House of Lords

Date01 August 2007
DOI10.1350/jcla.2007.71.4.301
Published date01 August 2007
Subject MatterHouse of Lords
House of Lords
Communications Act 2003: ‘grossly offensive’ Message
DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40
The respondent, who had strong opinions on issues surrounding
immigration, telephoned his Member of Parliament and spoke either
directly to him or to members of his staff or left messages on an
answering machine. In those conversations and messages the defendant
referred to ‘wogs’, ‘Pakis’, ‘black bastards’ and ‘niggers’. Some of those
who heard the messages described themselves as shocked, alarmed and
distressed at the language. None of the people whom the defendant
addressed or who picked up the recorded messages was a member of an
ethnic minority. The defendant was tried for sending, by means of a
public telecommunications system, messages that were grossly offensive
contrary to s. 127 of the Communications Act 2003. Section 127(1)
provides that a person is guilty of an offence if he: (a) sends by means of
a public electronic communications network a message or other matter
that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing charac-
ter; or (b) causes any such message or matter to be so sent. The justices
held that, although the conversations and messages were offensive, a
reasonable person would not have found them grossly offensive; accord-
ingly, they acquitted the defendant. The Divisional Court dismissed the
Crown's appeal by way of case stated. The Director of Public Prosecu-
tions appealed to the House of Lords following the certif‌ication of a point
of law of general public importance. It stated:
When deciding whether a message is grossly offensive for the purposes of
section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, what, if anything, is the
relevance of (a) the intention of the person who sent the message and
(b) the reaction of the recipient?
H
ELD
,
ALLOWING THE APPEAL
, the House of Lords set aside the deci-
sion of the Divisional Court and the justices, but did not order that the
case be remitted to the justices. The purpose of s. 127(1)(a) was to
prohibit the use of a service provided and funded by the public for the
benef‌it of the public for the transmission of communications which
contravened the basic standards of society. The proscribed act was the
sending of the message of the proscribed character by the def‌ined
means, and the offence was complete when the message was sent. It was
for the court, applying the standards of an open and just multiracial
society and taking account of the context and all relevant circumstances,
to determine as a question of fact whether a message was grossly
offensive. It was necessary to show that the defendant intended his
words to be grossly offensive to those to whom the message related, or
that he was aware that they might be taken to be so. In this case the
defendant's messages were grossly offensive and would be found by a
reasonable person to be so.
301

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