Hughes and The Attorney General for Northern Ireland v The Charity Commission for Northern Ireland and The Department for Communities
| Jurisdiction | Northern Ireland |
| Judge | McBride J |
| Judgment Date | 16 May 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] NICh 6 |
| Court | Chancery Division (Northern Ireland) |
| Date | 16 May 2019 |
1
Neutral Citation No: [2019] NICh 6
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)*
Ref: McB10932
Delivered: 16/05/2019
2017/59063
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
________
CHANCERY DIVISION
________
Between:
TREVOR McKEE AND JOSEPH HUGHES
First Appellants
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
Second Appellant
and
THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
Respondent
and
THE DEPARTMENT FOR COMMUNITIES
Intervener
________
2017/129608
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
________
CHANCERY DIVISION
________
Between:
THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
Appellant
and
2
SEAN CAUGHEY
First Respondent
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
Second Respondent
________
2017/129444
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
________
CHANCERY DIVISION
________
Between:
ROBERT CRAWFORD
First Appellant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
Second Appellant
THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
Respondent
and
TREVOR McKEE
Intervener
________
McBRIDE J
Introduction
[1] The three appeals under consideration all raise the same question of law (“the
key issue”) namely, whether the functions attributed to the Charity
Commission for Northern Ireland (“The Commission”) by the provisions of
the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (“the 2008 Act”) can lawfully be
discharged by employees of the Commission, acting alone.
[2] The Attorney General, Mr McKee, Mr Hughes, Mr Crawford and
Mr Caughey each submitted that employees of the Commission acting alone
could not lawfully discharge the functions attributed to the Commission
under the 2008 Act.
3
[3] In contrast the Commission and the Department for Communities (“the
Department”) each considered that the functions in question could lawfully
be discharged by employees of the Commission.
[4] The appeal brought by Mr Crawford raises an additional question relating to
the lawfulness of the institution of a statutory inquiry pursuant to section 22
of the 2008 Act. Although the parties made some written submissions in
respect of this question, the court directed with the consent of the parties, that
this question should be addressed after the court determined the key issue.
[5] Before considering the key issue it is first necessary to set out the background
in respect of each of the three appeals under consideration.
Appeal by Mr McKee and Mr Hughes
Background
[6] On 3 September 2013 Ms McGahey, a casework officer employed by the
Commission, made a decision, (“the impugned decision”) under section 96 of
the 2008 Act whereby she gave consent on behalf of the Commission to
alterations in the constitution of the charity Lough Neagh Rescue Limited.
Both Mr McKee and Mr Hughes appealed the impugned decision to the
Charity Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The appeal was heard on 10 and 16
November 2016 and the Tribunal heard oral evidence from Mr McKee, Mr
Hughes, Mr Burke and Ms McGahey.
[7] On 7 April 2017 the Tribunal concluded that Ms McGahey, an employee of
the Commission, was lawfully authorised to make the impugned decision
and further held that she did not err in law or in fact in granting consent to
alterations in the constitution of the charity, Lough Neagh Rescue Limited,
pursuant to section 96 of the 2008 Act.
[8] The reasoning of the Tribunal in respect of the key issue is set out at
paragraph 37 of its decision as follows:
“After considering the parties’ submissions, this Tribunal
has concluded that the appellant’s contention that the
consent could only be given by the respondent – e.g. by
its Board or by a Committee with delegated authority – is
incorrect. It is true to say that paragraph 9(1) of the
Schedule to the 2008 Act provides that the respondent
may make provision for the discharge of its functions by
committees. But that paragraph does not say that the
respondent shall or must make provision for the
discharge of its functions by committees. Indeed, it is
notable that the paragraph begins by recognising and
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