Heightening Security Consciousness and Sensitizing Police Personnel: “Factor X”
| Date | 01 October 1996 |
| Author | Prateep V. Philip |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032258X9606900411 |
| Published date | 01 October 1996 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
PRATEEP V. PHILIP, IPS
Superintendent and Principal, Police Training College, Ashok
Nagar, Madras, India
HEIGHTENING SECURITY
CONSCIOUSNESS AND SENSITIZING
POLICE PERSONNEL: IIFACTOR XII
The recent assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzak Rabin, by
a right-wing Jewish fanatic, has once again evoked cries of "security
lapse" in many quarters. What has surprised the world is the ease with
which a student, armed with a pistol, managed to walk up to the Israeli
PM and pump three bullets into him. After all, the Israeli security
services have a formidable reputation and are considered amongst, if not
the world's best.
Why did the men guarding Rabin fail to prevent the one eventuality
that they had been trained to deal with? Their failure was on two counts:
first, the lack of alertness on the part of those providing proximate
physical security; second, to correctly perceive the source of the threat
to the VIP. The first occurs because assassination attempts are rare and
never carried out in the same manner twice. Security personnel are
therefore looking to prevent an attack by known, previously attempted
methods. Over time security measures become "routinized". With each
successful security "bandobust", the security consciousness tends to
become diluted. The very fact that so far things have been uneventful
reinforces the belief that nothing untoward will happen. This
unconsciously adopted feeling of safety leads to a general complacency
and a fall in the standard of security.
Security personnel deployed on VIP security begin to believe that
an attack, while possible, is not likely. They do not act on the assumption
that an attack is imminent.
It
is necessary to change this attitude and act
as if an attempt on the VIP's life is certain and will take place. The
meaning of this assumption is that every policeman and officer deployed
on duty in any area connected with VIP security should act and behave
as if a grave threat or danger is present in his vicinity, say to the range
of 50 feet (15 metres). Let us call this dangerous person or device
"Factor-X", Then every security man should look to ensure that "Factor
X" is detected and neutralized in his area of surveillance or operation.
Once such an assumption is made, the result would be maximum mental
alertness and physical agility on the part of every person involved in VIP
security. Finding Factor X becomes the quest of each and every person
deployed on VIP security.
The introduction of a dummy Factor X during rehearsals will help
in testing the alertness of the personnel in the sector.
If
they succeed
individually or collectively in detecting the dummy Factor X they should
354 The Police Journal October 1996
To continue reading
Request your trial