Gordon James Ramsay v Gary Love
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Morgan |
| Judgment Date | 20 January 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] EWHC 65 (Ch) |
| Date | 20 January 2015 |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: HC-2013-000082 |
[2015] EWHC 65 (Ch)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Mr Justice Morgan
Case No: HC-2013-000082
Jonathan Seitler QC and Benjamin Faulkner (instructed by Mishcon de Reya) for the Claimant
Romie Tager QC and Alexander Goold (instructed by Jeffrey Green Russell) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28 November and 1, 2 December 2014
Introduction
On 18 February 2008, Northam Worldwide Ltd ("Northam"), the then freehold owner of premises at 127 and 129 Parkway London, NW1 ("the premises"), granted a lease of those premises to Gordon Ramsay Holdings International Ltd ("GRHI"). The terms of the lease provided for the obligations of the lessee to be guaranteed by Gordon Ramsay Holdings Ltd ("GRH") and by Mr Gordon Ramsay. On completion, Northam as the lessor was provided with the counterpart lease which appeared to have been duly executed as follows. The counterpart appeared to have been duly executed by GRHI (as lessee), by being signed as a deed by Mr Ramsay as a director of that company with Mr Ramsay's signature being witnessed by Mr Christopher Hutcheson, another director of that company. The counterpart also appeared to have been duly executed by GRH (as guarantor), again by being signed as a deed by Mr Ramsay as a director of that company with Mr Ramsay's signature again being witnessed by Mr Christopher Hutcheson, another director of that company. Further, the counterpart also appeared to have been executed by Mr Ramsay (as guarantor) by being signed by him personally with his signature being witnessed by a Mr Kevin Fung.
Following the grant of the lease, the lessee commenced to fit out the premises and eventually began to trade from the premises as a restaurant and a small hotel. The lessee continues to trade in that way up to the present time.
On 6 July 2011 as a result of court proceedings brought by Mr Love against Northam, Mr Love became entitled to acquire the reversion on the lease and on 7 November 2012, the reversion was assigned by Northam to Mr Love.
In September 2011, Mr Ramsay told Mr Love that he was not bound by the guarantee apparently signed by him.
Initially, the position of GRHI and GRH in relation to the lease and guarantee was not clear but it is now accepted by both these companies that each of them is bound as lessee and as guarantor, respectively. Mr Love asserts that Mr Ramsay is bound by the guarantee which was apparently given by him. But even if it should be held that Mr Ramsay is not bound by that guarantee, Mr Love accepts (and indeed asserts) that there has been an effective grant of a lease of the premises and that he has the benefit of the covenants given by GRHI and GRH (as lessee and as guarantor) respectively.
The issue which I am asked to decide is whether Mr Ramsay is bound by the guarantee apparently given by him. Mr Ramsay says that he is not so bound because he did not sign the counterpart lease. He says that his apparent signature was placed on that document by means of a signature writing machine which was operated by or under the direction of Mr Christopher Hutcheson (to whom I will refer as "Mr Hutcheson" to distinguish him from his son, Adam Hutcheson, to whom I will refer as "Adam"). Mr Hutcheson is the father in law of Mr Ramsay and in February 2008 was the Chief Executive Officer of GRH. Mr Ramsay says that Mr Hutcheson did not have any authority to commit Mr Ramsay to the guarantee in this case and did not have authority to place Mr Ramsay's apparent signature on the document. The principal dispute in this case is one of fact as to whether Mr Hutcheson did or did not have actual authority to commit Mr Ramsay to the guarantee in this case. If Mr Hutcheson did not have actual authority to act in that way, Mr Love contends that Mr Ramsay is estopped from denying Mr Hutcheson's actual authority in that respect.
For the avoidance of doubt, I will refer to certain matters which were not argued in this case. It was accepted that for the purpose of signing a document (and, in particular, a deed) creating a guarantee, it was not necessary that the guarantor should sign the document with a pen held in his own hand. It was accepted that if Mr Ramsay had himself operated the signature writing machine to place his signature on the deed, then the deed would have been effectively signed by him. Similarly, it was accepted that if Mr Ramsay had expressly authorised another person to operate the signature writing machine to place Mr Ramsay's signature on the deed, then the deed would have been effectively signed by Mr Ramsay. Section 1(3) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 states that a deed must be "signed" by an executing party. There are statements in the authorities which suggest that a document is only "signed" by an executing party when he signs it with a pen in his own hand: see Firstpost Homes Ltd v Johnson [1995] 1 WLR 1567 at 1575 and 1577, citing Goodman v J Eban Ltd [1954] 1 QB 550 at 555 and 561. However, those statements were not designed to distinguish between signing by use of a pen held in the executing party's hand as distinct from the use of a signature writing machine. Further, no point was taken as to the requirement in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act that the deed be signed by the executing party in the presence of an attesting witness. In any case, a guarantee can be entered into otherwise than by deed. Initially, counsel for Mr Ramsay did refer to section 4 of the Statute of Frauds Act 1677, which states that a guarantee must be evidenced in writing by a document which is "signed" by or on behalf of the guarantor and some point was sought to be made about the application of section 4. However, it was pointed out that the disputed "guarantee" in this case was a guarantee and indemnity and that it has long been established that section 4 did not apply to a contract of indemnity (see Chitty on Contracts, 31st ed., paragraph 44–043), so any possible point under section 4 fell away. At this point, I should explain that I will for convenience in this judgment refer to the disputed obligation in this case as "a guarantee" even though, more technically, it is a contract of indemnity.
Mr Seitler QC and Mr Faulkner appeared on behalf of Mr Ramsay and Mr Tager QC and Mr Goold appeared on behalf of Mr Love.
An overview of the evidence
The principal dispute in this case, as to Mr Hutcheson's authority to act on behalf of Mr Ramsay in relation to the giving of a guarantee by Mr Ramsay, is essentially a dispute of fact. I was given both oral and documentary evidence as to the factual matters in dispute. However, both the oral and the documentary evidence tendered at the trial are known to be incomplete. So far as the oral evidence goes, the central issue relates to the relationship between Mr Ramsay and Mr Hutcheson. While Mr Ramsay gave evidence, Mr Hutcheson did not. Other persons who might have given highly relevant evidence were not called. One such non-witness was Mr Hutcheson's son, Adam, who was closely involved in the negotiations which led to the grant of the lease in this case.
As regards the documentary evidence, I was told that when Mr Hutcheson was dismissed as Chief Executive Officer of GRH in October 2010, he removed large quantities of documents from that company's offices and he deleted emails from the company's computers. Accordingly, while it is possible that there might have been emails between Mr Ramsay and Mr Hutcheson which could have thrown light on the issues in this case, hardly any such emails have been disclosed. Indeed, it is not possible to know with any degree of confidence whether relevant emails once existed and have since been deleted and lost or whether there were never any such relevant emails. In this context, I should add the further fact that whilst it is clear that Mr Ramsay and Mr Hutcheson spoke on the telephone several times every day on average, there is no record of the contents of those calls. Yet further, although Mr Love applied for extensive disclosure of documents from Mr Ramsay, the latter successfully opposed the width of the disclosure sought but nonetheless, in the course of the trial, began to volunteer documents which had not been disclosed earlier, no doubt in the belief that the volunteered documents would assist his case.
The result of the evidence taking the form it did is that the court has a difficult jigsaw puzzle to solve but it knows that it does not have all of the jigsaw pieces which once existed and it does not even have all of the jigsaw pieces which still exist and which could have been supplied.
Naturally, the question was raised at the trial as to the court's response to the fact that it was not being given all of the available and potentially relevant evidence. I consider that the starting point is that the court has to do the best it can with the evidence it has been given and it has to decide the case on that evidence. Plainly, the fact that potentially relevant evidence had been destroyed by Mr Hutcheson cannot be relied upon to draw inferences against Mr Ramsay or, indeed, against Mr Love. Further, it was not suggested that the fact that Mr Ramsay had successfully resisted an order against him for wider disclosure should be the basis of any adverse inference against him. The stance he took was almost certainly on legal advice, was upheld by the Master at the hearing of an opposed application for disclosure and there has been no appeal against the Master's decision.
However, Mr Seitler did submit that the absence of Mr Hutcheson and his son Adam from the trial was attributable to the decision of Mr Love not to call them and that the court should draw...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi and Brothers Company (“AHAB”) v Saad Investments Company Ltd (in Official Liquidation) (“SICL”) and Others
...forgery case, including its “New for Old” case, are considered below. 1545 Dealt with earlier under the heading “New for Old”. 1546 [2015] EWHC 65 1547 Supra 1548 Supra [110]. 1549 Supra [110]. 1550 Supra [110]. 1551 {G/3263/1} (Arabic), {G/3263/3} (translation). 1552 {G/4996.2/1} (Arabic),......
-
Between: Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi and Brothers Company Plaintiff/Appellant v (1) Saad Investments Company Ltd (2) Maan AL Sanea and Others Defendants/Respondents
...findings on AHAB's forgery case. 642 Day25/128–130 643 Day5A/38 644 Judgment AA/2.4/591 at para 41 footnote 1554 645 Ramsay v. Love [2015] EWHC 65 646 Judgment 647 Judgment AA/2.4/622–623 at paras 122–123 of Section 4. 648 G/2180 649 Day 23/78 650 G/2381.2 651 Day42/120–122 652 G/2393.1 653......
-
“Ghost in the Machine”: Ghost Written Signatures on Legal Documents and the Authority to Act
...of documents and the use of ghost writing machines to create binding legal contracts. Case citation: Gordon James Ramsay v Gary Love [2015] EWHC 65 (Ch) Jonathan LawrenceAritha Wickramasinghe...
-
Case Update: Ramsay v Love
...the recent case of Ramsay v Love [2015] EWHC 65 (Ch), the celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay was found to be bound by a personal guarantee given to a landlord, even though he had not physically signed the guarantee A lease over a prominent building near Regent's Park which now contains the York a......
-
Execution Of Guarantees
...has been duly authorised to execute such deed or document on behalf of the principal. Footnote Gordon James Ramsay v Gary Love [2015] EWHC 65 (Ch), 20 January The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about y......