I Political Science: Method and Theory / Science Politique: Méthodes et Théories
| Published date | 01 August 2019 |
| Date | 01 August 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002083451906900401 |
| Subject Matter | Abstracts |
I
POLITICAL SCIENCE : METHOD AND THEORY
SCIENCE POLITIQUE : MÉTHODES ET THÉORIES
69.4800
ACEMOGLU, Daron, et al. — Democracy does cause
69.4805
BAGCHI, Aniruddha ; FARIA, João Ricardo ; MATHEWS,
growth. Journal of Political Economy 127(1), Feb. 2019 : 47-
Timothy — A model of a multilateral proxy war with spill-
100.
over. Public Choice 179(3-4), June 2019 : 229-248.
We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per
Motivated by the war in Syria and the ascension of ISIS, this paper
capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and
models a proxy war with three sponsors and three combatants as a
the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of de-
dynamic game. Sponsors are leaders that provide resources for combat-
mocracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of
ants to fight each other. Sponsors 1 and 2 have strong aversion to
democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results
sponsor 3’s proxy, but not against each other. Three pure strategy
show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 per-
equilibria exist in the game. When the ex post value of winning is small,
cent in the long run. We find similar effects using a propensity score
all players fight in equilibrium. However, when the ex post value of
reweighting strategy as wel as an instrumental-variables strategy using
winning is large, in equilibrium either sponsors 1 and 2 coordinate their
regional waves of democratization. The effects are similar across differ-
actions, with one of them staying out of the contest, or sponsor 3 does
ent levels of development and appear to be driven by greater invest-
not participate. The probability of winning and the sponsors’ payoffs
ments in capital, schooling, and health. [R]
depend on a spil over effect. [R, abr.] [See Abstr. 69.4885]
69.4801
AGGESTAM, Karin ; ROSAMOND, Annika Bergman ;
69.4806
BAKER, Andy ; WOJCIK, Stefan — Does democratization
KRONSELL, Annica — Theorizing feminist foreign policy.
lower consumer prices? Regime type, prices, and the
International Relations 33(1), March 2019 : 23-39.
consumer-producer tradeoff. International Political Science
A growing number of states including Canada, Norway and Sweden
Review 40(2), March 2019 : 145-160.
have adopted gender and feminist-informed approaches to their foreign
The booming literature on the consequences of democratization for
and security policies. The overarching aim of this article is to advance a
material welfare has produced no findings on the relationship between
theoretical framework that can enable a thoroughgoing study of these
regime type and relative consumer prices. The literature largely shows
developments. Through a feminist lens, we theorise feminist foreign
that democracies favor masses over elites, generating the expectation
policy arguing that it is, to all intents and purposes, ethical and argue that
that democratization should lower consumer prices. Yet it also finds that
existing studies of ethical foreign policy and international conduct are by
democratization boosts economic growth, an outcome that is partially
and large gender-blind. We draw upon feminist IR theory and the ethics
contingent on making consumer goods expensive relative to capital
of care to theorise feminist foreign policy and to advance an ethical
goods. We argue that democratization lowers relative consumer prices
framework that builds on a relational ontology, which embraces the
since politicians under democracy can more effectively chase votes by
stories and lived experiences of women and other marginalised groups
satisfying consumers’ demands for the immediate payoff of lower prices.
at the receiving end of foreign policy conduct. [R, abr.]
Our statistical analysis of 160-plus countries over 60 years shows that
democratization raises consumer advantage, which is the consumer
price level relative to the price level of capital goods. [R, abr.]
69.4802
ANGSTROM, Jan ; PETERSSON, Magnus — Weak party
escalation: an underestimated strategy for small states?
Journal of Strategic Studies 42(2), Apr. 2019 : 282-300.
69.4807
BERTELLI, Anthony M. — Public goods, private partner-
We develop the strategic rationale behind weak party escalation against
ships, and political institutions. Journal of Public Admin-
istration Research and Theory 29(1), Jan. 2019 : 67-83.
stronger adversaries. There are, we suggest, four main strategies: to
provoke a desired over-reaction from the stronger adversary; to com-
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become an essential vehicle for
partmentalize conflict within a domain in which the weak party has
infrastructure development worldwide. Theoretical arguments primarily
advantages; to carve a niche with a stronger al y, and to forge a reputa-
focus on build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements as a canonical form of
tion of not yielding lightly. Spelling out these different logics contributes
PPP, though they rarely discuss the political underpinnings of govern-
to the literature on smal state strategies and escalation. It also suggests,
ments’ decisions to enter such agreements. How does a government’s
contrary to much of the existing literature, that it can be rational for weak
longevity, stability, and its capacity to raise revenue make BOTs more
parties to escalate against great powers. [R] [See Abstr. 69.4876]
attractive than other types of partnerships? Extending recent theoretical
advances through concepts of control rights and veto-players and statis-
tically analyzing a database of more than 4,300 PPP agreements for new
69.4803
AYCINENA,
Diego
;
BALTADUONIS,
Rimvydas
;
construction of infrastructure in 83 developing economies between 1990
RENTSCHLER, Lucas — Valuation structure in incom-
and 2014, I provide the first large-scale quantitative evidence of the
plete information contests: experimental evidence. Public
influence of political institutions on government choices to adopt BOTs.
Choice 179(3-4), June 2019 : 195-208.
[R, abr.]
We experimental y examine perfectly discriminating contests under three
valuation structures: pure common-value, pure private-value and a case
69.4808
BERTOLI, Andrew ; DAFOE, Allan ; TRAGE, Robert F. — Is
with both private and common value components. In line with the results
from the previous literature, we find that, regardless of valuation struc-
there a war party? Party change, the left-right divide, and
ture, contestants often choose very conservative expenditures, and very
international conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(4),
Apr. 2019 : 950-975.
aggressive expenditures. Average expenditures exceed Nash equilibrium
predictions. In valuation structures with a common value component,
Are leaders from certain parties particularly likely to engage in military
contestants often choose expenditures in excess of the expected value
conflict? This question is difficult to answer because of selection bias.
of the prize conditional on winning the contest. That is, they often guar-
For example, countries may be more likely to elect right-wing leaders if
antee themselves negative payoffs in expectation. [R] [See Abstr.
their publics are more hawkish or if the international system is particular-
69.4885]
ly dangerous. Put simply, who comes to power is not random, which
makes causal inference difficult. We overcome this problem by using a
regression discontinuity design. Specifical y, we look at close presidential
69.4804
BADER, Veit — Democratic inclusion in polities and
elections that were essentially “tossups” between two candidates. We
governance arrangements. Constel ations 25(4), Dec.
find that electing right-wing candidates increases state aggression. We
2018 : 570-585.
also find that electing candidates from challenger parties makes coun-
In recent democratic theory, one finds a vibrant discussion of three
tries much more likely to initiate military disputes, particularly in the first
principles of democratic inclusion: Al Affected Interests, Al Subjected to
year of the new leader’s term. [R, abr.]
Coercion and Al Citizenship Stakeholders. This article provides a con-
ceptual and analytical framework for combining highly separate recent
69.4809
BEST, Jacqueline — Technocratic exceptionalism: mone-
discussions on how to make Multi-Level Polities (MLP) and Multi-Level
tary policy and the fear of democracy. International Politi-
Governance (MLG) more democratic, transparent and accountable by
cal Sociology 12(4), Dec. 2018 : 328-345.
answering questions of whom to include how when and where in signifi-
cantly different contexts of democratic communication and decision-
What do border guards and central bankers have in common? Both
making. [A]
operate, on a day-to-day basis, in political spaces exempt from many of
487
Political science : method and theory
the norms of liberal democratic politics and yet have the power to define
cal party. We focus on two divisor methods of apportionment, first pro-
and constrain them. In order to understand the role of such routine
posed by Jefferson and Webster, that fall within a continuum of appor-
suspensions in the norms of liberal politics, we need to move beyond
tionment methods. Our applications of them depreciate the approval
analyses that focus narrowly on security exceptionalism or emergency-
votes of...
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