Human security and the Canadian armed forces
| Published date | 01 March 2005 |
| Date | 01 March 2005 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070200506000119 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
IN
RESPONSE
VINCENT
J.
CURTIS
Human
security
and
the
Canadian
armed
forces
we
willbe
pleased
to
publish
from timeto time in thisnew
rubric
responses
to
articles
that have
appeared
in the International Journal.
Please
send
themto
ij@ciia.org.
IN
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, David Dewitt expressed the view,
held by many, that the Canadian armed forces (CF)ought to adapt its
learning, policy development, and operations to formally recognize
human security as a principal element
of
Canada's foreign and interna-
tional security policy.IDewitt described the situation that presently
exists between the Department
of
Foreign Mfairs and International
Trade (DFAIT), as it was called at the time
of
his writing,
and
the
Department
of
National Defence (DND) concerning the policy
of
human security as two solitudes resulting from a clash
of
cultures.
The
view that is gently expressedis that DND is stubbornly refusing to adapt
itself to the new world order
that
emerged from the collapse
of
the
Soviet Union, and prefers
to
view the possibledeployment
of
the CFfor
ahuman security operation as a subcategory
of
the larger problem
of
war-fighting.
This
view-that
DND is being recalcitrant and perhaps alittle
obtuse-is
based upon three assumptions that are
not
directly stated
Vincent
j.
Curtis
isa
research
scientist
withan
interest
in
military
and
international
affairs.
1
David
Dewitt,
"National
defence
vs
foreign
affairs:
Culture
clash
in
Canada's
inter-
national
security
policy,"International /ourna/59
(summer
2004):
579-96.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Wint
Vincent
J.
Curtis
and
certainly
not
evaluated in detail. These assumptions are: 1) that
civiliansshould control the military; 2) that "human security" is a legit-
imate, and will be an enduring, end
of
Canadian foreign policy; and 3)
that athing done implicitly is less good than athing done explicitly
and as an end in itself
The
aim here is to critique these assumptions
and
to
show that the DND position on human security is sound and has
more merit than it was granted.
The
principle
of
"civilian control
of
the military" in fact is a deriva-
tive
of
the principle first observed by Clausewitz that war is "diploma-
cy by other means."
The
CFis one instrument with which a Canadian
government would conduct its war policy. Following Clausewitz, the
purpose
of
the CF is to destroy Canada's enemies in war.
The
principle
of
civilian control
of
this instrument arisesfrom the fact that the high-
est directors
of
a nation's policy usually are civilians, and is satisfied in
Canada by the fact that the chief
of
defence staff
(CDS),
the highest
ranking officer
of
the CF, receives his instructions from the prime min-
ister. DFAIT and DND are coordinate departments over both
of
which
stands the elected government
of
the day,
but
it does
not
follow that a
breach
of
the principle
of
civilian control is caused by a refusal by DND
to accept policy advice from DFAIT. Coordination
of
policy between
two government departments is in the first instance the responsibility
of
the cabinet and especially
of
the prime minister, and if that coordi-
nation has
not
been directed, it might be due to the diplomatic flexi-
bility
and
the political advantages that accrue
to
the prime minister
from the confusion, cross-purposes, and apparent helplessness
of
his
governmental departments.
Nevertheless, the opinion is widespread that the CF, being a disci-
plined body
of
troops,
ought
to
adapt
itself to any lawful require-
ment
of
its civilian masters. Indeed, the CF itselfacknowledges that
it
must
obey any lawful order.
There
are, however, definite limits
within which this position can be maintained,
and
these limits arise
from the difference between the essential
and
accidental properties
of
a thing.
An essential property is that which makes the thing what it is, and
an accidental property is a property athing has in virtue
of
its exis-
tence. This difference is best illustrated with acouple
of
examples.
The
copy
of
the International Journal
that
I read at McMaster
University has, as its essential property, the conveyance
of
thought.
But
that
copy, being in
the
form
of
abook, can also be used as a
274
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winter 2004-2005
Human
security
and
the
Canadian
armed
forces
doorstop, as a paperweight, and as a flyswatter; and these are just some
of
the myriad accidental properties that the InternationalJournalpos-
sesses from its existence in the form
of
a book. A farmer can use a
good-sized wrench to hammer a rusty bolt back into place,
but
that
doesn't change the fact that the primary purpose
of
the misused wrench
is to turn nuts.
The
CF has many accidental properties that arise from
the fact that its organizing principle is to fight in war.
The
limit to which the CF can obey a lawful order is reached when it
is asked to be something other than essentially an instrument for war-
fighting, for by so changing, it
ceases
to be what it is.
The
ramifications
of
being something else, based on the original thing's accidental prop-
erties, are profound. Because the CF has as its essential purpose the
destruction
of
Canada's enemies in war, it consists
of
disciplined troops
who accept the principle
of
unlimited liability, i.e. that one may be
wounded or killed in the ordinary course
of
doing one's job. It is
because
of
the discipline, the teamwork, and the equipment that mod-
ern war-fighting demands that the CF is able to peacekeep around the
world, plough snow in Toronto, help Winnipeg through a flood and
Quebec through an ice storm, and search for bodies from an air disas-
ter
off
the coast
of
Nova Scotia.
But
what
happens
when
the
essential
property
of
the CF is
changed from destroying Canada's enemies in war to merely keeping
peace in foreign countries? Because the essential aim is changed
from fighting in war
to
keeping a peace, the principle
of
unlimited
liability that war-fighting demands
of
soldiers is no longer applica-
ble. No
Canadian
can be expected to die on
behalf
of
peace for
some foreign country whose citizens don't
want
it kept. Therefore,
by changing the essential purpose
of
the
CF from war-fighting to
peacekeeping, the discipline and teamwork
that
makes the CF such a
useful
instrument
for peacekeeping is
undermined;
the
tactical
equipment the CF has becomes unjustifiable; and what remains
of
an
army is akin to a lightly equipped police force. But Canada already
has such an
instrument-the
RCMP.
Thus it is not a demonstration
of
an obsolete Cold War mentality
when the
CDS
declares that the CF must remain a general purpose com-
bat-capable force. It is a demonstration
of
a normal war mentality that
it is entirely proper for a military officer and a chief
of
defence staff to
possess; and by defending the essential requirement
of
the CF, the
CDS
sustains the accidental properties that make the CF so useful in all its
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winter
2004-2005
275
Vincent
J.
Curtis
respects
to
civilian policymakers.
The
limit
of
obedience is reached
when the
CF
is asked
to
be something other than what it is.
Let us now examine the assumption that human security is a legiti-
mate and enduring end
of
Canadian foreign policy. Were the
CF
to be
deployed for the purpose
of
human security, the term "human securi-
ty" means to protect the citizens
of
some foreign country from the
abuses and predations
of
their own government, or from the govern-
mentless mess they have made
of
their own country.
The
policy carries
with
it the assumption
that
Canadian taxpayers should fund these
efforts.
How seriously does the government
of
the day accept the principle
of
human security as a basis for deploying the
CF?
Consider Iraq and
Sudan. Was the government
of
Canada prepared to use the
CF
to help
liberate
the
Iraqi people from the abuses
of
the
Saddam Hussein
regime? No. Is the government
of
Canada prepared to use the
CF
to
help the Iraqi people rebuild their country, at least to the extent
of
pro-
viding security so that elections can take place? No. Is the government
of
Canada prepared to send the
CF
to Sudan to protect the Christians
of
the south from genocide perpetrated by Muslim militias supported
by the government
of
Khartoum? No.
From these examples, it is
dear
that the government
of
the day does
not
accept the principle
of
human
security as a decisive
end
of
Canadian foreign policy. From
of
its very formulation, it is also
dear
that human security as an end
of
Canadian foreign policy would lose
the support
of
a large segment
of
the
Canadian public if that policy
were pushed very far.
Thus
it is
not
at all obvious that there might even
be a need for the
CF
to change its learning, policy development, and
operations from what they presently are for the diplomatic end
of
the
human security
of
foreign populations whose plight might be broad-
caston
CNN.
The
final assumption to be examined is that a thing done explicitly
as an
end
in itself is better than athing done implicitly in the course
of
doing something else. This is a point
of
dialectics that was first recog-
nized in Aristotle's
The
Topics.
As apoint
of
dialectics, the principle is
neither true nor false,
but
merely a fine-sounding argument that may
be true or false depending on the particular circumstances in which it
is employed. In this case, the end is
human
security.
The
position
of
the
CF
is
that
that
end
is encompassed
within
the general scope
of
peacekeeping operations for which the
CF
already trains.
Dewitt
276
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Win«r2004-200S
Human
securityandthe
Canadian
armed
forces
lamented
that
more wasn't being done explicitly by the
CF
towards
that
end. Practical people, as soldiers often are, would find it an
absurdly fine
point
to have to resolve,
but
resolved it can be so long as
the resolution does
not
compromise the essential purpose
of
the
CF.
Such a resolution may be on the horizon. It is found in the concept
of
the "three block war" recently proposed by General Charles Krulak,
commandant
of
the United States marine corps.' Krulak foresees wars
of
the future as happening in cities: on one block there is traditional
combat, on the next block soldiers are engaged in peacekeeping, and
on the next block over,soldiers conduct humanitarian assistance.
Out
of
this concept and the doctrinal requirements it imposes, a
CF
true to
its purpose may emerge that more directly addresses the requirements
of
human
security and humanitarian operations within the scope
of
armed struggle. All it may take to bring about these changes to the
CF's
doctrine and training is political will, and the money for the concep-
tual development and expanded training.
In summary, there is no question
of
a breach
of
the principle
of
civil-
ian control
of
the military by the reluctance ofDND and the
CF
to
har-
monize its programs with the intellectual fashions
of
another govern-
ment department.
If
the prime minister desired such harmonization,
he could order it.
That
he hasn't, says much. There are limits to what
the
CF
can be properly called upon to do.
The
CF
has an essential pur-
pose and role in the foreign policy
of
Canada, and it must remain true
to that purpose or cease being useful altogether.
The
goal
of
human
security is high-sounding,
and
commanding
of
general respect
and
support. However, the practical implications
of
applying that princi-
ple to specific situations are often politically unacceptable,
and
there-
fore
human
security can never be a decisive end
of
Canada's foreign
policy. Military doctrine continues
to
evolve
and
adapt, and a greater
recognition
of
human
security
and
humanitarian assistance
that
is
adapted to a war context may be on the horizon.
Postscript:
Afterthe
article
was
submitted.
the
Asian
tsunami
occurred.
In
a
matter
of
days,
the
us
war
machine
was
able
to
deliver
large
amounts
of
humanitarian
assistance
in the
affected
region,
whereas
Canada's
disaster
2
Charles
C.
Krulak,
"Thestrategic
corporal:
Leadership
in thethree blockwar,"
Marines
Magazine.
January
1999.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winr.,r
2004-2005
277
Vincent
J.
Curtis
assistance
response
team (DART) was not able toget to the
region
until
weeks
afterward.
This
disparity
illustrates
that
th~
organizingprinciple
of
warfighting isa truerguidefor beingable to
provide
for human
security
needs
than is the principle
of
peacekeeping,
for peacekeeping
does
not
require
the
capability
of
force
projection,
and
disaster
assistance
response
cannotjustifj that
capability
alone.
Igiturqui desiderat
pacem,
przparet
bellum.
(If
you want
peace,
prepare
for
toar.)
278
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Wintcr2004-2005
To continue reading
Request your trial