Goldman v Hargrave
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judgment Date | 1966 |
| Date | 1966 |
| Year | 1966 |
| Court | Privy Council |
Australia - Western Australia - Negligence - Fire - Escape of - Accidental fire by lightning - Occupier's failure to check - Occupier's duty of care towards neighbour - Scope of duty - Occupier's duty to remove or reduce hazard - Standard of care. - Negligence - Fire - Escape of - Accidental fire started by lightning - Spread of fire through occupier's negligence in failing to put it out - Occupier's duty of care towards neighbour - Occupier's duty to remove or reduce hazard - Standard of care. - Fire - Fires Prevention Act - “Any fire shall accidentally begin” - Accidental fire started by lightning - Spread owing to occupier's negligence -
The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774, provides that no action shall lie against any person on whose estate “any fire shall accidentally begin.”
On February 25, 1961, a tall redgum tree, 100 feet high, in the centre of the appellant's land was struck by lightning and caught fire in a fork 84 feet from the ground. It was impossible to deal with the blaze while the tree was standing, so, pending the arrival of the district fire control officer, or a tree feller sent by the district fire control officer, the appellant cleared a space round the tree of combustible material and sprayed the surrounding area with water.
On February 26, at midday, the tree was cut down. The appellant did not at any time after February 27 take any steps which could be regarded as reasonable to prevent the fire from spreading, believing in the method of extinguishing a fire of that kind by burning it out. If the appellant had taken reasonable care he could have put out the fire by spraying it with water on the evening of February 26, or at latest early next morning, February 27.
On March 1, the weather changed. The wind, which had previously been from light to moderate, changed to 20 miles per hour with stronger gusts, and the air temperature rose some 10 degrees to 105 degrees F. The fire revived and spread over the appellant's paddock and onto the respondents' properties. The fire was observed by the appellant about noon on March 1, but by then it could not be stopped and the respondents' properties were damaged.
In actions by them for damages the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the appellant had not so acted as to use or adopt or continue the fire as his own and could not therefore be held liable under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher(
On appeal: —
Held, (1) that an occupier of land was under a general duty of care, in relation to hazards, whether natural or man-made, occurring on his land, to remove or reduce such hazards to his neighbour; that the existence of such duty must be based on knowledge of the hazard, ability to foresee the consequences of not checking or removing it, and the ability to abate it; and the standard of care required of the occupier is founded on what it was reasonable to expect of him in his circumstances (post, pp. 521F, H–522A, H–523A, G, 524B–D).
(2) That, although the appellant had initially acted with prudence in endeavouring to extinguish the fire up to February 26, his method of burning out the fire after February 27 brought into operation a fresh risk of a revival of the fire under the influence of changing wind and weather, if not carefully watched; that, in his circumstances, he could have foreseen that risk and taken necessary action to put out the fire on February 26 to 27; and that, accordingly, as he failed to do so, he was liable in negligence for damages for the loss sustained by the respondents (post, pp. 518B–D, 524H–525A).
(3) That, giving the words “any fire shall accidentally begin” in the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774, an interpretation which was sensible in the context of the statute, in accordance with its antecedents, and made possible a reasonable application of it to the facts of the case, the fire which damaged the respondents' property was that which arose on March 1 due to the appellant's negligence, and the statutory defence accordingly failed (post, p. 525G–H).
Per curiam. The law must take account of the fact that the occupier on whom the duty is cast has, ex hypothesi, had this hazard thrust upon him through no seeking or fault of his own; his interest and his resources, whether physical or material, may be of a very modest character either in relation to the magnitude of the hazard, or as compared with those of his threatened neighbour. A rule which required of him in such unsought circumstances in his neighbour's interest a physical effort of which he is not capable, or an excessive expenditure of money would be unenforceable or unjust. The standard ought to be to require of the occupier what it is reasonable to expect of him in his individual circumstances (post, p. 524A–B, C–D).
APPEAL (No. 30 of 1965) from a judgment of the High Court of Australia (November 22, 1963) (Taylor, Owen and Windeyer JJ.) allowing the respondent's appeal and setting aside the judgment of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (January 9, 1963) (Jackson J.). The appellant, Allan William Goldman, and the respondents, Rupert William Edeson Hargrave, Winifred Hazel Hargrave, Edward R. Taylor, Elizabeth E. Taylor, Richard Brennand, Frederick W. Price, Gladys J. Price, Reginald V. Cousins, Peter W. Williamson, Eileen G. Williamson, John R. Garside and Gwendoline M. Garside, carried on their respective businesses in a farming area known as Gidgegannup in Western Australia. The respondents brought seven actions which were consolidated by an order (April 13, 1962) against the appellant claiming damages on the grounds (1) that the appellant adopted and used as his what was in the first instance an accidental fire so that it might be said to have become his fire; that it then escaped, and that he was liable for damage resulting from such an escape; (2) that the appellant was under a duty to the respondents as near-by owners or occupiers of land to extinguish a fire on his land, even though it started by accident; that the appellant negligently failed to do so and was hence liable for the damage caused when it escaped; and (3) that the appellant was liable for breach of statutory duties imposed on him by sections 17 and 28 of the
On appeal to the High Court of Australia, the appellant supported the trial judge's conclusions of law but attacked his findings of fact as to the origin of the fire which damaged the respondents' properties; the respondents supported his findings of fact but attacked his conclusions of law as to negligence, nuisance and breach of statutory duty. The High Court upheld the trial judge's findings of fact but allowed the appeal on the ground that a man had a duty to exercise reasonable care when there was a fire upon his land, although not started or continued by him or for him, of which he knows or ought to know, if by the exercise of reasonable care it could be rendered harmless or its danger to his neighbours diminished.
1966. April 25, 26, 27. Peter Bristow Q.C., F. T. Burt Q.C. (Western Australia) and Michael Kempster for the appellant.
Gresley Clarkson Q.C. (Western Australia) and Marcus Anwyl-Davies for the respondents.
The following cases, in addition to those referred to in the judgment, were cited in argument: Saxby v. Manchester and Sheffield Railway Co.F2; Proprietor of Margate Pier v. Town Council of MargateF3; Broder v. SaillardF4; Black v. Christchurch Finance Co.F5; Attorney-General v. Tod HeatleyF6; Barker v. HerbertF7; Mulholland & Tedd Ltd. v. BakerF8; Kent v. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment BoardF9; Rouse v. Gravelworks Ltd.F10; Slater v. Worthington's Cash Stores (1930) Ltd.F11; Neath Rural District Council v. WilliamsF12; Mint v. GoodF13; Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd.F14; Smeaton v. Ilford CorporationF15; Williams v. OwenF16; Balfour v. Barty-KingF17; Bugge v. BrownF18; Hazelwood v. WebberF19; Wise Bros. v. Commissioner of Railways (N.S.W.)F20; Des...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
-
Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd
...recent developments in the common law of nuisance. The old distinction between misfeasance and non-feasance no longer rules the day. Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 and Leakey v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1980] QB 485, building on the decision in ......
-
Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd
...or artificial contrivance which constitutes the nuisance. In these sentences I am not attempting exclusive definitions." 51 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] A.C. 645 was a case which came to the Privy Council from the High Court of Australia. The issue was whether the occupier of land on which a f......
-
Leakey v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty
...has held that that view of the law is wrong. He bases his decision on the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Goldman v. Hargrave (1967) Appeal Cases 645. The main issue in this appeal is whether Goldman v. Hargrave accurately states the law of England. If it does, ......
-
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd; Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd
...a person who is under an affirmative duty to prevent harm being caused by a source of danger which has arisen without his fault (see Goldman v. Hargrave [1967] 1 AX. 645), a point to which I shall return later. But the former requirement indicates that any affirmative duty to prevent delibe......
-
Igniting success through bushfire managements plans ' why you should have one
...[1954] 4 DLR 90. 4 Bugge v Browne (1919) 26 CLR 110; Wise Bros v Commissioner of Railways (1947) 75 CLR 59. 5 Ibid. 6 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 (P.C.); 115 CLR 7 Vaughhan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing NC 468; 132 ER 490. ' Cooper Grace Ward Lawyers Cooper Grace Ward is a leading Australi......
-
Basic rules about landslips
...a hazard to neighbours is known to a landowner, they have to act as is reasonable in their individual circumstances: Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645 (PC) at Councils are entitled to take cost and public benefit into account when assessing landslip prevention or response. J L Tindall v Fa......
-
Table of Cases
...SJ 176, ChD 200, 203 Glass v Kencakes [1966] 1 QB 611, [1965] 2 WLR 363, [1964] 3 All ER 807, QBD 178 Goldman v Hargrave [1966] UKPC 2, [1967] 1 AC 645, [1966] 3 WLR 513, [1966] 2 All ER 989, PC 87, 90 Goodhart v Hyett (1883) 25 Ch D 182, 48 JP 293, 53 LJ Ch 219, ChD 190 Gordon v Selico Ltd......
-
Easements and Nuisance
...of land, it had no responsibility 69 [1940] UKHL 2, [1940] AC 880 at 897. 70 [1940] UKHL 2, [1940] AC 880 at 904. 71 [1966] UKPC 2, [1967] 1 AC 645. 72 [1980] QB 485. 88 Positive Covenants and Freehold Land for any damage caused. A few weeks later, a large quantity of earth and some tree st......
-
Table of cases
...SCJ No 53 ........................................................................................... 30 Goldman v Hargrave (1966), [1967] 1 AC 645, [1966] 3 WLR 513 (PC) ...................................................................................376, 412 THE LAW OF TORTS 506 Good-We......
-
Table of cases
...S.C.J. No. 53 ....................................................................................... 30 Goldman v. Hargrave (1966), [1967] 1 A.C. 645, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 513 (P.C.) ................................................................... 373, 409 Good-Wear Treaders v. D. & B. Holdi......