Hawks, doves, and opportunistic opposition parties
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343313506029 |
| Published date | 01 January 2014 |
| Date | 01 January 2014 |
| Author | Laron K Williams |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Hawks, doves, and opportunistic
opposition parties
Laron K Williams
Department of Political Science, University of Missouri
Abstract
Parliamentary regimes offer the unique opportunity for opposition parties to react to foreign policy by propos-
ing no-confidence motions (NCMs). The threat of an NCM bringing down the government may be enough to
induce pacific behavior by the executive. Yet, this simplistic characterization neglects the possible electoral
motivations of opportunistic opposition parties. I develop a theory that opposition parties respond to involve-
ment in international conflict by proposing NCMs as a tool to influence voters’ opinions with an eye toward
the next election. I develop two expectations based on policy disagreement and issue ownership that I use to
explain the electorally motivated decision to propose NCMs following conflict. I test these expectations with
a dataset of 14 European parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 2001. The empirical evidence suggests that
the partisanship of both the government and opposition parties interact to create varying electoral incentives to pro-
pose NCMs based on issue ownership. Right-wing opposition parties are more likely to challenge than left-wing
parties, and this effect is exacerbated when facing left-wing governments. This study has important implications that
underpin a number of theories of the domestic causes of international conflict as well as implications for the study
of party strategy.
Keywords
elections, international conflict, no-confidence motions, opposition, parliaments, partisanship
Introduction
Previous research has posited that the threat of a no-
confidence motion (NCM) increases the degree of ex
post accountability, which induces more pacific beha-
vior on the part of leaders of parliamentary regimes com-
pared with those of presidential regimes (e.g. Maoz &
Russett, 1993; Reiter & Tillman, 2002). Based on
this logic, we would expect to only rarely observe
NCMs in response to conflict, either because the
motions induced peaceful behavior by the govern-
ment, or because the opposition rescinded the motion
when its failure was clear. Yet, history is littered with
examples of opposition parties publicly challenging
governments involved in international conflict. Our
current understanding of ex post accountability in
parliamentary regimes offers no satisfying explanation
for this puzzling behavior.
This study examineshow opposition parties respondto
international conflict. I develop a theory that opposition
parties use NCMs – even if they are likely to fail – to
improve their electoral fortunes. We can expect variations
in the usage of this tool based on the partisanship of the
governmentand the opposition party. Sincetheir behavior
is motivatedby electoral concerns, I expectthat opposition
parties’ choices should reflect well-known patterns of vot-
ing behavior. I find that right-wing opposition parties are
more willing to challenge governments involved in hostile
disputes than are left-wing opposition parties. Moreover,
right-wingopposition partiesare more aggressive whenfac-
ing a left-wing government. These patterns are consistent
with theories of voting behavior, and reflect a desire for
Corresponding author:
williamslaro@missouri.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2014, Vol 51(1) 111–125
ªThe Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343313506029
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