III Governmental and Administrative Institutions / Institutions Politiques et Administratives
| DOI | 10.1177/002083451906900303 |
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Abstracts |
GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATIVES
(a) Central institutions /Institutions centrales
69.3612
AMIRPUR, Katajun — Gender in the Iranian Constitution.
the institutions — the Supreme Court of India, and the Parliament of
Oriente moderno 98(2), 2018 : 265-283.
India, perceive themselves and therefore each other, assuming that in a
My aim in this paper is to show that the Iranian constitution, with respect
rhetorical network of what constitutes a democracy, these intersubjective
interactions between the institutions matter. Using the theoretical frame-
to women’s rights, is vague and ambiguous. If one only looks at the text
work of discursive institutionalism, the paper analyzes the symbolic and
of the constitution and its current interpretation, both cannot be consid-
ered as guaranteeing women’s rights in the sense of modern human
rhetorical relationship established between the Parliament as a symboli-
cally representative institution and the Supreme Court of India, in order to
rights. But one can stil ask the question: Could it not be the case that
decode whether the Supreme Court of India is in a crisis. [R, abr.] [See
this arbitrary character of the constitution can be exploited? This is where
Abstr. 69.3624]
the actual role of the people comes in, which is not the topic of this paper
but its most important context. [R] [See Abstr. 69.3681]
69.3617
BATTAGLINI, Marco, et al.— The informational theory of
legislative committees: an experimental analysis. Ameri-
69.3613
ANCKAR, Carsten — Are powerful presidents always
can Political Science Review 113(1), Feb. 2019 : 55-76.
popularly elected? Implications for separating semi-
presidentialism from parliamentarism. Democratization
We experimental y investigate the informational theory of legislative
26(2), 2019 : 327-342.
committees [W. T. Gil igan and K. Krehbiel, "Asymmetric information and
The traditional conception of semi-presidentialism stipulates that powers
legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee", ibid. 33(2), May 1989:
459-490; Abstr. 40.70]. Two committee members provide policy-relevant
are shared by a popularly elected president and a prime minister, who is
information to a legislature under alternative legislative rules. Under the
responsible to parliament. An increasingly popular strategy has become
open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed
to disregard the power dimension and define semi-presidentialism only
with regard to whether the president is popularly elected or not. Based
rule, the legislature chooses between a member’s proposal and a status
quo. We find that even in the presence of biases, the committee mem-
on a principal-agent framework the present study sets out to test the
bers improve the legislature’s decision by providing useful information.
relationship between the mode of election and the powers of the presi-
We obtain evidence for two additional predictions: the outlier principle,
dent in democratic republics where the government is dependent on the
legislature for survival. Findings indicate that although powerful presi-
according to which more extreme biases reduce the extent of information
transmission; and the distributional principle, according to which the open
dents most often are popularly elected there are also instances where a
rule is more distributional y efficient than the closed rule. [R, abr.]
non-popularly elected president shares executive powers with the prime
minister. [R, abr.]
69.3618
BATURO, Alexander ; ELGIE, Robert — Bicameralism and
69.3614
ASHRAF, Ali ; ISLAM, Shafiqul — Explaining public policy
bicameral reforms in democracy and dictatorship: a
comparative perspective. Taiwan Journal of Democracy
choices: a case study of the first nuclear power plant in
14(2), Dec. 2018 : 1-29.
Bangladesh. Strategic Analysis 42(5), Sept.-Oct. 2018 : 503-
523.
First, we reexamine the fortunes of bicameralism in all democracies and
This article employs the 3-i framework to explore the institutions, ideas,
dictatorships from 1945 to 2016. Second, we look under the hood of the
and interests that have shaped the Bangladesh government’s policy
observed trend and take stock of over a hundred cases of the introduc-
choices for implementing the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, the first
tion, removal, or reintroduction of second chambers. We find that democ-
racies rarely reform bicameralism and, when they do, it is typical y in the
such plant in the country. The logic behind three choices — vendor
context of a transition period. By contrast, the change in dictatorships is
country, reactor model, and spent fuel management — are analyzed.
The findings reveal an interactive policy process, involving various
much more frequent. Second chambers provide patronage opportunities
domestic and international institutions, whose ideas regarding project
to authoritarian leaders, which, in turn, may influence regime stability.
Drawing from survival analysis, we find that dictatorships with partly or
funding, reactor safety, technical expertise and calculation of financial,
fully appointed senates are more durable. In general, we argue that it is
organizational and political interests have played a key role in shaping
the choices of Bangladesh. [R]
important to bring the experience of change in nondemocratic regimes
into the discussion about second chamber reform. [R, abr.]
69.3615
BÄCK, Hanna ; TEORELL, Jan ; LINDBERG, Staffan I. —
69.3619
BENETTI, Julie — Le mythe de la sixième République (The
Cabinets, prime ministers, and corruption: a comparative
myth of the Sixth Republic). Pouvoirs 166, Sept. 2018 :
analysis of parliamentary governments in post-war Eu-
rope. Political Studies 67(1), Feb. 2019 : 149-170.
139-145.
Why are some states more corrupt than others? Drawing on the literature
Under the falsely univocal banner cal ing for a new or “Sixth” Republic,
on governance in parliamentary democracies, we suggest that the
two different constitutional options can be distinguished which both claim
to attack the unbridled presidentialism of our institutions. The first offers
degree of corruption depends on the ability of key political actors to
to consolidate the president’s power vis-à-vis the Prime minister in a
control ministers who have been delegated power. We argue that the
French-style presidential regime, while the second would like to neutral-
Prime Minister has incentives to limit corruption within the cabinet and
has the ability to do so when there are certain “control mechanisms” at
ize it on the model of the European prime-ministerial regimes. But both
derive from an il usion, namely that a genuine change of regime could
hand. One such mechanism is the PM’s ability to fire or demote ministers
take place without a reform of the mode of election of the head of State.
who are not behaving in accordance with his or her wishes. We hypothe-
[R] [See Abstr. 69.3630]
size that governmental corruption wil be lower in systems where the
constitution grants the PM strong powers. We analyze corruption in 26
West and East European democracies over the post-war period and find
support for our hypothesis. [R, abr.]
69.3620
BENTELE, Keith Gunnar ; SAGER, Rebecca ; AYKANIAN,
Amanda — Rewinding Roe v. Wade: understanding the
accelerated adoption of [US] state-level restrictive abor-
69.3616
BANERJEE, Mouli — Pathways of political narratives:
tion legislation, 2008-2014. Journal of Women, Politics and
populist rhetoric, the Supreme Court and the (im)balance
Policy 39(4), Oct.-Dec. 2018 : 490-517.
of power. Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 51(3), 2018 :
352-366.
Since 2008 the volume of state-level legislation regulating abortion has
dramatically increased, with nearly 300 restrictive laws passing in 33
Using the January 2018 Press Conference by the four Supreme Court
states. While the character of these laws is varied, many have the poten-
Justices as an entry point, the paper proposes that Parliamentary dis-
tial to significantly limit access to abortion for some women. Using a
course, an oft-ignored pulse of the political narrative, is a relevant win-
multilevel modeling approach, we investigate a wide variety of state-level
dow into studying how the legislature perceives the judiciary, and the
factors associated with these developments. We find that a larger num-
Supreme Court in particular. It analyzes through various examples, how
ber of anti-abortion policies have passed in states under full Republican
366
Institutions politiques et administratives
control, with fewer female Democratic legislators, and states with a
a discernible trend. More and more social elites have been co-opted onto
stronger presence by the conservative Evangelical movement within
them. The empirical results further attest to the usefulness of the infor-
state governments. We also examine more substantive restrictions on
mation efficiency theory. Unfortunately, specialization has yet to give the
clinics, abortion-seekers, and funding in a separate analysis, and sym-
Chinese legislature more autonomy. Only 30% of committee members
bolic restrictions and those intended to discourage women seeking
are privileged to serve more than one five-year term. The influence of the
abortions in another. [R, abr.]
Party-state core and the lack of membership stability have...
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