Haynes v Harwood

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Date1934
CourtKing's Bench Division
[KING'S BENCH DIVISION] HAYNES v. HARWOOD. [1933. H. No. 3021.] 1934 April 26, 27. FINLAY J.

Negligence - Plaintiff Police Constable stopping bolting Horses - Volenti non fit injuria - Risk in course of duty.

The plaintiff, a police constable, was on duty inside a police station in a frequented street. Seeing the defendants' runaway horses with a van coming down the street he rushed out and eventually stopped them, sustaining injury in consequence, for which he claimed damages. The defendants, whom the Court found guilty of negligence, contended that the maxim Volenti non fit injuria applied:—

Held, that as the defendants must have contemplated that some one might attempt to stop the horses in an endeavour to prevent injury to life and limb, and also that the police were under a general duty to intervene to protect life and property, the act of and the injuries to the plaintiff were the natural and probable consequence of their negligence. The plaintiff did not within the true meaning of the maxim Volenti non fit injuria agree to take a risk knowing all the circumstances, but acted pursuant to his official duty.

Cutler v. United Dairies (London), Ld. [1933] 2 K. B. 297, distinguished.

ACTION tried by Finlay J.

The plaintiff, Thomas John Haynes, a Metropolitan police constable, claimed damages (agreed at 350l.) from the defendants, G. Harwood & Son, for personal injuries sustained by him as a result of the defendants' negligence.

On August 24, 1932, a two-horse van belonging to the defendants was left unattended by the driver in Paradise Street, Rotherhithe. For some reason the horses bolted along the street, which was frequented by many persons, including children, and other traffic. The plaintiff was in the police station in Paradise Street. He was on duty, but not on point duty. He looked out and saw the horses and van coming; he rushed out, seized the reins and eventually stopped the horses, sustaining injuries in so doing. The defendants denied negligence, and said that the plaintiff had voluntarily undertaken the risk of injury, and that they would rely on the maxim Volenti non fit injuria. They also alleged contributory negligence, and relied on the doctrine of common employment.

An executive officer from Scotland Yard gave evidence that the orders of the Metropolitan police provided that all the efforts of a police constable must be directed to the preservation of life and property, but that they contained no express provision that it was his duty to try to stop a runaway horse.

Hilbery K.C. and N. R. Fox-Andrews for the plaintiff. The plaintiff is entitled to succeed. Through their servant the defendants were guilty of negligence. Their duty was to use reasonable care to avoid injuring those using the highway: Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.F1 There was a complete breach of that duty when their servant left the horses unattended, and the cause of action was complete when, in consequence, the plaintiff was injured. The bolting of the horses was prima facie evidence of negligence: Gayler & Pope, Ld. v. B. Davies & Son, Ld.F2, and the defendants have not discharged the onus of disproving negligence thus thrown on them.

[Martin v. StanboroughF3; Lynch v. NurdinF4; and Cooke v. Midland Great Western Ry. of IrelandF5 were also referred to.]

The doctrine Volenti non fit injuria does not apply. The plaintiff may seem to have voluntarily taken the risk. But he had no choice. In the performance of his duty as a policeman he had to act and did act at once, without a moment's hesitation. And another duty would also be operating on his mind — namely, the moral and social duty to protect life. Lord Young in Wilkinson v. Kinneil Cannel and Coking Coal Co.F6, where a boy was injured while endeavouring to save a friend from injury, said that the boy was under a duty, though not a legal duty, to interfere to save the life or limbs of another. In the New York case of Wagner v. International Ry. Co.F7 Cardozo J. said: “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognises them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.” The initial act was the negligence of the defendants; one of the links of causation was that some one would thereby be put in danger and that some one else might react to the impulse to rescue. This case is distinguishable from Cutler v. United Dairies (London), Ld.F8, inasmuch as there was not in the present case as there was in that case time for deliberation which constituted the act of the plaintiff a novus actus interveniens. And Slesser L.J. in that caseF9 distinguishes it from a case where a man sees his child in great peril in the street, and, moved by paternal affection, dashes out and holds a runaway horse, and is injured.

[Donoghue v. StevensonF10; Hollaran v. City of New YorkF11; Devine v. PfaelzerF12; Brandon v. Osborne Garrett & Co.F13; Yarmouth v. FranceF14; and an article “Rescue and Voluntary Assumption of Risk” in the Cambridge Law Journal, vol. v., p. 192, by Prof. Goodhart, were also referred to.]

Rowland Thomas K.C. and G. J. Paull for the defendants. There was no evidence of negligence. But even if the defendants were guilty of negligence, it was not the cause of the plaintiff's injuries; the cause was the voluntary act of the plaintiff in stopping the horses. Though there be a general duty on the part of the police to protect life and property there is no specific duty to try to stop a runaway horse, and the plaintiff would not have suffered official penalties had he failed to make the attempt. He was not on duty regulating traffic. As a police officer he would be familiar with incidents like this and cannot be heard to say that in attempting to stop the horses he had to act precipitately and had no time to think. His act constituted a novus actus interveniens. If he was under a duty to attempt to stop runaway horses then he always knew that he was bound to do so, and the principle of the maxim Volenti non fit injuria must apply. Cutler v. United Dairies (London), Ld.F15, governs this case. In Brandon v. Osborne Garrett & Co.F16 the defence of Volenti non fit injuria was not raised, and in Wilkinson v. Kinneil Cannel and Cooking Coal Co.F17 three of the seven judges dissented.

[Beven on Negligence, 4th ed., vol. i., p. 174, was also referred to.]

FINLAY J. The action is both interesting and rather important. It is an action for damages for personal injuries, and it is brought by the plaintiff, a police constable in the Metropolitan police force stationed at Rotherhithe, against the defendants, who are the owners of a two-horse van. The substance of the case for the plaintiff is that by reason of the negligence of the servant of the defendants the horses ran away and bolted down a street, called Paradise Street, and that the plaintiff, rushing out of a police station on that route, seized the horses' heads and succeeded in stopping them, but was injured in doing so. In those circumstances the plaintiff says that he has suffered injuries caused by the negligence of the defendants. The defendants raise several defences: they deny that there was any negligence on...

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14 cases
  • Bourhill v Young
    • United Kingdom
    • House of Lords
    • 5 August 1942
    ...called in the United States "rescue" or "search" cases. This type has been recently examined and explained in the Court of Appeal in Haynes v. Harwood, 1935, 1 K.B. 146, where the Plaintiff, a police constable, was injured in stopping runaway horses, in a crowded street, in which were many......
  • Knightley v Johns
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 27 March 1981
    ...in favour of a policeman who was injured in stopping a runaway horse negligently left unattended on the highway: Haynes v. Harwood 1934 2 KB 240, 249. This court affirmed his decision in 1935 1 KB 146 and Lord Justice Greer found the decision of Mr. Justice Swift "very helpful" ib.156. At......
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    • Australia
    • High Court
    • Invalid date
  • Chester v Waverley Corporation
    • Australia
    • High Court
    • Invalid date
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