Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE FOX,LORD JUSTICE GLIDEWELL,SIR ROUALEYN CUMMING-BRUCE
Judgment Date19 February 1987
Judgment citation (vLex)[1987] EWCA Civ J0219-4
Docket Number87/0144
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date19 February 1987
Hill
(Plaintiff/Appellant)
and
The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
(Defendant/Respondent)

[1987] EWCA Civ J0219-4

Before:

Lord Justice Fox

Lord Justice Glidewell

Sir Roualeyn Cumming-Bruce

87/0144

1983 H. No. 529

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (JUDGE IN CHAMBERS)

(SIR NEIL LAWSON, sitting as a High Court Judge)

Royal Courts of Justice,

MR RICHARD CLEGG, Q.C. and MR J.M. COLLINS (instructed by Messrs. Appleby, Hope & Matthews, Solicitors, Middlesborough) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

MR ALAN RAWLEY, Q.C. and MR R. RAINS (instructed by W. Miles, Esq., Solicitor, County Hall, Wakefield, West Yorkshire) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

LORD JUSTICE FOX
1

This is an appeal from an order of Sir Neil Lawson, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, that the writ and statement of claim be struck out as disclosing no cause of action.

2

The plaintiff is the mother and sole personal representative of Jacqueline Hill (to whom I will refer as "Miss Hill") who died, aged 20, on or about the 17th November 1980. It is the plaintiff's case that about 9.30 p.m on the 17th November 1980 Miss Hill was attacked in a street in Leeds by one Peter Sutcliffe and thereby suffered injuries from which she died on or about the same day. On the 22nd May 1981 Sutcliffe was found guilty, at the Central Criminal Court, of the murder of Miss Hill on or about the 17th November 1980.

3

The plaintiff's pleaded case is broadly as follows.

4

Between 1969 and the 17th November 1980, and in particular between the 1st July 1975 and the 17th November 1980, Sutcliffe committed a series of offences against young or fairly young women and mostly in the Metropolitan Police Area of West Yorkshire (of which Area the defendant is the Chief Officer of Police). Those offences consisted of 8 cases of attempted murder and 13 cases (including that of Miss Hill—who was the last to be killed) of murder. Sutcliffe has been commonly referred to as the Yorkshire Ripper. Although his victims were women he was not, we were told, a rapist. He killed or attempted to kill.

5

The mode of assault and the circumstances of the offences, it is pleaded, resembled one another to such an extent that it was reasonable to infer that the offences were committed by the same man; and that, accordingly, it was at all material times foreseeable that if he were not apprehended the man would commit further similar offences.

6

Accordingly, it is contended, it was the duty of the Chief Office of Police and of the officers under his direction to exercise all reasonable skill and care to apprehend the perpetrator of the crimes, but in breach of that duty the police failed to use sufficient skill or care to detect the perpetrator prior to the murder of Miss Hill. The statement of claim sets out, at length, particulars of alleged failures by the police to use information which they obtained and to conduct investigations which would have been appropriate.

7

Inter alia it is alleged that the police failed to collate relevant information and to investigate records relating to Sutcliffe; failed to make sufficient use of photo-fit pictures; attached undue importance to hoax letters and telephone calls; failed to re-evaluate suspects who had been eliminated; and failed to take account of the fact that Sutcliffe had been provided with an alibi for offences only by his wife.

8

In the premises, the plaintiff claims on behalf of the estate of Miss Hill (a) damages for loss of expectation of life and pain and suffering caused to Miss Hill prior to death; (b) funeral expenses; (c) damages in respect of Miss Hill's loss of earnings during the lost years. The main element in this claim is item (c)—the lost years' claim. Such claims on behalf of the estate of a deceased person were abolished by Parliament in 1982. That was done by the Administration of Justice Act 1982, section 4. The plaintiff is only able to assert the claim in this case because Miss Hill died before section 4 of the 1982 Act came into force.

9

The defendant is sued under the provisions of section 48(1) of the Police Act 1964 under which the Chief Officer of Police for the police area is liable for torts committed by Constables under his direction and control.

10

The statement of claim contains no allegation that the alleged breach of duty by the police caused the death of Miss Hill but that could be cured by amendment.

11

The plaintiff was not a dependant of Miss Hill and we were informed by counsel that although she is the sole residuary beneficiary of the estate, she does not seek to recover damages for her own benefit but wishes to use them to establish a charitable trust to commemorate her daughter.

12

The defendant applies to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no cause of action. The judge, in acceding to that application, held that Miss Hill was not in such a relationship with the defendant or his officers as to give rise to any duty of care in relation to the apprehension of Sutcliffe.

13

The case comes before the court, not by way of preliminary issue but under Order 18 Rule 19 on an application to strike out as disclosing no cause of action. For the purposes of such an application it must be assumed, in the plaintiff's favour, that all the facts pleaded in the statement of claim are true. The issue, which was argued before us, is whether under the law of England any cause of action lies against the police for the consequences of a direct physical attack upon one citizen (Miss Hill) by another (Sutcliffe) in circumstances where the attacker was not a police officer and was not in police custody or, having been arrested, was allowed to escape from police custody but where reasonable care on the part of the police would have resulted in the attacker's previous arrest. If the answer is "No", then the plaintiff must fail and there will be no need for the lengthy trial which the examination of the pleaded facts would otherwise entail. Since the question is purely one of law and will have to be determined sooner or later whatever course the action takes, it seems appropriate to decide it at this juncture. It is, of course, a novel point (in the sense that it has not previously been decided) and cannot be said to be unarguable in the sense that there is a short answer to it. But if at the end of the argument, be it short or long, the court is satisfied that no cause of action lies, I apprehend that the court is entitled to decide the matter accordingly (see Williams & Humbert v. W. H. Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd, (1986) 2 WLR 24 at page 37). No objection to the procedure is in fact raised and the matter has been argued at length before us.

14

In dealing with the case I will assume that, if the police owed Miss Hill a duty of care in the conduct of their investigations into the Yorkshire Ripper murders, the facts pleaded in the statement of claim would, if proved, constitute a breach of that duty. The question is whether the duty of care existed.

15

I begin with some familiar quotations. Lord Atkin's "general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care" was that:

"You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour. The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely or directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question". ( Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562 at page 580).

16

Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office (1970) AC 1004, 1027, observed that Lord Atkin's formulation was not to be treated as a statutory definition; it would require qualification in new circumstances. "But", said Lord Reid,

"I think the time has come when we can and should say that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion. For example, causing economic loss is a different matter….."

17

Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton L.B.C (1978) AC 728 at pages 751–52 said:

"Through the trilogy of cases in this House— Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562, Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) AC 465, and Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd v. Home Office (1970) AC 1004, the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter—in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise see Dorset Yacht case (1970) AC 1004 per Lord Reid at page 1027".

18

Applying this statement, the plaintiff contends first, that there was a sufficient relationship of neighbourhood or proximity that it must have been within the reasonable contemplation of the police that failure to exercise due care in their investigations could put at risk the life of an unaccompanied young woman; and, secondly, it is...

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1 books & journal articles
  • Torts: Cases and Commentary, 5th ed.
    • Australia
    • Melbourne University Law Review Vol. 27 No. 3, December 2003
    • 1 December 2003
    ...of fundamental justice'. (101) [1989] AC 53. (102) For the Court of Appeal's decision, see Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] QB 60. (103) [1989] AC 53, 62 (Lord (104) Jane Doe (1998) 160 DLR (4th) 697. See Mayo Moran, 'Case Comment: Jane Doe v Board of Commissioners of Police ......

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