GREEN GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL SURVIVAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LAW OF THE COMMONS by BURNS H. WESTON AND DAVID BOLLIER
| Author | OLE W. PEDERSEN |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2013.00635.x |
| Date | 01 September 2013 |
| Published date | 01 September 2013 |
Book Reviews
GREEN GOVERNANCE: ECOLOGICAL SURVIVAL, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND THE LAW OF THE COMMONS by BURNS H. WESTON AND
DAVID BOLLIER
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 363 pp., £65.00)
In their 2004 essay, `The Death of Environmentalism', Michael Shellenberger
and Ted Nordhaus offer a damning indictment on the failures of the modern
environmental movement.
1
Among other criticisms, Shellenberger and Nord-
haus argue that the modern environmental movement suffers from group
think, `is no longer capable of dealing with the world's most serious ecological
crisis', and that environmental campaigners are `like generals fighting the last
war'.
2
Criticism of environmentalism is not unusual and environmental
campaigners have no doubt become used to receiving their fair share of
criticism. What is particularly striking about Shellenberger and Nordhaus's
criticism is that it comes from within the environmental movement: both
Shellenberger and Nordhaus are experienced environmental campaigners.
In many respects, we may judge Weston and Bollier's Green Govern-
ance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the Commons as
an attempt to counter the negative judg ement of Shellenberger and
Nordhaus. This is particularly so if we consider Shellenberger and Nord-
haus's call to `rethink everything' and to create new `proposals around a big
vision and a core set of values',
3
for very early on in Green Governance it
becomes evident that Weston and Bollier are, if nothing else, ambitious. The
aim of the book is to offer `a new template of effective and just environ-
mental protection based on the new/old paradigm of the commons and an
enlarged understanding of human rights' (p xix). The purpose of this
proposal is nothing less than to `pioneer new types of governance that allow
and encourage people to move from anthropocentrism to biocentrism . ..' (p.
xxi). In this, Weston and Bollier highlight that existing governance structures
afford too much power and attention to what they term the tragedy of the
State/Market Alliance. Recommending a turn away from this failed con-
stellation, they instead argue in favour of a governance system which
incorporates the features found in self-organized common structures. In the
468
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Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
1 M. Shellenberger and T. Nordhaus, `The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warm-
ing Politics in a Post-Environmental World' (2004), at
archive/the_death_of_environmentalism>.
2 id., pp. 6±7.
3 id., p. 7.
attempt to identify models which serve as examples of such common struc-
tures, Weston and Bollier draw our attention to a number of cases ranging
from the internet to the Arab Spring to the Occupy movement to Wikileaks.
From there, Weston and Bollier take the reader through a whirlwind
assessment of international human rights law as this is developed in respect
of environmental rights as well as the development of earth-rights provisions
in the domestic legal regimes of Ecuador and Bolivia (notwithstanding the
irony of relying on countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador in an argument
which rests on deontological foundations).
If we judge Weston and Bollier against the criticism of groupthink put
forward by Shellenberger and Nordhaus, we have, however, reasons to believe
that the authors fare less well. The reason for this is that, while they are indeed
ambitious in their enterprise of advocacy, this reviewer could not supress a
nagging sensation of deÂjaÁ vu when reading Green Governance. That is, in
many places, the book reads as a continuation of previous `calls to arms'
produced by the environmental movement. One example of this is the authors'
insistence on relying on what Hirschman elsewhere terms the imminent
danger thesis.
4
For example, Weston and Bollier contend that this current
point in time represents, varyingly, an `unusual opening' and a `historical
propitious moment for reimagining our economic order' (pp. xix, 79), while
asserting that the consequences of not taking rapid action are likely to be
ruinous. In doing so, they alert us to a common character trait of advocates
seeking a response to those reactionaries who harbour a predilection for
inaction: the argument that the risk of inaction significantly outweighs the
costs of the status quo. While this in all likelihood is true in some cases, it is far
from always the case.
In their claim for imminent action, the authors, moreover, uncritically list
a series of problems which are likely to gain prominence in the coming years
without engaging much with the primary literature. These problems include
loss of biodiversity, sea-level rises, famines, increase in vector-borne
diseases, and `environmental refugees'. While such lack of engagement with
the wider literature is not uncommon, it seems critical that when the
imminent danger claim is so central to the authors' argument, it would have
been useful to acknowledge some of the discrepancies in the underlying
research. For example, recent research indicates that the predicted increase
in malaria infec tions, result ing from an incre ase in global aver age
temperatures, has largely failed to materialize.
5
Elsewhere, it seems that
the surge in climate refugees previously predicted by UNEP has (luckily)
failed to happen ± at least so far.
6
This tendency to rely uncritically on the
469
4 See A.O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reason (1991) 153.
5 See P.W. Gething et al., `Climate Change and the Global Malaria Recession' (2010)
465 Nature 342.
6 `Climate Refugees, Not Fo und' Wall Stree t J., 21 April 20 11, at /
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704658704576274470237832478.html>.
ß2013 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß2013 Cardiff University Law School
imminent danger thesis thereby arguably falls within the category of what
Matt Ridley calls `fashionable gloom'.
7
The point to bear in mind here is that
we have reason to doubt whether an enterprise which relies so strongly on
the claim of imminent danger is likely to appeal to anyone but those who are
already wedded to dramatic reform. That is, will Weston and Bollier succeed
in talking people who are perhaps less agreeable to the `new paradigm' they
propose into switching sides? This reviewer is inclined to answer the
question in the negative. In many respects this is a shame in so far as ± if the
authors are right in their assertions ± what is needed is broad societal support
from a majority of citizens.
A further criticism to consider is whether, in relying on the imminent
danger thesis, Weston and Bollier are guilty of simplifying the matter at
hand. For example, they argue in relation to the use of the deontological
vocabulary of rights that `there is no principled reason why States that
encourage or tolerate release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere [. . .]
cannot or should not be targeted and shamed' (pp. 92±3). Another example is
found in the authors' support for framing the problem of climate change in
the vocabulary of human rights in order to address power imbalances,
rhetorically asserting `imagine British Petroleum's Deepwater Horizon
disaster approached in this light' (p. 95). An assessment of whether the
authors seriously consider such regulatory regimes desirable seemingly
hinges on what they mean by `principled reasons'. But very basic `principled
reasons' as to why a regime punishing states for the emission of greenhouse
gases is not currently in place (and is unlikely to be forthcoming) is that one
such system would require a complete reconfiguration of international legal
principles, while running the risk of disincentivizing states from taking part
in international negotiations at a time when there are at least vague
movements towards an international consensus.
Moreover, the argument that existing heterogeneous commons structures,
as these emerge in indigenous and local communities, on the internet or in
cloud computing, can be broadened into a wider and general governance
framework overlooks the obvious point that such governance structures
primarily work well where there is a central but shared interest in a particular
good (for example, upland hill farmers or indigenous fishing villages). Related
to this is the argument that many environmental disputes seemingly represent
a confli ct of vary ing int erests r elatin g to reso urce use , often wi th
environmental considerations on the one side and property/economic interests
on the other. If this is broadly correct, then it is hard to see how such disputes
can be easily resolved by reference to a commons structure which is built on a
scenario of common interest. The answer to this is, to Weston and Bollier, to
be found in the governance principles which they set forward in chapter 7.
Here they argue that any future governance system ought to in the least `make
human rights and nature's rights an explicit, integral part of its Vernacular
470
7 M. Ridley, The Rational Optimist (2010) 283.
ß2013 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß2013 Cardiff University Law School
Law system' and further that `markets must be strictly controlled' (pp. 185±6,
187). Prior to this, Weston and Bollier argue that the state within which the
commons is situated ought to give rec ognition to diverse `tribes' of
commoners (p. 179). To some this may seem like having your cake and
eating it. Throughout the book the authors have been highly critical of the
State/Market Alliance, blaming it in part for the current state of affairs. But
then they go on to assert, ostensibly with a nod to diversity, that commons
structures ought to at least possess the above-mentioned characteristics;
readers would not be amiss in thinking that this looks like Weston and Bollier
imposing state law on the commons structure by the back door. A much less
charitable interpretation would be that this is simply an example of law being
considered a game, which will yield proper results if played by the right
rules.
8
The problem is that those who decide the rules are the same persons
who also identify what constitutes proper results: in this case Weston and
Bollier with their emphasis on biocentric-anchored commons systems.
A further reason for considering whether the claims that a regulatory
framework based on rights and management principles of commons risks
simplifying the picture is, as Richard Lazarus reminds us, that regulation of
the environment is not `a simple matter because the objects of its concern,
the ecosystem and the human activities causing its de gradation, are
themselves not simple.'
9
In other words, we may question whether it is
possible to achieve effective regulation of environmental harms by reference
to `meta rights' and general c ommons paradigms when in fact t he
environment (in the broadest sense) is a highly complex matter which does
not necessarily lend itself to a one-way style of regulation.
Against all of this we might consider whether Weston and Bollier's
blueprint for green governance may simply serve as an inspiration for
ambitious campaigners and policy-makers. While being highly ambitious,
but not necessarily utopian (a point which the authors acknowledge them-
selves), it may well be that Weston and Bollier are right in recommending a
govern ance str uctur e based on r ights an d princi ples for c ommon s
management. That is, rather than pursuing an improbable cause, they may
well turn out to be so-called norm-entrepreneurs, succeeding in moving
forward socially desirable norms. If this is the case, although this reviewer
remains doubtful, then Green Governance serves as a robust rebuke to
Shellenberger and Nordhaus's obituary of the environmental movement.
OLE W. PEDERSEN
Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1
7RU, England
ole.pedersen@ncl.ac.uk
471
8 See P. Schlag, The Enchantment of Reason (1998) 33±6, who terms this move the
`noble scam'.
9 R.J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (2008) 6.
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