Gary Nichols v Chelsea Football Club Ltd

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
JudgeLord Justice Peter Jackson,Lord Justice McCombe
Judgment Date27 March 2020
Neutral Citation[2020] EWCA Civ 470
Docket NumberCase No: A2/2020/0400
Date27 March 2020

[2020] EWCA Civ 470

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT (QUEENS BENCH DIVISION)

Ms Rowena Collins-Rice (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

QB-2019-000558

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

Lord Justice McCombe

and

Lord Justice Peter Jackson

Case No: A2/2020/0400

Between:
Gary Nichols
Appellant
and
Chelsea Football Club Limited
Respondent

Hafsah Masood (instructed by Scott-Moncrieff & Associates Ltd) for the Appellant

Edward Rowntree (instructed by Kerman & Co) for the Respondent

Hearing date: 26 March 2020

Approved Judgment

Lord Justice Peter Jackson
1

On 26 March 2020, we heard an appeal from a sentence passed for contempt of court. At the end of the hearing, we dismissed the appeal and said that we would give our reasons in writing. These are my reasons for concurring in that decision.

2

The appeal hearing was conducted remotely. We are grateful to the parties' representatives and to the court staff for making the necessary arrangements. We particularly thank Ms Masood, counsel for the appellant, from whom most was required during the hearing. The very clear outcome of the appeal is no reflection on her well-judged advocacy.

3

Turning to the facts: on 25 February 2020, the appellant Gary Nichols was committed to prison for 21 weeks for contempt of court. The contempt consisted of a breach of an order made on 19 February 2019 by Dove J by which the appellant was prohibited from dealing in Chelsea Football Club tickets. The breach occurred on 4 December 2019 when the appellant was filmed selling a ticket to an agent of the club near Stamford Bridge stadium on a match day. The appellant admitted the breach and on 14 January 2020 Ms Margaret Obi, sitting as a deputy Judge, found him to be in contempt of court and adjourned sentencing. On 25 February 2020, Ms Rowena Collins-Rice imposed the sentence of imprisonment and suspended it for 72 hours to allow an application for a stay to be made to this court. That application was refused by Coulson LJ on 28 February 2020, since when the appellant has been in custody.

4

The appellant was at the time of the breach also subject to a suspended sentence for contempt of court for a similar breach of a High Court order. In July 2018 he sold four Wimbledon tickets in breach of an order made by Lindblom J on 26 September 2011. On 7 September 2018, Lane J sentenced the appellant to six months imprisonment, suspended for two years.,

5

In her careful sentencing remarks, the deputy Judge directed herself as to the principles in respect of sentencing for contempt and as to the nature of the contempt with which she was dealing.

“5. I am required to pass the minimum sentence which I consider to be effective to punish the behaviour which has occurred, deter others from doing likewise and secure future respect for court orders from the person having been found to be in contempt. I am directed by the guidelines and the authorities to look at the culpability of the breach, that is how seriously blameworthy it is, and at the harm done.

6. As to culpability, in this case I note that the fact of the breach is undisputed. Mr Nichols says in the statement I have before me that the act of trafficking constituting the contempt was impulsive and made under a degree of personal stress. But however planned or unplanned the act of trafficking may have been, Mr Nichols had a choice. He chose to breach the order. He did so deliberately and for personal gain (albeit modest). I have no evidence that the order itself or the suspended sentence to which he was subject acted as a material restraint on his behaviour. He acted in disregard or defiance of the decision of the court, in a way which inevitably defeated the objectives of the court, contrary to the interests of justice. The apology briefly noted in Mr Nichols' statement before me today does not persuade me that the gravity of this conduct is fully understood, or that an unambiguous attempt has been made to purge the contempt adjudged by Ms Obi in January and give confidence of restored respect for court decisions. All of this points to a high degree of culpability.

7. As to harm, I have noted what decided cases emphasise about the perniciousness of ticket touting: the harm it does to the business model of sports organisations, the exposure of purchasers to having the tickets rejected or, conversely, the risks posed to public order and public safety by unauthorised and uncontrolled access to sports grounds. Mr Nichols was party to an inherently harmful activity. On the other hand, I also remind myself that there is a single incident before me today with no evidence as to any particular consequences, and that the harm in this case is therefore of a general rather than a specific nature. I consider the degree of harm on the facts before me to be no more than moderate.”

6

In her approach to penalty, the Judge was equally careful:

“9. Applying the guidance given by the authorities, it is difficult to see that I can commensurately pass any sentence short of immediate custody. I note that that was the expectation of Ms Obi, having tried the case and adjourned sentencing for the purpose of enabling personal mitigations to be put forward. I am satisfied that nothing less than immediate custody addresses the culpability of this conduct, or is likely to deter others or constrain Mr Nichols' future behaviour. I am reinforced in this view by the fact that the contempt was committed during the currency of a suspended sentence also for contempt, involving ticket touting in breach of an order of the High Court. I consider that to be a seriously aggravating factor. It demonstrates a sustained and apparently undeterred lack of respect for orders of the court and for the administration of justice.

10. When I come to consider personal circumstances I therefore start with the fact that Mr Nichols is not entitled to be treated as a person of good character because this is not the first occasion on which a sentence of imprisonment for contempt of court is being passed on him.”

7

The Judge then considered personal mitigation, being matters related to the appellant's health, and his financial and family circumstances. She did not find much of relevance in the appellant's medical conditions but she gave some weight to his family circumstances:

“13. … He has provided no specific evidence as to his finances, or indeed as to the potential impact of a period of imprisonment on his family. But I give what he and his son say as much mitigating weight as I am able to. I have...

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1 cases
  • Chelsea Football Club Ltd v Gary Nichols
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 6 April 2020
    ...Next, there was an appeal to the Court of Appeal, which was heard by Lords Justices McCombe and Peter Jackson on Friday 27 March 2020: [2020] EWCA Civ 470. They dismissed the appeal. Peter Jackson LJ said this at [19]: “On an appeal against sentence in a contempt case [the court] will look......

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