A ‘GO SLOW’ OR A ‘WORK TO RULE’?
| Date | 01 October 1963 |
| Author | O. L. Aikin |
| Published date | 01 October 1963 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1963.tb00993.x |
A LEGAL NOTE
A
'
GO
SLOW
'
OR
A
'
WORK
TO
RULE
'?
PERHAPS
it
seems to be quibbling to insist upon the distinction between a
'
go slow
'
and
a
'
work to rule
',
certainly the two hrases are often used interchangeably to describe the
same situation. However, there is a {istinction between the two and legally this distinction
is of absolutely vital importance.
Contracts of employment either expressly establish a rate of working,
or
else
there is
an implied term that the employee will work competently and in accordance with the duty
of fidelity, which he owes to his employer. If an employee deliberately works at a rate
below the agreed rate, or below the rate
of
a normal competent workman, i.e. if he
'
goes slow
',
he will therefore be in breach of his contract of employment. The employer
could then sue the employee for damages for breach of contract and, if the breach is
sufficiently serious, the employee could be dismissed without notice.
A
breach is serious
enough to have this latter effect if it can be said that it shows an intention on the part of
the employee to repudiate the contract.1
A
'
work to rule
'
is not a breach
of
contract, quite the contrary, it is an insistence on
performance of the contract in all its detail. The object
of
the
'
work to rule
'
is exactly
the same as a
'
go slow
',
to harm the employer by lowering output, but the method
of
achieving this aim is different, the end is achieved by using the terms of the contract, not
b breaking them, the employees are only insisting on complying with every lawful order
or
the employer. Thus so long as the orders are obeyed there cannot be a breach of
contract. A classic example
of
a
'
work to rule
'
is the railway employee who, in order to
fulfil his duty
of
making certain that all train doors are closed, checks each door individu-
ally and
so
effectively delays the train. The railway timetable may then be reduced to
chaos, 'but the em loyee has only done what he was told to do. If he had caused the
same amount
of
deyay by deliberately refusing to signal the train to leave this would be a
'
go slow
'
and breach of contract. The
motive
behind the
use
of the rules in a
'
work to
rule
'
is immaterial,
so
long as their application is correct.
But
it
is
not simply in the area
of
contract that the distinction is of importance.
Statutes have made certaip breaches
of
contract criminal offences and
so
in these limited
circumstances a
'
go slow would not.
S.5
of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 provides that when a
person wilfully and maliciously breaks a contract
of
service knowing
or
having reasonable
cause to believe that the probable consequence of his breach alone
or
in combination with
others will be to endanger human life, or cause serious bodily injury,
or
to expose
valuable property to destruction or serious injury, he commits a criminal offence
punishable either with a fine not exceeding
fno
or by imprisonment for up to three
months.
2
S.4
of the same Act contains a similar provision covering employees employed by a
public utility undertaking supplying gas or water to the public, who know or have
reasonable cause to believe that the effect of a wilful or malicious breach of their contracts
will be, either individually or in combination, to deprive the community which they
supply wholly or in part of gas or water. This has been extended to cover electricity
employees.3
For a person to
'
maliciously
'
break his contract under these sections it
is
not
necessary to shoy spite or malice in the ordinary sense of the word. Bowen L.
J.
said in
R.
v.
Lathe74
.
. .
a person is deemed malicious when he does an act which he knows
will injure either the person or the property
of
another.'
So
'
maliciously
'
means little
more than
'
wilfully
'
because it relates to knowledge of the effect of the act and is not
concerned with the motive behind it. Nor is it necessary for the breach actually to harm
persons or property or to deprive anyone of gas, water or electricity, it is enough to show
that the breach would probably have this result. But not every act having this effect is
1
See
~4~s
v.
Londo,c
Chronicle
(Indicator Newspapers) Ltd. [1959],
1
W.L.R. 698 [1959l,
2
All
E.R.
285.
There might be a further liability which attaches to threatened breaches of contract. In
Roolces
v.
Barpaard
the
Court
of Appeal reversed the decision of the tria! judge and decided that a threat, to break
a contact was not a threat to do an illegal act and therefore did not amount to the tort
of
intimidation.
The matter was yet to be decided by the
House
of
Lords.
2
A wrongful statement that a person had done any act in breach
of
this Section (or
S.4
below)
would
be slander and actionable without proof of special damage.
3
Electricity Act 1919
s.
31. Further examples of breach
of
contract which may amount to a criminal
pffence can be found i,n the Police Act 1919
s.
3 which makes it an offence for policemen to commit
breaches of discipline
,
and the Post Office Act 1953
s.
58 and 59 which deals with wilful acts causing
dela
of
the mail.
may be criminal, but,
of
course, a
'
work to rule
4
17
&B.D.
3.59.
p.
362.
2
60
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