How do international bureaucrats affect policy outputs? Studying administrative influence strategies in international organizations
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Author | Nora Wagner,Michael W. Bauer,Jörn Ege |
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/00208523211000109 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
Article
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
How do international
bureaucrats affect policy
outputs? Studying
administrative influence
strategies in
international
organizations
J€
orn Ege
German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer,
Germany
Michael W. Bauer
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Nora Wagner
German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer,
Germany
Abstract
The article investigates how international public administrations, as corporate actors,
influence policymaking within international organizations. Starting from a conception of
international organizations as political-administrative systems, we theorize the strate-
gies international bureaucrats may use to affect international organizations’ policies
and the conditions under which these strategies vary. Building on a most-likely case
design, we use process tracing to study two cases of bureaucratic influence: the influ-
ence of the secretariat of the World Health Organization on the “Global action plan for
the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases”; and the influence of the
International Labour Office on the “Resolution concerning decent work in global supply
Corresponding author:
J€
orn Ege, German University for Administrative Sciences Speyer, Freiherr-vom-Stein-Str. 2, 67346 Speyer,
Germany.
Email: ege@uni-speyer.de
International Review of Administrative
Sciences
!The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00208523211000109
journals.sagepub.com/home/ras
2021, Vol. 87(4) 737–754
chains”. We use interview material gathered from international public administration
staff and stakeholders to illustrate varying influence strategies and the conditions under
which these strategies are used. The study shows how and when international public
administrations exert policy influence, and offers new opportunities to extend the
generalizability of public administration theories.
Points for practitioners
International bureaucrats influence the outcomes of multilateral negotiations by means
of their technical expertise and strategic involvement in the decision-making process.
Their influence is primarily geared toward achieving organizational goals. However, the
perception of too much influence can threaten the implementation of a decision.
Political leadership needs to find the right balance between encouraging entrepreneurial
behavior and providing sufficient political steering. Civil servants themselves need a
well-functioning political radar to sense how far they can push with their ambitions.
Keywords
bureaucratic influence, global governance, International Labour Organization, interna-
tional public administration, World Health Organization
Introduction
1
Despite recent backlashes against multilateralism (Weiss, 2019), interest in the
secretariats of international organizations (IOs) or international public adminis-
trations (IPAs) remains high—not least because of their unique role in fostering
collective policy action in fighting global pandemics or regulating international
trade (Stone and Moloney, 2019). The effectiveness of collective action depends
on IPAs’ autonomous capacities (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Beigbeder, 1997;
see also Thorvaldsdottir et al., this issue). At the same time, the rise of unelected
civil servants raises questions of democratic control and the legitimacy of global
governance (Vibert, 2007: 144–164). Between these poles, IPA influence has
become the crucial variable to explain the problem-solving capacities (Hickmann
et al., 2021), as well as pathologies, of international bureaucracies (Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004).
We conceive of IPAs as corporate actors made up of individual bureaucrats
who are jointly able to engage in strategic behavior. We aim to identify the strat-
egies that these actors use in the complex streams of policymaking. While strategies
are primarily actions of individuals, we start from the assumption that aggregated
individual behavior can lead to strategic collective action, which allows the admin-
istration to influence public policy (Mayntz, 1986). Thus, this article contributes to
the debate about when and how IPAs can exert influence within IOs. Considering
the long tradition in public administration of studying bureaucracy and its
738 International Review of Administrative Sciences 87(4)
To continue reading
Request your trial