How local personal vote-earning attributes affect the aggregate party vote share: Evidence from the Belgian flexible-list PR system (2003–2014)

DOI10.1177/0263395718811969
Published date01 November 2019
Date01 November 2019
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718811969
Politics
2019, Vol. 39(4) 464 –479
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0263395718811969
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How local personal
vote-earning attributes affect
the aggregate party vote share:
Evidence from the Belgian
flexible-list PR system
(2003–2014)
Gert-Jan Put, Jef Smulders and Bart
Maddens
KU Leuven, Belgium
Abstract
This article investigates the effect of candidates exhibiting local personal vote-earning attributes
(PVEA) on the aggregate party vote share at the district level. Previous research has often assumed
that packing ballot lists with localized candidates increases the aggregate party vote and seat
shares. We present a strict empirical test of this argument by analysing the relative electoral swing
of ballot lists at the district level, a measure of change in party vote shares which controls for
the national party trend and previous party results in the district. The analysis is based on data of
7527 candidacies during six Belgian regional and federal election cycles between 2003 and 2014,
which is aggregated to an original data set of 223 ballot lists. The ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression models do not show a significant effect of candidates exhibiting local PVEA on relative
electoral swing of ballot lists. However, the results suggest that ballot lists do benefit electorally
if candidates with local PVEA are geographically distributed over different municipalities in the
district.
Keywords
Belgium, electoral swing, flexible-list PR system, local PVEA, nomination strategies
Received: 3rd April 2018; Revised version received: 25th September 2018; Accepted: 1st October 2018
Introduction
This article examines how individual-level vote-earning characteristics promoting the
‘localness’ of candidates impact the party ballot list result at the district level. Previous
literature identified a set of candidate traits as local ‘personal vote-earning attributes’
Corresponding author:
Gert-Jan Put, Research Centre for Regional Economics, KU Leuven, Vlamingenstraat 83, Box 3550, 3000
Leuven, Belgium.
Email: gertjan.put@kuleuven.be
811969POL0010.1177/0263395718811969PoliticsPut et al.
research-article2018
Article
Put et al. 465
(PVEA): specific personal characteristics which provide voters with substantive cues to a
politician’s local knowledge and competence to represent them, such as being a district
native or having prior local-level political experience (Shugart et al., 2005). The more
burdensome acquiring information on all parties and candidates running for election, the
more rational voters will rely on this candidate localness as a cue in their voting decision.
Especially in candidate-centred systems, these PVEA are crucial attributes for voters as a
shortcut, for candidates to signal their credibility, and for political parties as a nomination
criterion (Nemoto and Shugart, 2013).
But how do these objective candidate attributes affect the election outcome? Previous
research demonstrates that prior local-level political experience significantly increases a
candidate’s personal vote share (e.g. Gschwend and Zittel, 2015; Jankowski, 2016; Put
and Maddens, 2015; Tavits, 2010). To our knowledge, however, there has not been a sin-
gle empirical test to date of how PVEA affect the aggregate party vote share at the district
level.1 It is often conveniently assumed that parties in candidate-centred electoral systems
will electorally benefit in terms of aggregate vote and legislative seat share if they pack
their ballot lists with local office-holders.
In this contribution, we test the electoral effectiveness of this candidate nomination
strategy by analysing data on Flemish candidates for six consecutive regional and federal
elections in Belgium between 2003 and 2014. In addition, we present and empirically test
a new theoretical argument as to how political parties can optimize nomination strategies
by taking into account a maximal geographical distribution of localized candidates on
their ballot lists. To this end, we build an original data set of 223 ballot lists from Flemish
political parties, aggregating information on 7257 individual candidacies at the ballot
list–level.2
We run ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with the Relative Electoral
Swing (RES), which measures the shift in ballot list vote shares taking into account the
general party trend and previous party result in the district, of ballot lists as dependent
variable. The results suggest that nominating high numbers of candidates exhibiting local
PVEA does not significantly increase the electoral result of the ballot. We do find evi-
dence, however, that the aggregate list result benefits from the presence of candidates
holding local office in as many different municipalities as possible. This result provides
an empirical underpinning for the electoral importance of balancing ballot lists geograph-
ically, and therefore has important implications for party scholars and practitioners alike.
Local PVEA as nomination criteria for parties
The concept of PVEA emerges from the vast literature on the personal vote, originally
defined by Cain et al. (1987) as the share of votes received by legislators resulting from
personal activities and characteristics helping them to develop an individual electoral
support base and reduce electoral vulnerability. In their seminal article, Carey and Shugart
(1995) develop a comprehensive theoretical framework as to how a candidate’s incentive
to cultivate these personal votes is conditional on the electoral formula. A large number
of scholars have subsequently analysed the personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators
(e.g. Bräuninger et al., 2012; Crisp et al., 2004; Shomer, 2009) and candidates (e.g. De
Winter and Baudewyns, 2015; Zittel and Gschwend, 2008).
In addition to research on personal vote-seeking behaviour, Shugart et al. (2005) argue
that politicians can also instrumentalize certain objective attributes to cultivate personal
votes. In the extant literature, these are commonly referred to as PVEA: personal traits

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