Hospital Numerical Flexibility and Nurse Economic Security in China and India

AuthorCharmine E.J. Härtel,Cherrie Jiuhua Zhu,Thin Vu,Chris Nyland
Published date01 March 2015
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12020
Date01 March 2015
Hospital Numerical Flexibility and Nurse
Economic Security in China and India
Chris Nyland, Charmine E.J. Härtel, Thin Vu and
Cherrie Jiuhua Zhu
Abstract
This article contrasts the flexibility of Chinese and Indian urban hospitals and
the security of nurses. The study draws on a survey of 55 urban hospitals, and
finds that national context generates different flexibility–security outcomes
even when workers with similar skills are considered. Our findings support
claims that China is constructing a flexibility–security regime that aims to
promote both security and flexibility, and that India remains attached to
employer-based social protection, but challenges the claim that economic
growth is higher in China because India’s employers have relatively less capac-
ity to utilize labour-time as they wish.
1. Introduction
The enterprise flexibility and employee security literature has debated
whether it is possible to reconcile employers’ wish for enhanced labour flex-
ibility and workers’ desire for security by having the state underpin enterprise
flexibility with a robust social security and retraining regime (Vandenberg
2010; Wilthagen and Tros 2004). Much of this literature argues that finely
tuned, such state and enterprise policies and strategies can concomitantly
enhance both organizational flexibility and employee security. Some scholars
charge, however, that these arguments are vulnerable because they accord
inadequate attention to how the flexibility–security relationship varies across
occupations, workplaces and regions (Burroni and Keune 2011). This article
responds to this observation by examining the numerical flexibility of hospi-
tals and the economic security of hospital nurses in China and India. Numeri-
cal flexibility refers to an organization’s capacity to adjust labour utilization
in line with fluctuations and changes in product demand, and economic
Chris Nyland and Cherrie Jiuhua Zhu are at Monash University. Charmine Hartel is at
The University of Queensland. Thin Vu is at Monash University and at National Economics
University, Hanoi.
Note: correction added on 9 September 2013 following initial online publication on 8 April 2013.
The list of author names for this article has been amended to include Cherrie Zhu. Nyland,
Hartel and Vu apologise for the original omission.
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British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12020
53:1 March 2015 0007–1080 pp. 136–158
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2013. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
security relates to the capacity of workers to sell their labour-time in an
environment in which basic income and representation security are assured
and wherein other forms of work-related security are improving. In brief, we
determine if the flexibility–security experiences of Chinese and Indian nurses
differ in significant ways, and thus shed light on the extent to which these
regimes reconcile the interests of employers and workers.
We examine and contrast the situation in China and India for three reasons.
First, we do so because these nations have different approaches to the
flexibility–security nexus; second, because Chinese and Indian nurses share
similar skills and undertake similar tasks; third, because Indian employers and
scholars allege that a key reason China has higher economic growth than India
is because Chinese employers have greater freedom to arrange employment
relations as they wish. We find that although nurses in our case countries have
similar skills and work in like environments, their flexibility–security mix
differs markedly. This suggests that skills and workplaces may be a secondary
magnitude influence relative to institutional factors, such as custom and
practice, the ideological orientation of the populace and state, and govern-
ment administrative capacity. The article also supports Vandenberg’s (2010)
claim that China’s state is constructing a regime that underpins increased
enterprise flexibility with increased government-generated securities, and that
India remains tied to an employer-based flexibility–security regime. Finally,
the article challenges the notion that China has a higher rate of growth than
India because Chinese employers have greater freedom to arrange employ-
ment relationship as they wish. The article begins by introducing the
flexibility–security literature pertaining to China and India, and then proceeds
to contextualize the empirical analysis by detailing the character of nurse
employment in the two countries. In Section 6, we describe our approach to
data collection and analysis. Section 7 presents our results, and the article
concludes by discussing implications that cascade from the analysis.
2. Enterprise flexibility and employee security
In focusing on China and India, we build on Vandenberg’s (2010) compari-
son of the flexibility–security relationship in six Asian countries. He reports
that China’s government has embraced a model that emphasizes the need for
enterprise flexibility, and a robust welfare and retraining regime, while Indian
stakeholders retain ‘employer-based security’ (Vandenberg 2010: 31). By the
latter notion, Vandenberg means an employment system wherein the state
limits the employers’ ability to dismiss/retrench employees, and concomi-
tantly denies workers unemployment benefits and retraining (Shrestha 2009).
Explanation for these findings, Vandenberg (2010: 32) argues, ‘is to be sought
in domestic factors, notably the government’s administrative and financial
capacity, representational politics and ideology’. In brief, India’s ‘leftist’
politics and limited administrative capacity and finances render it difficult to
transition from an employer-based security regime and/or provide benefits to
Hospital Numerical Flexibility and Nurse Economic Security 137
© John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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