III Governmental and Administrative Institutions / Institutions Politiques et Administratives

Date01 June 2021
DOI10.1177/00208345211023819
Published date01 June 2021
362
III
GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET ADMINISTRATIVES
(a) Central institutions /Institutions centrales
71.3598 ALBRECHT, Frederike ; KARLSSON, Christer ; PERSSON,
Thomas Patterns of parliamentary opposition: empiri-
cal evidence from the deliberations in the German Bun-
destag’s Committee on European Union Affairs. Parlia-
mentary Affairs 74(1), Jan. 2021 : 230-251.
This article examines patterns of oppositional behaviour in the German
Bundestag’s Committee on European Union Affairs (EAC) for two sepa-
rate legislative periods (2005-2009 and 2009-2013). The study makes
two contributions to previous research. It, first, shed some much-needed
empirical light on political opposition in the Bundestag by examining how
much and what kind of opposition exists in the German EAC. Secondly,
the article examines the differences in oppositional behaviour of the
Members of Parliament between the two legislative periods following an
institutional reform in 2009 that afforded the Bundestag with increased
opportunity structures in European Union affairs. [R]
71.3599 ANCKAR, Carsten Constitutional monarchies and
semi-constitutional monarchies: a global historical
study, 1800-2017. Contemporary Politics 27(1), 2021 : 23-
40.
Since there is no place for a powerful hereditary monarch in a democrat-
ic system, one could argue that systems with powerful monarchs do not
qualify as democracies. Nevertheless, there are many examples of
political systems, classified as democracies by most reputable categori-
zations or indices, where the monarch has, or has had, more or less the
same position as a president in semi-presidential systems. The present
study [examines] to what extent the occurrence of semi-constitutional
monarchies, i.e., democratic regimes in which power is shared between
a prime minister and a monarch, can be explained by reference to
Huntington’s notion of the King’s dilemma and the size of countries. The
study is global and encompasses the time period 1800-2017. [R, abr.]
71.3600 ARAGONÈS, Enriqueta ; PONSATÍ, Clara The stability of
multi-level governments. Journal of Theoretical Politics
33(1), Jan. 2021 : 140-466.
This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze
an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two
levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such
government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about
electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different
levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may
be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative
perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level
government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial
constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity. [R]
71.3601 ASKIM, Jostein, e t al. How government agencies react
to termination threats. Journal of Public Administration Re-
search and Theory 30(2), 2020 : 324-338.
Much research following Kaufman’s classic study Are Government
Organizations Immortal? [Brookings Institution, 1976] has investigated
the claim that government agencies enjoy great security and long life.
Less attention has been paid to Kaufman’s thesis that government
agencies facing a termination threat have strong incentives to react. In a
study of the on-going Norwegian local government amalgamation reform,
we demonstrate that this type of government agency reacts by hoarding
(i.e., a last-minute flurry of spending) when faced with a termination
threat. This finding shows that agencies facing termination threats are
active players in the termination game. We discuss implications for
research on agency termination and design implications for reformers of
the public sector. [R]
71.3602 BASINGER, Scott J. ; MAK, M axwell The “new normal”
in Supreme Court confirmation voting: hyper-
partisanship in the Trump era. Congress and the Presiden-
cy 47(3), 2020 : 365-386.
Much of the public debate over Supreme Court nominees focuses on
assessments of each nominee’s qualifications, experience, and legal
opinions, and how senators’ votes on these nominees seem to be driven
largely by partisan politics. We propose and estimate a statistical model
that emphasizes the dynamic nature of partisanship while also account-
ing for factors specific to nominees, the president, and senators respec-
tively. We then examine how the scandal that erupted in the middle of
Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation process influenced senators’ votes.
Utilizing forecasting methods, we show that few senators in either party
were inclined to defect, no matter how much perceptions of Kavanaugh
changed after the allegations against him were publicized. We con clude
that, with average party loyalty at record levels, partisan prejudice crowds
out consideration of other relevant attributes of Supreme Court nomi-
nees. [R]
71.3603 BATISTA, Mariana ; LOPEZ, Felix Ministerial typology
and political appointments: where and how do presidents
politicize the bureaucracy? Brazilian Political Science Re-
view 15(1), 2021 : online.
Does ministry type influence profiles in upper-level bureaucracy? To
govern, presidents need to (1) maintain control over the content of public
policies, (2). make political concessions that earn them enough parlia-
mentary support to see those policies approved, and (3) build or keep in
place the bureaucratic competencies necessary to implement them. We
argue that the president makes key appointments according to the nature
of the policies of each ministry and their centrality in the executive
branch’s decision-making process. Employing cluster analysis, we
propose an objective classification of ministries into four types: ‘coordina-
tion’, ‘redistribution’ (social policy and income), ‘regulation’, and ‘distribu-
tion’. We also identify their relationship with the profiles of those who
have occupied positions in the middle and upper echelons of Brazil’s
federal bureaucracy in the period from 1999 to 2016. [R, abr.]
71.3604 BERNIER, Luc ; DESCHAMPS, Carl Autonomy and
distance from the centre as drivers of innovation in the
public sector: testing a positioning-based hypothesis.
Canadian Public Administration 63(2), June 2020 : 271-292.
A generally accepted assumption is that innovation in the public sector is
easier when managers have more autonomy. Previous research has
revealed a paradox: the most innovative organizations are autonomous
organizations, but also central agencies, more so than ministries. What
has not been documented so far in Canada is the quality and nature or
type of innovation by location. We developed a database of applications
for IPAC's innovative management award with 1712 innovations in
federal and provincial governments over the past 29 years. Using statisti-
cal analysis that takes into account the proximity of applicant organiza-
tions to political power, we provide a picture of innovation and institution-
al position in the public sector in Canada. [R]
71.3605 BERTELS, Jana ; SCHULZE-GABRECHTEN, Lena Map-
ping the black box of intraministerial organization: an an-
alytical approach to explore structural diversity below the
portfolio level. Governance 34(1), Jan. 2021 : 171-189.
This article explores the structural diversity of intraministerial organization
over time. Based on organization theory, it proposes a generic typology
for intraministerial units applicable to any hierarchically structured gov-
ernment organization. We empirically investigate the critical case of the
German federal bureaucracy. By classifying its subunits, we analyze the
longitudinal development of structural differentiation and its correspond-
ence to denominational variety. The data stem from a novel international
dataset, covering all ministries between 1980 and 2015. We find that
intraministerial structure differentiates over time, across and within
ministries. A stable core of traditional Weberian structure is complement-
ed by structurally innovative intraministerial units. We conclude that the
German federal bureaucracy is more diverse than suggested in previous
literature. [R, abr.]
71.3606 BHAVNANI, Rikhil R. ; LEE, Alexander Does affirmative
action worsen bureaucratic performance? Evidence from
the Indian administrative service. American Journal of Po-
litical Science 65(1), Jan. 2021 : 5-20.

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