote that: ‘Even if … the Court finds that it has jurisdiction … there are still good reasons for the Court to refrain from exercising it, since it bears on the question of judicial propriety.’22

These decisions and separate opinions reveal that for the Court, under some compositions, and for some judges, there are concerns about the suitability of certain disputes for international adjudication, that is, about their justiciability. The idea that international tribunals’ jurisdiction should be limited to legal as opposed to political disputes is thus not unheard of. At some point it was even popular. For example, Rosalyn Higgins once asserted that most British international lawyers would consider ‘it improper for the International Court to consider “political” disputes’.23

Yet the trend in academic thought today is to favour an expanded notion of international adjudication which blurs the distinction between legal and political disputes.24 This trend also finds support in the ICJ’s jurisprudence. The Court has promptly shut down attempts to rely on the term legal to distinguish those kinds of disputes from political ones. Attempts to transplant the political question doctrine developed by US Courts, or other doctrines of discretionary justiciability, to the ICJ have failed. The Court has been adamant to state that the fact that a dispute may have certain political elements does not imply that it is unfit for judicial decision.

But...

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