Historical institutionalism and institutional design: divergent pathways to regime complexes in Asia and Europe
| Published date | 01 June 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231170717 |
| Author | Stephanie C. Hofmann,Andrew Yeo |
| Date | 01 June 2024 |
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https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231170717
European Journal of
International Relations
2024, Vol. 30(2) 306 –332
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/13540661231170717
journals.sagepub.com/home/ejt
Historical institutionalism
and institutional design:
divergent pathways to
regime complexes in Asia
and Europe
Stephanie C. Hofmann
European University Institute, Italy
Andrew Yeo
The Catholic University of America, USA; Brookings Institution, USA
Abstract
Why and how do pathways to regime complexes diverge? Building on insights from
the literatures on institutional design and historical institutionalism, we argue that
early institutional design choices produce long-term variation in the pace, density, and
composition of institutional layers within a regime complex. In a first step, we argue that
if an institution becomes focal, this increases the exit costs for member-states to leave.
Additional institutional layers become a more likely outcome. In a second step, we argue
that depending on the focal organization’s formal or informal design, variegated sovereignty
costs inform the additional layering pathways. If a focal organization is formal, sovereignty
costs are high for member-states. Consequently, creating additional institutional layers
becomes cumbersome, leading to a slow pace of “negotiated layering” and a regime
complex characterized by low density and composed of formal and informal institutions. In
contrast, low sovereignty costs associated with informal focal organizations enable a rapid
process of “breakout layering” resulting in a high density of mostly informal institutions.
We develop our argument by examining the evolution of security institutions in Europe
and Asia through diplomatic cables, treaty texts, personal memoirs, and policy memos.
Keywords
Institutional layering, focal organization, regime complexity, EU, ASEAN, NATO
Corresponding author:
Andrew Yeo, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC 20064, USA.
Email: yeo@cua.edu
1170717EJT0010.1177/13540661231170717European Journal of International RelationsHofmann and Yeo
research-article2023
Original Article
Hofmann and Yeo 307
Introduction
Regime complexes—that is, an array of overlapping and nested organizations that share
member-states and functional mandates—have become an established feature in interna-
tional politics (Alter and Raustiala, 2018). Densely institutionalized environments across
a wide range of issue-areas exist regionally and globally. For example, scholars have
observed regime complexes in trade (Allee et al., 2017), finance (Henning, 2017), cli-
mate change (Keohane and Victor, 2011), refugee protection (Betts, 2010), crisis man-
agement (Hofmann et al., 2016), and energy policy (Colgan et al., 2012). However, we
still know little about how and why regime complexes develop and vary over time.
Questions about how regime complexes unfold carry real-world consequences for
global order-making and governance. State actors are turning to new institutions, particu-
larly at the regional level, to circumvent increasing gridlock created by geopolitical divi-
sions within global institutions. As many regime complexes continue to grow, practitioners
and scholars alike will need a better grasp of how and why processes of institutional layer-
ing vary. Understanding, for example, the pace in which regime complexes develop, and
its resulting density, provides us with insights about how stable complex institutional
constellations are at any point in time and what politics to expect from member-states.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and renewed concerns about a Taiwan Strait conflict make
this apparent as policymakers in Asia and Europe debate whether it is best to focus on one
focal organization, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or rely on multiple and new security institutions
that facilitate trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific security cooperation.
How and why do the pathways to regime complexes diverge? In particular, how do we
explain differences in the pace and density of regime complexes? Building on recent
scholarship on institutional design, historical institutionalism, and regime complexity,
we show how the formal or informal design of focal organizations1 shapes the pace of
institutional layering—that is the addition of new institutions in conjunction with exist-
ing ones—and the subsequent density of a regime complex. As a first step, we argue that
the focality of an institution increases the exit costs for member-states to leave their
institution and instead steers policymakers to create additional institutional layers (Jupille
et al., 2013). In a second step, we argue that a focal organization’s design—or more spe-
cifically, its degree of formality—results in two different paths to institutional layering
as a result of variegated sovereignty costs2:
negotiated and breakout layering. Negotiated layering is likely to occur when the focal
organization is formal. When proposals for additional institutions are on the table and at least
some member-states would be member of both organizations, the formal institutional layer is
likely to result in cumbersome negotiations as states fear that their formalized commitments in
the focal organization will not be accommodated in the additional layer. This slows down the
pace of layering as policymakers must overcome resistance from states who fear additional
sovereignty costs in form of coordination pressures and possible de-coupling. Consequently,
negotiated layering tends to produce a low-density regime complex. In contrast, an informal
focal organization enables a rapid proliferation of more informal institutions through breakout
layering. Thus, breakout layering is prone to generating a high density of additional institutional
layers.
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