Hell is other people’s schedules: Canada’s limited-term military commitments, 2001–2015
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0020702016662797 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
International Journal
2016, Vol. 71(3) 371–392
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702016662797
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Scholarly Essay
Hell is other people’s
schedules: Canada’s
limited-term military
commitments,
2001–2015
Aaron Ettinger
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario
Jeffrey Rice
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario
Abstract
Since 2001, Canada has participated in multilateral security operations in Afghanistan
and Libya, and as part of the anti-ISIS coalition. Canada’s contributions have been the
sum of eleven distinct time-delimited missions ranging from six months to four years.
Until now, this variation in strategic duration has drawn little scholarly attention. This
paper investigates the logic underpinning Canada’s variable mission commitments. We
find that the actions of specific allies, as well as the NATO alliance as a whole, can
account for the particular duration of Canadian military commitments. External pres-
sure, combined with Canada’s internationalist orientation, reputational concerns, and
the relative weakness of Canada’s Parliament, contributes to a cycle of engagement and
re-engagement whereby extrication is perceived to come with high costs in reputation.
This creates a dilemma for Canadian governments: participate in multilateral operations
and be seen as a good ally, but cede control over strategic duration to forces beyond
your control; or, don’t participate and risk that standing.
Keywords
Afghanistan, alliance politics, Canadian defence policy, ISIS, Libya, strategic duration
Corresponding author:
Aaron Ettinger, University of Waterloo, Political Science, 200 University Avenue W, Hagey Hall,
Room 315, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada.
Email: aaron.ettinger@uwaterloo.ca
Since 2001 Canada has engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Libya and, as part of
the anti-ISIS coalition, in Iraq and Syria. Although each conflict leaves the impres-
sion of a singular military effort, as is implied on the National War Memorial that
reads ‘‘Afghanistan 2001–2014,’’ the reality is more complex. Each engagement has
been stitched together by a series of time-delimited missions, extensions and renew-
als varying in length from three months to four years. This paper explains variation
in ‘‘strategic duration’’—the time horizons that Canadian governments set for
military missions—and its implications for multilateral security operations.
Fundamentally, strategic duration is a limitation placed on a state’s use of force
not as a matter of what to contribute, but rather for how long. Here, we investigate
the sources and implications of Canada’s strategic duration to illuminate a problem
for Canadian policymakers: its foreign policy internationalism and need to be
perceived as a good ally leaves Canada particularly vulnerable to external pressures
when participating in coalition warfare. Canada is thus caught in a dilemma: par-
ticipate and be seen as a good ally, but yield control over strategic duration to
exogenous forces; or don’t participate and risk your good standing.
We explore this dilemma by analyzing variation in eleven instances of significant
limited-term mission commitments to wars in Afghanistan, Libya, and as part of
the anti-ISIS coalition (see Table 1).
What explains variation? Sartre’s dictum that ‘‘hell is other people’’ is instruct-
ive, but with a twist. For Canada, hell is other people’s schedules: the strategic
duration of most of Canada’s limited-term commitments was set to time frames
determined outside Ottawa. We find that the most significant influences on
Canada’s strategic duration are its international commitments to NATO and to
key allies, whose influence Parliament is unable to offset. Throughout the
Table 1. Canada’s military missions since 2001.
Year Commitment Duration
Afghanistan 2001 Combat mission, Kandahar 6 months
2003 ISAF rotation, Kabul 12 months
2005 Combat and PRT, Kandahar 9–12 months and 18 months
2006 First Kandahar extension 2 years
2008 Second Kandahar extension 3 years
2010 NATO training mission 4 years
Libya March 2011 Naval and air support 3 months
June 2011 Naval and air support 3 months
Sept. 2011 Naval and air support 3 months
Anti-ISIS Oct. 2014 Training; air campaign 6 months
March 2015 Training; air campaign 12 months
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force; PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team.
372 International Journal 71(3)
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