In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part One

DOI10.1111/j.1467-9248.2006.00621.x
Published date01 October 2006
Date01 October 2006
Subject MatterOriginal Article
In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part One P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 0 6 VO L 5 4 , 4 2 7 – 4 4 3
In Defence of Associative Political
Obligations: Part One

John Horton
Keele University
Part One of this article seeks to defend the idea of associative political obligations against a number of
criticisms that have been advanced opposing it.The purpose of this defence is not to demonstrate that the
associative account is therefore the best explanation of political obligations, but only that the principal
reasons which have been given for rejecting it are much less compelling than its critics maintain. The
argument focuses in particular on the various criticisms advanced by A. John Simmons.Two general lines
of defence figure especially prominently. First, it is shown how many of the criticisms in one way or
another ultimately rest on the assumption that political obligations must be voluntarily acquired, when it
is just this assumption that is contested by an associative account. Secondly, it rebuts the charge that the
idea of associative obligations faces a particular problem because it entails the view that members must
have obligations to associations or groups that are evil.While it is not claimed that the idea of associative
political obligations is entirely without difficulties, it is contended that stories of its demise are greatly
exaggerated, and in this respect the ground is laid for Part Two of the article, which sketches a particular
account of associative political obligations.
[O]rdinary moral opinion ... continues to see associative duties as central compo-
nents of moral experience. In so doing, it recognises some claims upon us whose
source lies neither in our own choices nor in the needs of others, but rather in the
complex and constantly evolving constellation of social and historical relations into
which we enter the moment we are born. For we are, after all, born to parents we
did not choose at a time we did not choose; and we land in some region we did
not choose of a social world we did not choose.And, from the moment of our birth
and sometimes sooner, claims are made on us and for us and to us. ...And if, in due
course, we inject our own wills into this mix – straining against some ties and
enhancing others, sometimes severing old bonds and acquiring new ones – the
verdict of common moral opinion seems to be that we can never wipe the slate
entirely clean. Our specific historical and social identities, as they develop and
evolve over time, continue to call forth claims with which we must reckon, claims
that cannot without distortion be construed as contractual in character, and which
are not reduced to silence by general considerations of need (Scheffler, 2001, p. 64).
In a book now nearly fifteen years old, I sought to sketch an account of political
obligation in terms that pretty much conformed to what have now become
known as ‘associative obligations’, although that expression was never explicitly
used (Horton, 1992).1 However, the idea of associative obligations in general, and
of associative political obligations in particular, has come in for extensive criticism
in recent years (e.g. Dagger, 2000; Higgins, 2004, ch. 4; Jeske, 2001; Simmons,
1996; 2001; Wellman, 1997; 2001). In Part One of this article, I critically assess
some of these objections, and in doing so I seek to defend what Samuel Scheffler,
in the quote above, calls ‘ordinary moral opinion’ on such matters. The ultimate
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association

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J O H N H O RTO N
challenge is to elaborate, as fully and convincingly as possible, a sense of what it
is to have associative political obligations. That is not, though, quite what is
attempted in Part One. Instead, I shall rest content with the still far from
negligible task of responding to a raft of criticisms that have been directed at the
coherence or moral acceptability of the idea of associative political obligations. In
so doing I aim to undermine the claim that there is something irrational,
unreasonable or inherently morally objectionable about this idea. Undermining
these criticisms should make the idea of associative political obligations appear
more plausible, and thus help to lay the ground for the constructive account of
them offered in Part Two of this article.2 However, this part stands (or falls) largely
independently of the second. If its arguments are sound then it will have shown
that the principal reasons advanced by critics for rejecting associative political
obligations are at best weak and at worst simply mistaken. However, these
arguments do not depend, for the most part, upon the merits or otherwise of the
particular positive account set out in Part Two.While the positive account should
enhance the persuasiveness and attractiveness of understanding political obliga-
tions in terms of associative obligations, it has little direct bearing on the
effectiveness of the arguments that are propounded here.
In mounting this defence, it is important to note the way in which I characterise
my project by distinguishing it from the more common understanding of what is
meant by a philosophical theory of political obligation. In particular, the philo-
sophical problem is not taken to be one of straightforwardly seeking to determine
whether or not individuals have political obligations, at least not in the sense of
purporting to offer a compelling moral justification one way or the other. Rather,
the approach is more interpretative or explanatory in intent, seeking to explore
the conceptual and moral coherence of the idea of associative political obliga-
tions. It is concerned with what sense can be made of the idea that people have
associative political obligations, and whether or not it can be shown to be
irrational or necessarily immoral for people to think in terms of their having such
obligations.This is of course not unrelated to the more familiar question, but my
primary concern is to ‘justify’ associative political obligations only in the weak
sense of showing them not to be open to certain moral and philosophical
objections; that is with showing the general intelligibility, moral reasonableness
and plausibility of thinking in such terms. This difference bears importantly on
one frequent criticism made of defenders of associative obligations. This is that
their ‘argument slides from the sense of obligation to the obligation itself ’ (Dagger,
2000, p. 108).This is a point I shall return to shortly, but it should be clear from
the start that this characterisation of the argument, as involving an illicit slippage,
itself rests on a conception of the theoretical task at hand that is far from
uncontroversial. Perhaps this project will seem unduly modest, or even vacuous,
to some, but, whatever more political philosophy can do, such a project genuinely
engages with the fundamental philosophical concern of trying to make sense of
our experience by exploring the intelligibility and coherence of the concepts and
ideas through which that sense is expressed.
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2006, 54(3)

A S S O C I AT I V E O B L I G AT I O N S : PA RT O N E
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A second preliminary point concerns how the term ‘obligation’ is to be under-
stood. It is not used here in any technical sense; for example, as systematically
differentiated from ‘duty’. Rather, I mean simply some general category of moral
reason, ethical concern or ethical bond or relationship. I continue to use ‘obli-
gation’ only because it is the traditional terminology; arguably, it might be better
if it were replaced by something carrying less philosophical baggage. Although
uncertain whether it does, I hope that this clarification meets Glen Newey’s
criticism of earlier comments of mine on the relation between members and their
polity as involving an ‘entirely gratuitous’ demand that the relationship ‘must
consist in, or otherwise depend on, a thought about obligation’ (Newey, 2001, p. 74,
original emphasis). Certainly, I would want to support a much richer moral
landscape, in which there are multiple and diverse sources of normativity, than
that which tends to be associated with an excessive focus on obligations, narrowly
construed. But, important though these larger questions are, they raise complex
and difficult issues which do not need to be addressed directly in the criticisms of
associative political obligations that are considered in what follows.
I want now to move on to consider more systematically the principal objections
to the idea of associative political obligations. These are sometimes directed
towards the idea of associative obligations in general, but some are focused more
narrowly on associative political obligations. Any adequate defence of associative
political obligations must, therefore, address both sorts of criticism, as a vindica-
tion of associative obligations in general, while necessary and important, would
not be sufficient. Probably the philosopher who has given the most sustained
critical attention to associative political obligations is A. J. Simmons, and I want to
repay that attention by organising my discussion largely around his arguments. He
characterises associative obligations as ‘a special moral requirement, attached to a
social role or position (including that of membership in a group), whose content
is determined by what local practice specifies as required for those who fill that
role or position’ (Simmons, 1996, p. 253). He would, I think, agree with...

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