Grand strategy, grand rhetoric: The forgotten covenant of campaign 1992
| Published date | 01 February 2021 |
| Date | 01 February 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720935782 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
research-article2020
Special Issue Article
Politics
2021, Vol. 41(1) 80 –94
Grand strategy, grand rhetoric:
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
The forgotten covenant of
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720935782
DOI: 10.1177/0263395720935782
journals.sagepub.com/home/pol
campaign 1992
James D Boys
Abstract
The presidential campaign of 1992 is remembered for its focus on the US economy, as George
Bush, Ross Perot, and Bill Clinton proposed solutions for the state of the nation’s finances. A key
challenge for the Clinton campaign was to present their candidate as a viable commander-in-chief,
with a viable foreign policy, without betraying the campaign’s focus on the domestic economy. A
consideration of key speeches reveals the evolution of the candidate and his foreign policy, as the
campaign served as a training ground for power. What emerges is Clinton’s adoption of foreign
policy as a positive force in American domestic political life, in contrast to his many predecessors
and successors, who regularly utilised foreign policy to assail foreign nations and entities. In doing
so, parallels and contrasts with the Trump’s 2016 message emerge, enabling a greater appreciation
of the use of campaign rhetoric in the development of US grand strategy.
Keywords
1992 presidential election, 2016 presidential election, Anthony Lake, Bill Clinton, Donald Trump,
George H. W. Bush, New Democrat, rhetoric, US foreign policy, US grand strategy
Received: 23rd September 2019; Revised version received: 5th November 2019; Accepted: 21st
November 2019
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election appears set to divide aca-
demic and political opinion for years to come. As Lacatus and Meibauer (2021) observe
in their introduction to this special edition of Politics, ‘Trump’s rhetoric on foreign policy,
his electoral success and his subsequent foreign policy performance as president have
challenged and continue to challenge many of our assumptions we hold about US foreign
policy-making’. In addition, his campaign and subsequent administration have under-
mined long-held norms of presidential behaviour and expectations regarding rhetoric,
tone, and responsibility. Trump’s narrow victory, secured on the basis of 46.9% of the
vote, was due, in part, to his appeal to disaffected blue-collar voters who deserted the
Democratic Party. Twenty-four years earlier, Bill Clinton secured the presidency with
Corresponding author:
James D Boys.
Email: james@jamesdboys.com
Boys
81
43% of the popular vote having also utilised campaign rhetoric to appeal to a similar
group of disenchanted voters. Despite their differing tones and policy aspirations, both
candidates sought to overcome their lack of foreign policy experience by using this area
of policy to address domestic economic conditions that proved essential to their election.1
Fisher and Taub (2016: A15) argue that Trump’s campaign ‘hacked the politics of foreign
policy’, while the 1992 Clinton campaign manipulated the definition of foreign policy ‘by
redefining its parameters [to] benefit from the appearance of a grand vision’ (Boys, 2015:
18). Both candidates addressed the issue of globalisation, a concept embraced by Clinton
and whole-heartedly rejected by Trump. While Clinton extoled the virtue of globalisation,
however, he was not above blaming foreign competitors, including Germany and Japan,
for US economic decline. Trump took campaign rhetoric to more robust levels by high-
lighting what he saw as the danger from illegal immigration and, in contrast to Clinton,
the threat from globalisation. Separated by 24 years, both candidates pledged to ‘make
America great again’ in their own way, as they attempted to use ‘foreign policy rhetoric
to further domestic political themes and slogans’ (Lacatus and Meibauer, 2021). This
article will, therefore, consider the use of political rhetoric in the formulation of US for-
eign policy during the presidential campaigns of Bill Clinton and Donald Trump to con-
sider similarities and contrasts in tone and substance. The article finds similarities between
the two campaigns in regard to content, but that rhetorical tone emerges as a key determi-
nant between them. Despite these differences, however, the successful blending of for-
eign and domestic policies, and the use of foreign policy as a vehicle to address domestic
economic conditions, was a winning rhetorical devise shared by both campaigns.
The 1992 presidential campaign focussed on the state of the US economy, as President
George H. W. Bush, Governor Bill Clinton, and Ross Perot advocated policies to move
America out of a recession. A white board in Clinton’s campaign headquarters reminded
the candidate to focus on three issues: Change versus More of the Same, The Economy,
and Stupid, Don’t Forget Healthcare. George Stephanopoulos (1999: 88) viewed this as
‘a campaign haiku – an entire manifesto condensed to nineteen syllables’. Notable in its
absence was any mention of foreign policy, despite an appreciation that Clinton’s lack of
experience in this area was a shortcoming that President Bush may exploit as he sought a
second term. Addressing this, and devising a new direction for US grand strategy, was
essential to position Bill Clinton as a potential commander in chief, but without betraying
the campaign’s focus on domestic affairs. The Clinton campaign overcame this through
an astute use of rhetoric; advocating the benefits of foreign policy for the domestic econ-
omy as it positioned their candidate as a credible successor to President Bush.
The development of grand strategy during the 1992 presidential election has gone
under-examined, while broader studies of the Clinton presidency have largely overlooked
the use of rhetoric to develop grand strategy during the campaign. This has helped per-
petuate the belief that Governor Clinton cared little and understood less about interna-
tional affairs, resulting in works that are critical of the administration’s foreign policy
(Hyland, 1999; Mandelbaum, 1996; Miller, 1994; Muravchik, 1996). Studies of cam-
paign rhetoric and foreign policy have not been aided by former members of the Clinton
administration’s national security team. Christopher (2001), Albright (2003), Soderberg
(2005), and Lake (2000) do their utmost to justify their actions in office but provide little
consideration to the development of foreign policy on the campaign, or the use of rhetoric
to convey policies. Waldman (2000) comes closest to providing an insight into the rhe-
torical development of policy in the Clinton White House, however, his recollections
avoid direct reference to the 1992 campaign.
82
Politics 41(1)
This article utilises discourse analysis to reflect upon key speeches given during the
Clinton campaign to reveal how these developed into policies that became US grand
strategy, while remaining true to its focus on domestic affairs. George (1994: 191)
observed that studies of discourse analysis were united by a commitment to understand
how ‘textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific
contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the contem-
porary world’. Clearly, any methodological approach has its limitations, and discourse
analysis is no exception. As noted by Doty (1993: 302), discourse analysis is a ‘system of
statements in which each individual statement makes sense’, however, it also produces
interpretative possibilities. This article concedes that while language is crucial to the
notion of discourse, politics is not reducible to language or linguistic analysis alone and
that problems exist within this analytical approach.
Particular challenges present themselves in regard to under-analysis; by poorly sum-
marising a statement rather than quoting directly, fixating upon an isolated quote, or con-
versely by simply over-quoting. To address these challenges, this article draws directly
from campaign speeches delivered by Governor Clinton that referenced foreign policy;
the October 1991 announcement address; the December 1991 Georgetown University
address; the April 1992 Foreign Policy Association address; the August 1992 World
Affairs Council address; and the October 1992 University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee
address. Where material has been drawn from contemporary reportage, it is to convey the
words of the candidate, not journalists. This selection process has been initiated to ensure
that the exact words of the candidate are considered, enabling an insight into the stylistic
and political choices that contributed to campaign rhetoric on foreign policy.
As Weldes (1998: 217) observed, studying political language is vital, since it
‘actively produces the issues with which policy makers deal and the specific problems
that they confront’. By drawing on the specific text of Clinton’s 1992 public statements,
it is possible to present an accurate rendering of the campaign’s core foreign policy
principles, which were advocated to win over a sceptical electorate. Doing so also ena-
bles an opportunity to compare and contrast the rhetoric and policies of the 1992 cam-
paign with those from 2016, providing a more acute context within which to analyse
tone, content and intent.
Selection bias is clearly a challenge in any use of discourse analysis. As Van Dijk
(1990: 14) noted, the methodology...
To continue reading
Request your trial