A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Republic of China's Emerging Electoral System

AuthorEmerson M.S. Niou,Peter C. Ordeshook
Published date01 January 1992
Date01 January 1992
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/019251219201300105
Subject MatterArticles
59-
A
Game
Theoretic
Analysis
of
the
Republic
of
China’s
Emerging
Electoral
System
EMERSON
M.S.
NIOU
AND
PETER
C.
ORDESHOOK
ABSTRACT.
Despite
differences
in
history,
culture,
and
stages
of
political
development,
the
same
theoretical
constructs
used
to
study
American
and
European
political
processes
can
be
used
to
understand
the
Republic
of
China’s
evolving
electoral
institutions
and
processes.
The
particular
theoretical
constructs
upon
which
we
focus
are
game
theory
and
its
application
to
electoral
politics,
spatial
models
of
party
competition.
After
reviewing
the
core
results
of
spatial
analysis
that
electoral
systems
dominated
by
a
single
issue
occasion
stable
and
convergent
party
platforms
and
that
systems
with
multiple
salient
issues
occasion
instability
we
examine
the
types
of
issues
that
opposition
parties
are
most
likely
to
use
in
challenging
KMT
rule.
Based
on
this
discussion
we
argue
that
the
ROC
ought
to
be
especially
sensitive
to
Riker’s
conclusion
that
evolving
democracies
should
devote
special
attention
to
developing
institutional
structures
such
as
bicameralism
and
staggered
terms
of
office
for
legislators
that
avoid
the
populist
ideal
of
direct
democracy.
Theoretical
results
reveal
the
fragility
of the idea of
a
popular
will,
so
that
populist
institutions
designed
to
achieve
it
can
foster
electoral
instability.
We
use
a
recent
result
about
multi-candidate
elections
to
argue
that
the
form
of
electoral
competition
and
the
forces
operating
to
produce
factionalism
within
parties
are
functions
of
the
extent
to
which
voters
perceive
electoral
competition
in
terms
of
individual
candidate
characteristics
versus
party
labels.
To
the
extent
that
voters
evaluate
candidates
on
the
basis
of
their
party
label,
the
parties
will
tend
to
converge
on
issues;
whereas,
to
the
extent
that
voters
focus
on
the
specific
characteristics
of candidates
and
their
policy
pronouncements,
the
candidates
will
diverge
on
issues.
Finally,
we
examine
the
circumstances
under
which
the
nature
of
the
issues
that
concern
an
electorate
determines
the
form
of
competition
in
democracies
characterized
by
a
single
dominant
party.
The
substantial
power
of
anti-democratic
governments
(parti-
cularly
the
Soviet
Union),
the
unreceptivity
to
democracy
of
60
several
major
cultural
traditions ...
and
the
prevalence
of
high
levels
of
polarization
and
violence
in
many
societies
all
suggest
that,
with
few
exceptions,
the
limits
of
democratic
development
in
the
world
may
well
have been
reached.
—HUNTINGTON
(1984:
218)
That
Huntington
did
not
foresee
events
in
Eastern
Europe
is
understandable,
given
the
dependence
of
those
events
on
policy
changes
within
the
USSR.
But
Huntington
also
asserts
that
the
states
of
East
Asia
&dquo;will
soon
constitute
an
authoritarian
anomaly
among
the
wealthier
countries
of
the
world&dquo;
(1984:
215).
With
the
political
reforms
in
Taiwan
in
mind,
predictions
that
are so
far
from
the
mark
reveal
why
it
is
important
that
we
study
the processes
in
a
society
such
as
Taiwan’s
in
the
context
of
a
general
theoretical
structure.
However,
two
problems
confound
the
broader
application
of
our
understanding
of
Taiwan’s
experience.
First,
we
do
not
yet
know
the
full
consequences
for
the
ROC
itself
of
its
move
to
democratization.
Second,
we
have
not
yet
developed
sufficiently
rigorous
conceptual
schemes
for
generalizing
our
understanding
of
this
movement
so
that
its
analysis
becomes
something
more
than
a
special
case
study.
With
respect
to
the
first
problem,
this
paper
focuses
on
Taiwan’s
electoral
politics
and
on
several
specific
questions
that
demand
our
attention.
What
strategies
will
opposition
parties
pursue?
What
counter-moves
might
we
predict
for
the
KMT
in
anticipation
of
these
strategies?
Do
current
institutional
arrangements
facilitate
stability,
and what
additional
modifications
of
institutions
might
we
consider
that
are
both
democratic
and
promoters
of
stability?
Is
there
a
danger
that
political
reform
will
tip
the
scales
too
far
in
the
direction
of
a
dangerous
populist
democracy?
In
what
ways
does
the
electoral
system
of
multi-member
district
voting
influence
events
and
strategies?
Are
there
forces
operating
for
and
against
increased
factionalism
within
the
parties?
Should
we
predict
the
continuance
of
KMT
control
for
the
foreseeable
future?
What
are
the
consequences
of
the
dominance
of
the
KMT?
With
respect
to
the
second
problem,
a
great
many
ideas
have
been
proposed
to
make
sense
of
political
development.
However,
because
we
focus
on
electoral
processes
and
the
strategic
imperatives
that
influence
candidates
and
parties
in
such
processes,
and
because
we
are
primarily
interested
in
understanding
how
the
ROC’s
electoral
reforms
in
particular
will
shape
its
politics
and
influence
its
political
stability,
we
eschew
broad
macro
constructs.
Instead,
for
our
conceptual
scheme
we
concentrate
on
the
application
of
that
branch
of
the
decision
sciences,
game
theory,
that
tries
to
uncover
the basic
processes
of
interdependent
choice
among
people
in
specific
and
well-defined
strategic
environments
and
on
the
application
of
that
theory
to
elections
in
the
form
of
spatial
models
of
party
competition.
Game
theory’s
application
to
elections
occurs
primarily
with
an
eye
to
the
two-
party
contests
of
the
United
States
or
the
multiparty
parliamentary
systems
of
Europe
(see
Enelow
and
Hinich,
1985
and
Robertson,
1976).
Hence,
we
ask
whether
game
theory
and
associated
election
models
can
be
applied
to
a
political
system
that
is
characterized
by
a
single
dominant
party
but
a
rapidly
evolving
pluralism.
In
this
way
we
can
try
to
use
game
theory
not
only
to
answer
specific
questions
about
Taiwan,
but
perhaps
more
importantly,
we
can
take
advantage
of
game
theory’s
generality
to
move
towards
a
generalization
of
our
understanding
of
Taiwan’s
experience.

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