How was the Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan seen in Pakistan?
| Published date | 01 June 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231172197 |
| Author | Muhammad Akram,Dania Mohamad,Adeela Arshad-Ayaz |
| Date | 01 June 2024 |
How was the Taliban 2.0 in
Afghanistan seen in Pakistan?
Muhammad Akram
Concordia University, Canada
Dania Mohamad
Concordia University, Canada
Adeela Arshad-Ayaz
Concordia University, Canada
Abstract
The Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan took the world by surprise. This article investigates how this event was
seen differently in varied contexts, such as neighboring Pakistan. Our research shows epistemological
pluralism in Pakistan, i.e. how different groups use different ways of knowing (epistemology), being
(ontology), and valuing (axiology) to explain and analyze Taliban 2.0. Conceptually, the paper draws
on insightsfrom the relationality theory to demonstratethe reasons behind such epistemological plur-
alism. The theory of relationality provides the grounds for epistemological pluralism, i.e. the mixed
sentiments and feelings among respondents about the Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan. Our research
reports the perspectives of nine selected civil society activists about Taliban 2.0 in Afghanistan and
its implications for Pakistan. The respondents were interviewed during the second quarter of the
Taliban administering Afghanistan. Some called it the victory of Islam, the freedom of Afghans from
foreign occupation, and the protection of the Pakistani border from Indian proxies. Others were
worried about the risks of increased extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, including the rise of banned
organizations like Tehr ik-e-Taliban Pakistan. This study intends to document the interviewee civil
society activists’suggestions to the State of Pakistan for dealing with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
Keywords
Afghanistan, Pakistan, security, Taliban 2.0, violent extremism
Corresponding author:
Muhammad Akram, Department of Education, Concordia University, 1455 Boul. de Maisonneuve Ouest, Montréal, QC
H3G 1M8, Canada.
Email: akramuhammad1@gmail.com
Original Research Article
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2024, Vol. 9(2) 274–290
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/20578911231172197
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
Introduction
Following the Taliban agreement with the U.S. on 29 February 2020 (Tariq et al., 2021), U.S.
President Joe Biden reiterated the decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan to end the
two-decade-long war, the longest war fought by the U.S. (Tariq et al., 2020). However, while
the U.S. and NATO troops were on their way out, the Taliban expanded their territory. They
gained control of Kabul on 15 August 2021 with minimal resistance from the previous government.
The world was shocked by the almost instant takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban (Taliban 2.0
hereafter). A few people and groups, such as the right-wing religious parties and political leaders in
Pakistan, celebrated Taliban 2.0. For example, former Prime Minister Imran Khan applauded
Afghans for “breaking the shackles of slavery.”His special assistant Raoof Hasan wrote on
Twitter that “the contraption that the U.S. had pieced together for Afghanistan has crumbled like
the proverbial house of cards …a virtually smooth shifting of power [from Ghani’s] corrupt gov-
ernment to Taliban rule”(Ellis-Petersen and Baloch, 2021). Ellis-Petersen and Baloch (2021) also
noted other statements, such as Asad Durrani, former chief of Pakistan’s intelligence agency named
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), saying, “The masses will be happy the Taliban took over
Afghanistan …Concerns are mostly among the privileged classes who will be deprived of their
loot and clout to exploit the poor …The problem is that the Taliban do not intend to influence pol-
itics or ideology in Pakistan, but it is entirely up to us if we want to adopt their victorious model.”
Khan (2021) concludes five key reasons why some Pakistanis have positive sentiments about the
Taliban 2.0: (1) the removal of foreign forces’presence from the region; (2) the nullified influence
of India in Afghanistan, which was perceived to be a substantial security risk for Pakistan; (3)
potential reduction in Indian support for anti-state elements inside Pakistan such as Baloch
Liberation Army; (4) extended possibilities of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) towards Central Asia crossing through Afghanistan; and (5) no more “do more”
demands from the U.S. to fight Taliban factions inside Pakistan.
On the other hand, many Pakistanis have been worried about this political shift in Afghanistan
and perceive various risks for Pakistan (Siddique, 2021). The collateral damage to the economy and
stability through increased militancy and fragile politics is still going on (Hamid, 2020). Zahid
(2021) noted that Taliban 2.0 would accelerate sectarianism in Pakistan as those militants who
fled to Afghanistan owing to military operations will return to Pakistan and continue their terrorist
operations. Zahid highlights the ties between the Taliban in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan -
TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which may result in increased attacks on minority communities
of Shia and Hazara.
We briefly reviewed the associated history to better understand the relationship between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since its establishment, Pakistan has had fragile relationships with
Afghanistan, except when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s. The underlying reasons
for such tenuous relationships include Afghanistan refusing to recognize the establishment of
Pakistan in 1947, a dispute over the border between both countries drawn by the British colonizers,
and the training and support of Mujahideen fighters against the Soviet Union back in the 1980s
(Threlkeld and Easterly, 2021). Although the Taliban group was established in 1995, “most
Taliban leaders were Mujahideen”in the 1980s (Meirison, 2021: p. 29). Pakistan shares a 1200
km border with Afghanistan called the Durand Line, which divides people of close historical,
ethnic, cultural and family ties on both sides (Hanif et al., 2021). “Between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the borders cross people rather than the people crossing borders”, said Asfandyar Wali
Khan, the leader of a Pashtun nationalist political party in Pakistan (Isani, 2020). The Durand
Akram et al. 275
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