House of Lords
| Author | R. J. Cooper |
| DOI | 10.1177/002201838705100203 |
| Date | 01 May 1987 |
| Published date | 01 May 1987 |
| Subject Matter | House of Lords |
HOUSE
OF
LORDS
BURDEN OF PROOF-POSSESSION OF DRUGS
R.
v.
Hunt
In
R.
v.
Hunr
[1987]
1
All E.R. 1, the House of Lords has reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeal [1986] 1 All E.R. 184 (Noted at
50
J.C.L.
222).
It
will
be recalled that the defendant had been found
in
possession
of
a powder containing morphine and had been
charged
with
possession of a controlled drug contrary to section
5(2)
of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971. Section 5(1) of the 1971 Act
provides the general prohibition on possession of controlled drugs
but, by virtue of Regulation 4(1) of the Misuse of Drugs
Regulations 1973, section 5(1) has “no effect in relation to the
controlled drugs specified
in
Schedule 1”. Schedule 1 deals
with
preparations, compounds and mixtures of drugs and includes
in
paragraph 3 “any preparation of morphine containing not more
than
0.2%
of morphine
. .
.
compounded
with
other ingredients
in
such a way that the morphine cannot be recovered by readily
applicable means or
in
a yield which would constitute a risk to
health”. The defence had submitted at the trial that there was no
case to answer since the prosecution had failed to adduce evidence
of the proportion of morphine contained
in
the powder found
in
the
defendant’s possession. This submission was rejected by the trial
judge, whose ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal, which
declared that the burden of proving any exception under the 1973
Regulations was on the defendant.
In the House of Lords, after reviewing many authorities, Lord
Griffiths summarised the position regarding the burden of proving
statutory defences:
Woolmington
v.
D.P.P.
[1935] A.C.
462,
his
Lordship averred, did not lay down a rule that the burden of
proving a statutory defence lay on a defendant only
if
the statute
specifically
so
provided: rather a statute can, on its true construction,
place the burden
of
proof on the defendant expressly or by neces-
sary implication. Whilst recognising that it would
be
rare for such a
construction to be adopted in cases other than those envisaged by
R.
186
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