Gothamiax Limited (Case reference: 169028)

Case Number169028
Published date05 January 2022
Year2022
Adjudicated PartyGothamiax Limited
Procedure TypeTrack 2 (Phone-Paid Services Authority)
Tribunal meeting number 285
Case reference: 169028
Level 2 provider: Gothamiax Limited
Type of service: Subscription alert service
Level 1 providers: Veoo
DMB
Mobivate
Network operator: All mobile network operators
This case was brought against Gothamiax Limited, (‘the Level 2 provider’) under Paragraph 4.5 of
the 14th Edition of the Code of Practice (‘the Code’).
Background and investigation
1. This case concerned a subscription alerts service called Every Day Saves(‘the Service’),
which provided consumers with links to websites offering discounts and savings.
2. The Service operated via direct carrier billing using two shortcodes: 62150 and 88101 with
two value chains.
3. Shortcode 61250 operated with the Level 1 provider Veoo from 01 February until 12
September 2019. Shortcode 88101 operated with the Level 1 provider DMB and Mobivate,
which described itself as a Level 1 Second Tier aggregator, from 28 June 2019 and continues
to be in operation. The service charges for both shortcodes are stated to be a single charge of
£1.50 per message with a maximum of two messages per week.
4. The Level 2 provider is based in Cyprus and in accordance with the E-Commerce Directive
that was in effect at the time, the Executive had to notify the Level 2 provider’s home
member state regulator to ask them to take action in respect of the issues that the Executive
had identified prior to the Executive taking action.
5. On 18 June 2019, the Cypriot authority responded that it did not intend to take further
measures against the Level 2 provider. The Executive did not consider that the measures
taken by the Cypriot authority adequately addressed and remedied the harm and/or the
potential harm to UK consumers. The Executive consequently decided to proceed to take its
own measures in accordance with Art 3(4)(b) of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC.
6. The promotional material supplied by the Level 2 provider showed that the Service used a
PIN verification system for opt-ins. This means that consumers are sent a PIN after entering
their mobile number onto the Service website and that Service charges would commence
once the issued PIN is entered onto the Service website.
7. The Level 2 provider had four promotional campaigns as follows:
01 February 2019 24 February 2019 (pre-derogation, shortcode 62150)
17 June 2019 31 October 2019 (post-derogation, shortcode 88101)
19 December 2019 31 March 2020 (post-derogation, shortcode 88101)
18 December 2020 current (post derogation, shortcode 88101).
8. The Level 2 provider stated that it used Tropocom to verify PIN entries for the Service
operating on shortcode 62150 and used both Tropocom and Pintegrity to verify PIN entries
for the Service operating on shortcode 88101.
9. On 18 December 2020, the Level 2 provider launched a new promotional campaign using
third-party verifier Raw Mobility and their verification system called ‘RunAuth’. The PSA’s
investigation did not relate to this third-party verifier.
10. The Executive considered that the Service breached the PSA Code of Practice 14th edition
(‘the Code’) in relation to the following Code provisions:
Breach 1 Rule 2.3.3 – “Consumers must not be charged for PRS without their con sent. Level 2
providers must be able to provide evidence which establishes th at consent.”
Breach 2 Rule 2.3.1 – “Consumers of PRS must be treated fairly and equitably.
Breach 3 Rule 2.6.1 – “Level 2 providers must ensure that consumers of their services are
able to have their complaints resolved quickly, easily and fairly and that any redress is provided
quickly and easily.”
Preliminary issue service and proceeding in absence
11. As the Level 2 provider was not in attendance at the Tribunal, the Tribunal considered as a
preliminary issue the issues of service and proceeding in absence.
12. The Tribunal observed that a detailed response to the Warning Notice had been submitted
by the Level 2 provider in which it had denied breaches of the Code had occurred. The Level
2 provider had also attached an email from one of the third-party verifiers it had used for the
Service, Tropocom, together with screenshots provided by Tropocom of the records for 36
complainants who had responded to the Executive’s complainant questionnaire. The Level 2
provider stated that this evidence provided an audit trail that clearly followed the PSA’s
Guidance on Consent to Charge and Payment Platform Security, in that it recorded the
dates, the pricing and other key information that the consumer saw on the relevant website

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT