III Governmental and Administrative Institutions Institutions Politiques et Administratives
| DOI | 10.1177/002083451806800203 |
| Date | 01 April 2018 |
| Published date | 01 April 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Abstracts |
199
III
GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATIVES
(a) Central institutions /Institutions centrales
68.1981 AKMAN, Canan Aslan ; AKÇALI, Pinar — Changing the
system through instrumentalizing weak political institu-
tions: the quest for a presidential system in Turkey in
historical and comparative perspective. Turkish Studies
18(4), Dec. 2017 : 577-600.
Since the 1990s, debates on a constitutional system reform in Turkey
have ignited controversies over the executive structure of its parliamen-
tary system. This article looks at the d ebate in terms of the interaction
between institutional dynamics and politicians’ choices, shaped by past
institutional transformations following transitions. It is contended that
institutional weaknesses underlying both the presidency and executive-
legislative relations in Turkey have provided strong incentives for incum-
bent elites to challenge existing parliamentary norms and advocate
presidential alternatives. Far from contributing to a sober diagnosis of the
problems of parliamentarism, the recent constitutional amendment
introducing a system of executive presidency has further divided Tur-
key’s already polarized political and civil society. [R]
68.1982 ALTMAN, Micah ; M cDONALD, Michael — Redistricting by
formula: an Ohio [USA] reform experiment. American Poli-
tics Research 46(1), Jan. 2018 : 103-131.
Ohio reformers have advocated redistricting by formula: selecting the
redistricting plan that scores best on a predefined objective scoring
function that combines prima facie neutral criteria with political goals of
plan fairness and district competition. In the post-2010 redistricting, these
reformers hosted a public competition where prizes were awarded to the
best legal plan scored on the reformers’ formula. The submitted plans
provide a unique opportunity to evaluate how redistricting by formula
may work in practice. Our analysis finds the public yields a broader
range of redistricting plans, on indicia of legal and public policy interest,
than developed by the state legislature. The Pareto frontier reveals plans
that perform better than the legislature’s adopted plan on one and two
dimensions, as well as the reformers’ overall scoring function. [R, abr.]
68.1983 ANGHEL, Veronica — “Why can’t we be friends?” The
coalition potential of presidents in semi-presidential re-
publics — Insights from Romania. East European Politics
and Societies and Cultures 32(1), Feb. 2018 : 101-118.
Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary
democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the out-
comes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the
upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This
article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-
presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990-2016) and
discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape
coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence
gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet mem-
bers, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain
circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government
formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. [R, abr.]
68.1984 ANSALONI, Matthieu ; SMITH, Andy — Des marchés au
service de l'État? (Do markets work for the state?). Gou-
vernement et Action publique 6(4), Oct.-Dec. 2017 : 9-28.
This special issue is centered upon a key mode of political regulation:
how and why state representatives create markets when seeking to
tackle a public problem. Our introduction is organized around two ques-
tions. The first deals with the generalization of this phenomenon as of the
1980s; the second tackles the effects of this trend, notably in terms of the
capacity of state representatives to impact economic and social regula-
tion. We claim that because most of the creation of "state markets" builds
upon previous bureaucratic practices, these instruments are not highly
innovatory. Indeed, they are generally not the result of some over-
arching, top-down design, but rather the progressively generated out-
come of sector-specific experimentations. Second, we go beyond over-
general conclusions about the effects of states' markets upon govern-
mental influence and practice. [R, abr.] [First article of a thematic issue
on "The market as an instrument of public action". See also Abstr.
68.1989, 2014, 2031, 2051, 2504]
68.1985 BADAS, Alex ; STAUFFER, Katelyn E. — Someone like me:
descriptive representation and support for [US] Supreme
Court Nominees. Political Research Quarterly 71(1), March
2018 : 127-142.
Extant research on public support for judicial nominees finds that ideo-
logical congruence with the nominee is the most important factor in an
individual’s decision to support a nominee. The research presented
develops the theory that for individuals from underrepresented groups, a
shared descriptive identity with the nominee will moderate the negative
effect of ideological distance. We test our theory using the nominations of
Clarence Thomas, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor. We find that in
the context of the Thomas nomination, a shared racial identity led to
increased support for Thomas among liberal African-Americans. We find
similar effects in the case of Kagan and conservative women. In the case
of Sotomayor, we find that a shared ethnic identity led to increased
support among conservative Latinos, regardless of gender. [R, abr.]
68.1986 BARON, David P. — Elections and durable governments
in parliamentary governments. Journal of Theoretical Poli-
tics 30(1), Jan. 2018 : 74-118.
This paper provides a dynamic theory of a parliamentary government
system with proportional-representation elections, policy-motivated
parties and voters, and an endogenous status-quo policy. The theory
identifies the representation of parties in parliament, the governments the
parties form, the policies chosen by those governments, and the duration
of the governments and their policies. Governments are majoritarian,
government parties are equal partners, they and their policies are dura-
ble, voters elect minority parliaments in every period, and government
policies provide concessions to centrist voters. The theory provides
explanations for three empirical findings: equilibria consistent with Gam-
son’s law, an analog of Duverger’s law for proportional-representation
electoral systems, and compensational voting where voters give the out
party additional votes when an incumbent government is expected to
continue in office. [R, abr.]
68.1987 BASTA, Karlo — The state between minority and majority
nationalism: decentralization, symbolic recognition, and
secessionist crises in Spain and Canada. Publius 48(1),
Winter 2018 : 51-75.
This article addresses the debate about the relative utility of accommoda-
tive federalism as a method of conflict management in multinational
states. Comparative scholarship on this issue assumes that territorial
reform translates into political stability or instability through policy sub-
stance. This article tests that assumption against processes of institu-
tional accommodation of Catalan and Quebecois demands for autonomy
and recognition. The comparison demonstrates the absence of a linear
relationship between institutional change and political instability. When
autonomy for minority regions is extended without symbolic recognition,
subsequent majority response unfolds in the policy arena, mostly through
attempts to symmetrize autonomy arrangements (self-amplifying se-
quence). However, when the extension of territorial autonomy is com-
bined with formal symbolic recognition, it paves the way for majority
political backlash (reactive sequence). [R, abr.] [See Abstr. 68.1993]
68.1988 BEDNAR, Jenna ; PAGE, Scott E. — When order affects
performance: culture, behavioral spillovers, and institu-
tional path dependence. American Political Science Review
112(1), Jan. 2018 : 82-98.
Evidence suggests that the cultural context influences the performance of
laws, policies, and political institutions. Descriptive accounts reveal that
outcomes and behaviors often depend on the array of historical institu-
tions. This article presents a multi-institutional framework that can ac-
count for those findings through path-dependent behavioral spillovers.
Individuals learn equilibrium behaviors when interacting in a new institu-
tional setting. Initially, some individuals choose behaviors that align with
their behaviors in similar extant institutions, creating a cultural context
that can lead to inefficient outcomes. The article shows how avoiding
path dependence requires sequencing (or designing) institutions to
maintain behavioral diversity. [R, abr.]
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